MASTER 

NEGA  TIVE 
NO.  93-81425 


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AUTHOR: 


TAYLOR,  ISAAC 


TITLE: 


ELEMENTS  OF  THOUGHT 


PLACE: 


NEW  YORK 


DA  TE : 


1851 


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COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 


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Madison  Ave.  and  49th  Street,  New  York. 
Beshle  t/w  main  topic,  this  book  also  treats  of 
Subject  No.  On  page         \  Subject  No.  On  page 


ELEMENTS  OF  TirOUGH[Ei 


/ , 


v: 


OR, 


CONCISE    EXPLANATIONS 


or    THB 


PRINCIPAL   TERMS    EMPLOYED   IN   THE   SEVERAL  BRANCHES 


or 


INTELLECTUAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


; 


ISAAC    TAYLOUr  ] 


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Sibi  pcrmissits,  mullum  vjtlet. 

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SECOND    AMER 


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FROM      THE      NINTH      LONDON      EDITION. 


NEW  YORK  : 
WILLIAM    GOWANS 


1851. 


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rREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION. 


R.    CRAIGHEAD,    PRINTER    AND   STEREOTVPER, 
112   FULTON   STREET. 


The  design  of  this  volume  is  to  impart,  in  ci  familiar  form, 
elementory  explanations  and  instructions  on  subjects  connected 
with  the  intellectual  faculties;  to  afford  gradual  and  easy 
exercises  to  the  powers  of  abstraction ;  and  thus  to  conduct 
the  young  reader,  by  an  accessible  path,  into  that  region  of 
thought  where  the  mind  acquires  force,  accuracy,  and  com- 
prehension. 

A  writer  who  invites  the  attention  of  young  persons  to 
subjects  which  demand  a  continued  effort  of  thought,  is 
tempted  to  win  that  attention  by  some  promise  of  amuse- 
ment; or  to  profess  that  he  has  the  art  of  communicating 
knowledge  without  the  cost  of  labor  on  the  part  of  those  who 
receive  it.  No  such  promise  or  profession  can  be  offered  in 
the  present  instance.  The  author  believes  that  when  the 
object  intended  is  to  give  tone  and  vigor  to  the  understanding 
by  exertion,  trivial  digressions  and  gaieties  of  style  should  be 
avoided.  Relaxation  from  efforts  of  attention  is  perhaps 
always  better  provided  for  away  from  books  than  in  them  ;  or 
at  least  it  should  be  entirely  disjoined  from  serious  studies. 

The  writer,  therefore,  does  not  treat  his  young  readers  as 
children,  who  must  be  allured  by  the  promise  of  entertain- 
ment to  advance  in  the  course  of  mental  improvement,  and 
to  whom  knowledge  must  be  administered,  like  a  nauseous 
drug  concealed  in  a  sweetmeat.  On  the  coiitrarv,  he  boldly 
claims  their  undiverted  attention  ;  he  invites  them  to  THijsK, 


15112 


m^ 


.  ^  I  i»    ■  —  1  « I  >  1 1   »'^<«*« 


IV 


PREFACE     TO     THE     FIRST     EDITION. 


and  suggests  no  inducements  besides  the  proper  pleasures  and 
advantages  of  intellectual  cultivation.  He  has  indeed  endea- 
vored to  make  this  introduction  to  the  study  of  the  raind  as 
familiar  and  intelligible  as  possible,  and  has  presumed  upon 
no  higher  quali6cations  in  his  young  reader  than  an  ordinary 
measure  of  intelligence — a  moderate  proOcieucy  in  the  several 
branches  of  education,  together  with  a  deliberate  and  efficient 
desire  for  the  improvement  of  the  mind. 

In  explanation  of  the  form  into  which  these  elementary 
instructions  are  thrown,  it  may  be  proper  to  say,  that  the 
writer  has  been  guided  by  the  opinion  that  comprehensive 
and  systematical  books  are  little  adapted  to  the  purpose  of 
initiation  in  studies  of  the  kind  to  which  this  volume  relates. 
A  treatise  on  any  branch  of  intellectual  philosophy,  if  it  be 
complete  and  Sf/stcmaticalj  must  include  many  topics  which 
no  simplicity  or  perspicuity  of  stylo  can  render  easily  compre- 
hensible. One  portion  of  the  book  may  l>c  readily  under- 
stood, while  another  portion,  though  not  h.vss  lucid  in  ius  style, 
may  baffle  the  etl'urts  of  the  unexercised  fieulties;  and  thus 
perhaps  may  occasion  to  the  youthful  reader  tinal  discourage- 
ment and  disgust.  The  writer,  therefore,  has  not  aimed  to 
compose  regular  elements  either  of  Metiiphysics  or  of  Logic, 
believing  that  the  fii*st  book  whieh  is  put  into  the  hands  of 
a  young  person  with  the  view  of  inviting  his  attention  to 
objects  purely  intellectual,  should  be  rather  select  than  com- 
preh<^nsive  in  its  topics. 


r 


LIBHARV  ; 


mxT.-h  mdm>  fh,jt**-  V  -* 


ADVERTISEMENT 


TO    THE     NINTH    EDITION 


In  sending  this  little  volume  again  to  the  press,  after  the 
lapse  of  several  years,  the  author  has  been  induced  to  rewrite 
it;  and  although  he  Las  retained  portions  of  the  original 
work,  has  superseded  more,  and  has  thrown  the  whole  into  a 
new  form. 

The  volume  is  now  offered  to  the  public,  first,  as 

A    BOOK    OF    REFERENCE, 

to  which  recourse  may  be  had  by  those  who  are  not  fully  and 
familiarly  conversant  with  Intellectual  IMiilosophy,  when 
explanation  is  needed  of  those  abstract  and  scientific  words 
which  occur  in  the  course  of  reading  the  best  authors,  and 
which  find  a  place,  more  or  less  frequently,  in  the  conversation 
of  the  educated  classes.  It  is  especially  with  a  view  to  facili- 
tate this  use  of  the  book,  that  the  articles  have  been  placed 
in  alphabetic  order. 

The  author  has,  furthermore,  borne  in  view  the  advantage 
of  those,  who,  although  neither  their  tastes  nor  their  oppor- 
tunities may  admit  of  their  engaging  in  the  study  of  Intel- 
lectual Philosophy,  or  of  their  perusing  larger  works,  would 


VI 


ADVERTISEMENT 


A 


TO      THE     NINTH     EDITION. 


VJl 


gladly  acquire  some  general  knowledge  of  these  subjects, 
such  as  should  be  at  once  correct,  precise,  and  easily  retained. 
The  author  is  not  aware  that  any  modern  work,  except  his 
own,  is  to  be  met  with  adapted  to  the  use  of  the  class  of 
readers  he  is  now  speaking  of;  and  ho  has  especially  endea- 
vored to  suit  his  style  to  the  range  of  such  persons.  The 
method  he  recommeds  them  to  pursue,  in  availing  themselves 
of  his  labors,  is,  after  perusing  the  preliminary  synthetical 
explanation  of  terms,  to  read  each  article  of  the  vocabulary  in 
the  order  in  which  it  occurs  in  the  synthesis ;  by  which  means 
the  whole  will  present  itself  as  a  connected  system  (though 
brief  indeed)  of  the  three  principal  branches  of  Intellectual 
Study,  and  so  form  a  compendious 

SUMMARY    OF    MENTAL    SCIENCE. 

There  is  yet  another,  and  a  very  important  purpose  to 
which  the  author  would  fain  believe  his  little  volume  may  be 
found  applicable ;  he  means  that  of  catechetical  instruction 
in  schools  on  these  subjects,  indispensable  as  they  are  to 
a  good  education.  The  book  is  therefore  explicitly  offered 
to  Tutors  and  Teachers  as 

A    CLASS    BOOK    OF    PUILOSOrUIC    THEMES  ; 

and  without  presuming  to  dictate  to  those  whose  experience 
in  the  arduous  business  of  education  qualifies  them  to  select 
the  most  eflicient  and  practicable  methods  of  instruction,  the 
author  suggests,  that  each  pupil,  having  first  been  directed  in 
what  way  to  avail  himself  of  the  prefixed  synthesis  of  terms, 
as  a  means  of  bringing  together  the  several  articles  that  are 
naturally  related  one  to  the  other,  should  then  (the  books 
being  laid  aside)  express,  in  writing,  his  sense  of  each  article, 
and  that,  after  a  short  interval,  the  class  should  be  ques- 
tioned on  the  chief  points  of  the  three  branches  of  Intellectual 


Science ;  as,  for  example,  the  Teacher  asks  for  a  definition  of 
MIND,  as  distinguished  from  matter  ;  he  next  inquires  what 
correspondence  mind  has  with  matter,  and  by  what  means, 
namely,  the  senses  for  perception,  and  the  nervous  muscular 
system  for  the  exertion  of  its  innate  power  of  resisting  and 
moving  matter.  He  goes  on  to  interrogate  on  the  difference 
of  those  several  states  of  the  mind  which  connect  it  with  the 
external  world ;  and  in  doing  so  will  find  it  easy  to  render 
the  subject  at  once  intelligible  and  attractive  by  illustrations 
1^  readily  drawn  from  familiar  experience,  or  from  the  regions 
of  poetry. 

A  single  branch  of  any  of  these  subjects  may  be  quite 
^M  enough  to  fill  the  portion  of  time  allotted  to  the  exercise  ;  or 
the  rule  might  be  to  assume  the  words  belonging  to  one 
paragraph  of  the  synthesis  as  the  materials  of  each  catecheti- 
cal lecture.  Thus,  for  instance,  the  terms  of  physical  science 
(page  12)  would  be  explained  on  one  occasion,  those  belong- 
ing to  the  proof  of  historical  facts  (pages  12  and  13)  on 
another ;  and  again  the  phrases  of  argumentation  at  a  differ- 
ent time. 

The  author  will  only  subjoin  a  hint  to  the  Teacher  on  the 
importance  of  imparting  to  the  pupil,  and  of  maintaining  in 
his  own  mind,  a  clear  conception  of  the  essential  independ- 
ency and  dissimilarity  of  those  three  branches  of  study, 
namely — the  science  of  the  mind,  or  its  Physiology— Meta- 
phyics,  or  the  philosophy  of  abstraction — and  Logic,  or  the 
science  and  art  of  acquiring  and  communicating  knowledge  ; 
since  from  confounding  these  subjects,  not  only  does  the  mind 
lose  itself  in  endless  obscurities,  but  is  liable  to  practical 
mistakes,  in  matters  of  opinion,  which  are  easily  avoided  if 
the  distinction  be  kept  in  view. 

Without  attributing  a  paramount  importance  to  the  culti- 
vation of  Intellectual  Science— physical  or  abstract— it  may 


T 


Vlll        ADVERTISEMENT    TO    THE    NINTH    EDITION. 

fairly  be  affirmed,  that  a  well  conducted  and  early  initiation 
in  this  branch  of  philosophy  secures  a  mental  advantage  of 
great  practical  value ;  and  which,  if  it  were  generally  possessed, 
would  go  far  in  accelerating  the  universal  diffusion  of  the 
highest  Truths. 

November,  1833. 


I        » 


SYNTHESIS, 


OR 


SYSTEMATIC  VIEW   OF    THE    TERMS    EXPLAINED 

IN    THIS    VOLUME. 


The  terms  employed  in  the  several  departments 
of  abstract  and  mental  science  are  readily 
separable  into  Three  Classes : — 

The  First  Class,  containing  those  which 
belong  to  the  Physiology  of  the  human  Mind  ; 
and  which  designate  its  several  faculties,  and 
modes  of  feeling,  and  acting ;  such,  for  example, 
as  sensation^  emotion,  itnagination,  Sfc, 

The  Second  Class  comprehends  those  terms 
which  represent  purely  abstract  notions,  such  as 
essence,  extension,  space,  power,  substance,  mode, 
&c.,  and  which  belong  to  Metaphysics. 

The  Third  Class  are  those  that  express  the 
operations  of  the  Mind,  its  methods,  and  its 
artificial  processes,  in  acquiring  and  in  com- 
municating knowledge.  These  terms  belong 
to  Logic. 

I 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 

We  have  therefore  before  us — 
1st.  Mental  Philosophy,  which  treats  of  the 
nature  of  the  Mind  ; 

2d.  Metaphysics,  or  the  science  of  Abstrac- 
tion ; 

3d.  Logic,  or  the  method  of  gaining  know- 
ledge for  ourselves,  and  of  conveying  it  to 
others. 


CLASS  L 

TERMS    BELONGING    TO    THE    PHYSIOLOGY    OF 

THE    MIND. 

The  Mind  is  that  which  feels,  and  knows, 
and  thinks  ;  or  which  is  conscious  of  existence ; 
and  is  distinguished  from  Matter,  which 
affects  the  mind  through  the  senses;  and  is 
moved  by  the  voluntary  effort  of  the  mind, 
exerted  through  the  muscles. 

That  Consciousness  of  existence  which 
belongs  to  the  mind,  and  which  extends  with- 
out interruption  from  one  period  of  life  to 
another,  imparts  the  notion  and  conviction  of 
personal  Identity. 

The  human  Mind  is  distinguished  from  the 
brute  mind,  not  only  by  the  greater  extent  of 
its  faculties,  and  especially  of  the  faculty  of 


— ■  t-^^a^^^i  r^^t  <kJfcj« 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT.  3 

abstraction ;  but  by  its  being  guided,  in  almost 
all  its  operations,  by  its  •  knowledge  of  the 
connexion  of  cause  and  effect  :  whereas, 
animals  are  more  often  guided  by  an  unknown 
influence,  called  Instinct,  than  by  any  calcula- 
tion of  means,  as  conducing  to  an  end  ;  or  by 
a  knowledge  of  consequences.  The  words 
Reason  and  Instinct  are  used  to  express  this 
important  difference  between  man  and  animals. 
Whenever  the  state  of  the  mind  is  changed  by 
some  cause  exterior  to  itself  it  is  said  to  be  the 
subject  of  an  Impression. 

The  Mind  is  conscious  of  impressions  from 
the  external  world  through  the  organs  of  sight, 
hearing,  taste,  smell,  and  touch :  changes  in  its 
feehngs,  so  produced,  are  called  Sensations; 
and  when  two  or  more  sensations,  coming  from 
the  same  object,  through  different  senses,  lead 
the  Mind  to  think  of  that  object  as  an  external 
cause  of  its  feelings,  it  is  said  to  perceive,  or  to 
have  a  Perception.  The  recalling  of  a  former 
perception,  or  sensation,  is  Conception.  The 
mental  image,  so  recalled,  is  an  Idea  ;  and  is 
distinguished  from  a  Notion,  which  is  a 
thought,  purely  mental  or  abstract. 

Independently  of  any  act  or  effort  of  the 
mind,  there  is  incessantly  going  on  within  it  a 
Succession  of  Ideas  or  emotions ;  and  these 


fl 


ELEMENTS     OF     THOUGHT. 

ideas  follow  each  other  in  consequence  of  some 
circumstance  of  real  connexion,  or  of  accidental 
relationship.  This  is  called  the  Association 
OF  Ideas.  In  other  words,  there  is  a  something 
in  each  thought  which  brings  some  other  before 
the  mind ;  this  is  Suggestion.  When  former 
perceptions  or  emotions  recur  to  the  mind, 
attended  bj  circumstances  of  time  and  place, 
we  are  said  to  remember ;  and  the  power  of 
remembering  is  Memory. 

The  power  which  the  mind  possesses,  not 
only  of  recalling  ideas,  or  of  having  conceptions, 
but  of  separating  such  conceptions,  and  of 
recomposing  them  in  new  modes,  is  Imagina- 
tion. 

Besides  impressions  from  the  external  world, 
received  through  the  senses,  the  mind  is  liable 
to  feelings  which  arise  from  the  several  organs 
and  functions  of  the  body,  such  as  its  Appetites, 
and  other  corporeal  sensations.  It  is  moreover 
subject  to  states  of  feeling  which,  though 
belonging  to  the  Mind,  never  take  place  with- 
out,  at  the  same  time,  affecting  the  body,  either 
in  a  gentler  or  a  more  violent  degree :  these 
feeUngs  are  called  Emotions;  such  as  love, 
hatred,  fear,  wonder,  &^c. 

When  the  Mind  acts  in  bringing  together, 
comparing,  or  separating  its  ideas,  or  notions, 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT.  5 

it  exerts  its  Intellectual  powers.  The 
emotion  or  desire  to  know,  which  is  the  imme- 
diate cause  of  this  exertion,  produces  a  con- 
tinuance of  certain  ideas  or  notions  in  the  mind, 
longer  than  they  would  continue  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  the  succession  of  ideas.  This  act, 
producing  continued  thought,  is  Attention. 

If  two  or  more  objects  or  ideas  are  compared, 
and  the  relation  between  them  is  instantly 
perceived,  the  Mind  is  said  to  know  by  Intui- 
tion. When,  either  by  such  intuition,  or  by 
continued  attention,  the  relation  between  two 
ideas  is  perceived,  we  are  said  to  Apprehend. 

Single    properties,    or  sensible   qualities   of 
bodies,  or  the  parts  of  complex  notions,  are 
thought  of  separately  and  apart  from  all  other 
properties,  by  the  power  of  Abstraction.     This 
power  is  the  principal  distinction  of  the  human 
Mind.     The  power  of  considering  the  qualities 
of  things  apart,  leads  to  the  process  of  com- 
bining them  in  new  forms,  called  Invention. 
-     Two  or  more  objects  or  notions  are  detained 
before  the  Mind,  and   are  compared  the  one 
with  the  other,  and  their  agreement,  or  disa- 
greement, or  relative  proportion,  is  ascertained 
by  the  faculty  of  Judgment. 

Reasoning,  is  the  bringing  together  a  series 
of  things,  or  notions,  which  are  found  to  be 


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6 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


successively  dependent  one  upon  the  other,  or 
between  which  there  exists  a  real  connexion. 

The  principal  states  and  operations  of  the 
human  Mind,  considered  in  the  simplest  form, 
and  apart  from  all  the  diversities,  and  peculiari- 
ties, and  accidents  to  which,  in  individual  cases, 
it  is  liable,  are  designated  by  the  above-named 
terms. 

CLASS  II. 

ABSTRACT  OF  METAPHYSICAL  TERMS. 

The  notions  which  are  the  subject  of  the 
science  called  Metaphysics,  all  result  from  the 
faculty  of  Abstraction  ;  as,  for  example,  when 
various  objects  are  perceived,  and  compared, 
which  agree  in  form,  we  think  of  for7n  apart 
from  colour,  hardness,  Sfc.,  and  then  think  of  the 
several  sorts  of  form,  or  figure ;  as  round, 
square,  Sfc,  And  in  the  same  way  the  notions 
of  the  mind  are  separated,  and  compared,  and 
analysed,  and  combined.  These  abstract 
notions,  as  they  are  less  instantly  intelligible,  or 
less  readily  compared  than  sensible  images,  are 
often  called  Abstruse. 

From  our  own  consciousness,  after  separating 
from  it  all  idea  or  recollection  of  particular  states, 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 

or  emotions,  we  derive  the  simple  abstract  notion 
of  Existence  ;  otherwise  called  Being. 

All  the  sensible  and  inseparable  properties  of 
anything,  thought  of  together,  constitute  its 
Nature,  or  Essence  ;  and  we  think  of  this 
nature,  as  containing  a  hidden  something,  called 
Substance;  which  supports  or  sustains,  first, 
its  Primary  qualities,  or  those  essential  to  it ; 
and  then  its  Secondary  qualities,  which  are 
imagined  to  be  separable. 

These  qualities  are  the  Modes,  or  Affec- 
tions, or  Attributes,  or  Adjuncts,  or  Acci- 
dents, of  the  substance  in  which  they  are  found. 
The  entire  collection  of  properties  belonging 
to  a  substance  forms  the  Aggregate.  The 
qualities  spoken  of  as  so  associated  are  Con- 
crete ;  and  a  being,  or  a  notion,  consisting  of 
parts  or  qualities  that  may  be  abstracted  (in  idea) 
one  from  the  other,  is  Complex. 

The  thinking  of  two  things  or  notions 
together,  comparing  the  one  with  the  other,  gives 
the  notion  of  Relation  ;  which  may  be  the 
relation  of  Agreement,  or  of  Difference,  or  of 
Proportion,  or  of  Power. 

The  thought  of  a  quality  as  present,  or  as 
removed,  and  absent,  suggests  the  relative  notions 
of  Positive  and  Negative  modes. 

The  acquaintance  which  the  mind  gains  with 


8 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


matter,  by  its  own  sensations,  leads  it  to  form 
a  notion  from  which  all  particular  forms,  colors, 
and  other  variable  qualities,  are  withdrawn,  and 
which  we  call  Extension.  Removing  again 
from  this  notion  all  idea  of  the  sensible  proper- 
ties of  matter,  we  acquire  the  simple  abstract 
notion  of  Space.  By  a  similar  process  our 
general  consciousness  of  continued  existence, 
apart  from  particular  events,  suggests  the  notion 
of  Duration.  Extension  or  duration,  without 
limit,  is  Infinite. 

The  consciousness  which  the  Mind  has  of 
Its  ability  to  control  its  own  states,  and  to  move 
the  body,  gives  the  notion  of  Power     Whatever 
possesses,  or  is  supposed  to  possess  Power,  is 
called  Active:   that   which  is  acted  upon  is 
Passive.     That  which  exerts  Power,  or  which 
by   a   natural   prejudice,    is   thought   to  exert 
power,  is  a  cause ;  and  the  change  produced  is 
an  Effect.     Cause  and  Effect,  thought  of  as 
simply  connected  in  time,  are  called  Antece- 
dent, and  consequent.     Where  a  similar  order 
of  causes  is  supposed  to  exist  in  different  classes 
of  beings,  the  resemblance  or  sameness  is  ex- 
pressed by  the  word  Analogy. 

Power,  operating  without  restraint,is  Liberty. 
The  existence  of  restraint ;  or,  as  sometimes,  the 
infallible   connexion   of  causes   and  effects,  is 


ELEMENTS      OF     THOUGHT 


9 


called  Necessity,  and  is  opposed  to  Contin- 
gency; which  means  the  absence  of  any  real 
or  settled  connexion  of  causes  and  effects. 

When  the  established  order  of  causes  and 
effects  is  calculated  upon,  and  causes  are  put  in 
operation  with  an  express  view  to  obtain  the 
effects  they  will  produce,  this  intelligent  exercise 
of  power  is  Design.  Supposed  connexions  of 
cause  and  effect,  thought  of  as  contradictory,  or 
absurd ;  or  not  so,  give  the  notions  of  Possi- 
bility, and  Impossibility.  An  effect  which 
will  not  take  place,  unless  a  certain  cause  is 
assumed  as  present,  is  Conditional. 

This  synthesis  of  abstract  terms  might  be 
enlarged,  almost  without  end;  but  it  is  here 
purposely  confined  to  the  few  which  are  either 
of  principal  importance,  or  which  most  frequently 
occur  in  metaphysical  discussions. 

CLASS  III. 


logical  terms. 

Truths  which  are  not  intuitively  perceived, 
must  be  ascertained  by  successive  efforts  of  the 
mind  :  or  when  ascertained,  must  be  communi- 
cated to  others  in  successive  portions.  These 
methods  of  thinking  and  of  discoursing,  together 

1* 


mm 


^k^Mmmmmmi^^m^0,»^m  m  m  i»^^»^^  m^^^^^^m.^  m.  ^.^^^^^^ ^..y^j^^m.^.^^^^gyj^ ^ 


10 


ELEMENTS      OP      THOUGHT. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


11 


with  the  states  of  the  mind  in  relation  to  the 
subjects  of  its  knowledge,  are  designated  by  the 
following  terms,  which  may  be  arranged  under 
four  heads: — 1st.  Those  which  belong  to  the 
separation  and  sorting  of  ideas  or  notions.  2d. 
Those  that  relate  to  the  discovery  of  the  laws 
of  nature,  and  belong  to  physical  science.  3d. 
The  terms  that  are  connected  with  the  proof  of 
historical  facts.  4th.  The  terms  of  reasoning 
by  the  statement  of  successive  propositions. 

1st.  Terms  of  separation  and  sorting,  and 
which  belong  in  part  to  the  discovery,  but  more 
to  the  conveyance  and  preservation  of  know- 
ledge. 

Generally,  any  placing  of  multifarious  things 
in  sets  or  in  series,  for  the  ease  of  the  mind  in 
thinking,  or  in  learning,  is  Method;  of  which 
Order  is  either  the  means,  or  the  end,  according 
to  the  sense  in  which  that  word  is  understood. 
The  least  artificial  kind  of  method  is  that  of 
mere  Division  ;  which  reduces  many  to  a  few 
parcels.  But  if  many  things  are  sorted  with 
some  reference  (more  or  less  accurate)  to  their 
real  differences,  then  the  sorting  is  called  an 
Arrangememt  (in  reference  to  things) ;  or  a 
Disposition  (in  reference  to  thoughts).  After 
an  arrangement  has  been  planned,  the  things  for 


t 


II 


which  it  is  intended  are  assigned  to  their  places 
by  Distribution. 

A  more  exact  or  philosophical  sorting  of 
things  or  notions,  is  effected,  Jirst  by  an  effort 
of  abstraction  which,  when  completed,  in  relation 
to  a  complex  body  or  notion,  is  an  Analysis. 
After  an  analysis  has  been  completed  the  parts 
or  qualities  which  have  been  taken  asunder, 
may  be  re-composed  •  this  is  Synthesis. 

When  organized  bodies  (especially)  which  in 
some  things  are  alike,  and  in  some  unlike,  are 
sorted  according  to  their  resemblances  and 
differences,  the  process  is  Classification.  The 
larger  sets  or  sorts  are  genera;  and  the  smaller 
species.  Words  representing  many  individuals 
sorted  together,  are  common  terms.  A  question 
concerning  the  objects  of  common  terms,  gave 
rise  to  the  distinction  of  Nominal  and  Real. 

A  Definition  is  the  naming  of  the  larger 
sort,  or  genus,  to  which  any  thing  belongs;  and 
then  of  that  Difference  which  is  the  Distinc- 
tion, between  it,  and  others  of  the  same  genus. 
To  mention  more  differences  than  is  essential 
to  a  Definition,  is  to  give  a  Description. 

2d.  The  principal  terms  employed  in  relation 
to  the  discovery  of  the  laws  of  nature,  or  the 
terms  of  physical  science,  are  these :— 


12 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


13 


Any  natural  fact  or  event,  considered  as  an 
object  of  philosophical  curiosity,  is  a  Pheno- 
menon ;  or  facts  known,  and  which  are  to  be 
explained,  are  Data.  The  supposition  formed 
concerning  the  cause  of  a  phenomenon,  is  an 
Hypothesis.  A  complete  set  or  system  of  such 
suppositions,  is  a  Theory.  A  trial  made  for 
the  purpose  of  discovering  the  cause  of  an  effect, 
and  which  is  guided  by  some  hypothesis,  is  an 
Experiment.  The  inferring  of  general  facts, 
or  the  laws  of  nature,  from  many  particular  facts, 
is  Induction  ;  and  the  expressing  or  sorting  of 
such  laws  is  Generalization.  General  and 
well-established  truths,  in  matters  of  natural  phi- 
losophy, are  Science.  Special  truths,  applied 
to  human  industry,  constitute  an  Art. 

3d.  The  terms  belonging  to  the  proof  of  his- 
torical or  particular  facts,  are  these : 

The  subject  of  enquiry  is— a  Fact,  or  actual 
event,  not  known  to  us  by  personal  observation. 
In  support  of  the  affirmation  that  such  an  event 
has  taken  place,  we  seek  for  Evidence,  which 
may  be  either  human  Testimony,  or  other  facts, 
whence  an  inference  may  be  drawn,  bearing 
upon  the  matter  in  question.  If  this  evidence 
is  conclusive,  it  produces  Belief:  or  if  insuffi- 
cient, Doubt  :  and  then  the  fact  has  attached 


to  it,  in  our  minds,  the  idea  of  Probability,  or 
the  reverse.. 

If  the  matter  in  question  be  rather  an  abstract 
principle,  than  a  matter  of  historical  fact,  it  is 
established  by  Argument  ;  or  if  susceptible  of 
absolute  proof,  by  Demonstration.  The  con- 
viction produced  by  good  argument  is  Opinion  : 
or  if  that  conviction  be  influenced  by  improper 
motives,  it  is  Prejudice.  A  deceptive  or  un- 
sound argument,  is  a  Fallacy  ;  and  if  employed 
for  the  purpose  of  deluding  those  to  whom  it  is 
addressed,  it  is  a  Sophism. 

4th.  The  terms  employed  in  establishing  a 
truth  by  the  real  connexion  of  a  series  of  propo- 
sitions, or  Reasoning,  are  these : — 

That  which  is  the  object  of  the  process  is 
Truth.  Truths  when  so  evident  as  to  be  in- 
capable of  being  made  more  so,  are  Axioms. 
Axioms  from  which  many  inferences  are  to  be 
derived,  are  Principles.  All  reasoning  is  carried 
on  by  the  means  of  words,  or  other  arbitrary 

Signs. 

^ne   thing  affirmed   or  denied,  concerning 

mother,  is  a  Proposition.  The  words  express- 
ng  these  two  things  aud  their  connexion,  are 
he  Terms.  Terms  which  may  be  exchanged, 
•ne  for  another,  without  destroying  the  truth 


^^^■■^■''^^^^^^^^f^^M 


14 


«*  ^<fS^it^^,m^^i„^t^^m 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


"^'•■^■■-■■^■^^■■~—  - ,—  —  -)j —  - _f 


of  an  affirmation,  are  Convertible.  Terms 
which  inipli/,  one  the  other,  are  Correlative. 

A  positive  and  unconditional  proposition  is 
Categorical.  A  proposition  which  offers  for 
choice  one  affirmation  of  two,  is  a  Dilemma. 
Propositions  are  either  Affirmative,  or  Nega- 
tive ;  Indefinite,  Disjunctive,  or  Universal. 

The  thing  concerning  wbich  an  affirmation 
or  negation  is  made,  is  the  Subject  of  a  propo- 
sition.    The  thing  affirmed  is  the  Predicate. 

The  connecting  of  propositions,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  exhibiting  the  relation  which  subsists 
between  them,  is  a  Syllogism  ;  in  which  the 
facts  granted  are  called  the  premises;  the  fact 
inferred — the  Conclusion;  or  the  three  con- 
nected propositions,  are  called  the  Major, 
Minor,  and  Middle  terms. 


lil 


VOCABULARY,  &c. 


abstraction. 


From  Abstraho,  to  draw  off,  or  to  draw  apart ; 
or  to  separate  and  take  away  one  thing  from 
among  a  number. 

Things  that  differ  very  greatly,  one  from 
another,  are  often  found  to  be  alike  in  some 
single  quality;  and  when  this  one  quality  is 
distinctly  taken  notice  of,  we  readily  learn  to 
think  of  it  apart  from  the  other  quahties  with 
which  it  may  have  been  joined ;  and  thus  the 
mind  acquires  the  habit  of  drmving  of  certain 
properties  of  things,  and  of  giving  names  to 
them  :  tbis  habit  is  called  abstraction ;  and  the 
words  employed  on  such  occasions  are  called 
abstract  terms. 

There  are,  for  instance,  placed  before  us,  a 
cricket-ball,  a  marble,  a  glass  bubble,  an  apple, 
and  an  orange ;  and  we  are  asked  if  these  things 
are  alike ;  we  answer,  No  t  for  the  first  is  brown, 
and  may  be  indented ;  the  second  is  heavy,  and 


Ij/: 


16 


ELEMENTS   OP   THOUGHT. 


ELEMENTS   OF   THOUGHT. 


17 


K'Sp^.^Sp^^^^'^^ 


impenetrable;    the    third    is    transparent,  and 
fragile,  and  light ;  the  fourth  is  green  and  pulpy ; 
the  fifth  is  yellow  and  fragrant.     But  is  there 
then  no  respect  wherein  they  are  alike  1     Yes ; 
they  are  alike  in  shape,  or    form— they    are 
round.     Roundness  then  is  the  quality  or  cir- 
cumstance in  which  these  five  objects  agree,  and 
which  may  be  thought  of,  and  spoken  of,  apart 
from  the  tceight,  hardness,   color,  or   smell,  of 
these  five  things.  Thus  we  have  obtained  two 
abstract  ideas — namely,  that  of  form  or  figure, 
and  that  of  roundness;  roundness  being  a  par- 
ticular sort  of  form.     Examples  of  this  kind  are 
easily  multiplied ;  we  will  take  another.   Water, 
and  glass,  and  spirits,  and  diamonds,  admit  the 
rays  of  light  to   pass   through   them;  so  that 
objects  may  be  discerned  almost  as  clearly  when 
they   intervene,   as  when   they   are   removed. 
Some  other  bodies  possess  the  same  quality  in 
a  less  degree;  such  as  amber,  and  the  ame- 
thyst,  and  the  ruby,  &c.     We  want  a  name  for 
this  property,  belonging  as  it  does  to  things  so 
different  as  water,  glass,  and  stones;  and  we 
call  it  Transparency, 

Each  of  the  five  senses  has  its  class  of  ab- 
stractions ;  that  is  to  say,  each  sense  separates 
single  qualities  from  other  qualities,  discerned 
by  itself,  or  by  other  senses.     The  eye  separates 


redness  from  yellowness,  or  whiteness,  &c., 
and  brightness  from  duhiess ; — and  again  sepa- 
rates colour  from  figure,  and  it  separates 
colour  and  figure  from  the  notions  obtained 
by  the  other  senses,  such  as  hardness,  or 
weight,  or  fragrancy,  or  fluidity.  The  sense  of 
taste  not  only  distinguishes  sour  from  sweet  and 
bitter,  but  separates  them  from  the  qualities 
that  are  made  known  to  the  mind  by  the  sense 
of  touch,  as  heat  and  cold,  asperity  and 
softness,  &c. 

Thus  it  is  that  likeness,  or  sameness  of 
quality,  in  things  otherwise  unlike,  leads  the 
mind  to  form  abstract  notions,  and  to  use  ab- 
stract words.  But  having  acquired  this  habit, 
it  employs  the  power  of  separation  in  many 
other  instances  than  those  that  belong  to  the 
five  senses : — for  example.  If  a  man  restores 
freely  the  property  of  another,  which  he  could 
not  have  been  compelled  to  relinquish ;  or  if  he 
speaks  the  exact  truth  when  it  might  have  been 
advantageous  to  him  to  utter  a  falsehood ;  or  if 
in  any  way  he  regards  the  welfare  of  other  men, 
when  he  is  tempted  to  secure  his  own  benefit, 
we  form  a  notion  which  we  separate  from  the 
particular  circumstances  that  may  have  belonged 
to  the  man's  conduct ; — we  feel  that  there  is  a 
peculiar  quality,  that  belongs  to  his  conduct,  on 
all  these  several  occasions,  and  we  call  it — In- 


18 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


tegritj  ;  and  the  so  acting  is— Justice.     Justice 
is  not  the  name  of  one  action,  or  of  one  kind 
of  action ;    but  of  the  abstract  notion  which 
belongs  to  any  action  wherein  a  man  pays  strict 
regard  to  the  rights  and  property  of  others.     Or, 
if,  in  his  actions,  he  goes  beyond  what  might 
have  been  demanded  of  him  ; — if  he  prefers  the 
welfare  of  his  neighbour  to  his  own  ;  then  we 
form  the  notion  of  another  sort  of  quahty,  and 
call  it — Generosity,  or  kindness.     And  in  any 
new   instance,    even  if  all    the    circumstances 
are  different,  yet  if  a  friend  or  stranger  confers 
upon  us  a  benefit  which  he  might  properly  have 
withheld,  we  are  reminded  of  the  notion  we  had 
before  formed,  and  call  the  action  or  the  person 
generous. 

Some  abstract  notions  are  simple  ;  that  is  to 
say,  they  cannot  be  described  or  made  known 
otherwise  than  by  single  words,  or  by  pointing 
to  the  objects  in  which  they  are  to  be  seen  or 
felt.  Such  are,  redness,  whiteness,  heat,  cold, 
siveetness,  pleasure,  pain,  and  many  others.  If 
the  person  to  whom  we  would  convey  our  mean- 
ing has  never  himself  perceived  the  quality  we 
are  speaking  of,  we  cannot  impart  to  him  our 
idea  by  words :  or  if  he  does  not  understand 
the  word  we  first  use,  we  must  find  some  other, 
of  the  same  meaning; — if  he  does  not  know 
what  the  word  pain  means,  we  must  try  the  word 


K^i 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


19 


dolor,  or  some  other;  but  if  he  have  never  felt 
pain,  the  most  ingenious  description  of  it  would 
be  utterly  useless. 

But  there  are  abstract  notions  that  are  Com- 
plex, or  made  up  of  two  or  more  ideas ;  and 
may  therefore  be  described  by  mentioning  those 
constituent  ideas.  Thus  in  the  instances  al- 
ready mentioned,  Justice  may  be  described  as 
the  paying  a  strict  regard  to  the  rights  and  in- 
terests of  others  ;  or  the  not  preferring  our  own 
welfare  to  that  of  others.  Generosity  is  the 
conferring  of  benefits  upon  others  beyond  what 
they  could  claim.  Form  or  figure  is  the  rela- 
tion to  each  other  of  the  several  surfaces  of  a 
solid  body.  Distance  is  extension  between  two 
points,  divided  into  parts,  and  numbered.  Place 
is  the  relation  betw^een  one  point  and  some  other 
points  on  a  surface.  Perfection  is  the  existence, 
together,  of  all  the  parts  or  properties  that 
are  assigned  to  some  complex  body  or  being. 
Design  is  the  relation  of  all  the  parts  of  a  com- 
plex body  to  the  last  effect  which  it  is  intended 
to  produce.  Truth  is  the  relation  of  sameness 
between  things  and  our  notions  of  them ;  or  be- 
tween notions  and  thoughts,  and  our  affirmations. 
Liberty  is  the  absence  of  restraint  upon  choice 
or  action.  Necessity  is  the  certain  connexion 
between  cause  and  effect.     In  all  such  instances 


20 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


there  is  a  notion  conveyed  by  the  word  we  em- 
ploy which  admits  of  being  resolved  into  two 
or  more  ideas. 

Now  it  is  peculiarly  important  to  understand 
the  difference  between  simple  and  complex  ab- 
stract notions,  because,  on  the  one  hand,  much 
time  is  often  wasted  in  the  vain  attempt  to  de- 
scribe or  analyse  what  is  simple ;  and  on  the 
other  hand,  much  confusion  often  arises  from 
neglecting  to  analyse  notions  that  complex  : 
hence  it  is  that  so  many  words  are  used  in 
argument  to  which  the  disputants  attach  differ- 
ent ideas,  and  therefore  are  never  able  to  come 
to  an  agreement  even  when  they  are  really  of 
the  same  opinion.  It  is  a  good  exercise  to  de- 
fine or  analyse  complex  abstract  notions. 

The  faculty  of  abstraction,  conjoined  with 
the  use  of  language,  is  that  chiefly  which  dis- 
tinguishes human  nature,  and  raises  man  far 
above  all  other  animals. 

After  having  thought  of  certain  qualities  apart 
from  the  things  in  which  they  are  found,  the 
human  mind  takes  another  step,  and  proceeds 
to  bring  together  such  quahties,  and  to  compose 
them  in  new  forms  ; — this  is  Invention. 
The  same  faculty  enables  man  to  think  of  the 
quality,  or  goodness,  or  badness  of  actions,  and 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


21 


^^^^-^^^^H^t^^-^tlft,^ 


is  therefore  essential  to  accountableness,  and 
forms  the  basis  of  our  moral  nature. 

Those  differences  of  intellectual  character 
and  taste  which  distinguish  mankind  individu- 
ally, depend  very  much  upon  the  faculty  of 
abstraction.  One  man  possesses  eminently  the 
power  of  separating  color  from  form,  and  he 
becomes  a  painter :  another,  in  connexion  with 
sensibility  and  delicacy  of  tastes,  readily  sepa- 
rates or  draws  off  those  qualities  of  things  which 
excite  the  imagination,  and  he  becomes  a  poet : 
another  discerns  and  separates  the  mechanical 
properties  of  matter,  and  he  is  an  inventor  of 
machines  :  another  discriminates  mathematical 
properties,  and  he  addicts  himself  to  abstract 
science.  Each  department  of  science,  and 
each  walk  of  active  life,  has  its  peculiar  kind 
of  abstraction  ;  nor  can  a  man  be  very  success- 
ful in  any  line,  if  nature  has  denied  him  the 
special  faculty  which  is  demanded  in  that  line. 

What  is  called  a  natural  taste  for  particular 
pursuits  is  most  commonly  a  peculiar  power  of 
considering  some  one  class  of  qualities,  apart 
from  all  other  qualities  or  circumstances.  It  is 
well  when  the  choice  of  a  profession  is  made 
in  conformity  with  the  original  conformation 
of  the  mind. 


I! 


22 


ELEMENTS      OF     THOUGHT. 


ABSTRUSE. 

From  abstrudo,  to  hide,  or  thrust  out  of  sight. 
This  is  a  word  of  indefinite  meaning,  for  it 
may  be  applied  to  whatever  is  not  readily  un- 
derstood or  explained ;  and  that  which  to  one 
mind  is  very  obscure  or  difficult,  is  to  another 
perfectly  intelligible.  It  is  a  frequent  inaccu- 
racy to  confound  the  words  abstruse  and  abstract ; 
or  to  use  them  as  if  synonymous.  It  is  very  true 
that  abstract  notions  or  principles  are  often  ab- 
struse ;  or,  at  least,  may  seem  so  to  those  who 
are  not  conversant  with  subjects  of  that  sort. 

ACCIDENT. 

From  accido,  to  fall  close  by,  or  to  happen. 
When  used  in  its  philosophical  sense,  the  term 
accident  is  applied  to  some  quality,  or  property, 
or  condition,  which  does  not  invariably  belong 
to  the  thing  in  which  it  is  found,  or  which 
makes  no  part  of  its  essence  ;  as  heat  in  iron, 
polish  to  a  diamond,  learning  to  a  man. 


ACTIVE  and  PASSIVE. 


Whatever  produces  a  change  in  another  body 
is  active  :  the  body  which  undergoes  the  change 
is  passive.     The  same  being  may  at  one  time 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


23 


^h^M^^^^^^^^ 


be  active,  at  another  passive ;  or  at  one  and  the 
same  moment  may  be  in  part  active,  in  part 
passive.  Thus  the  human  rnind  is  often  at 
once  active  and  passive.  It  is  passive  when  it 
admits,  and  is  influenced  by  impressions  from 
the  senses ;  or  when  moved  by  the  appetites 
and  passions  that  belong  to  the  animal  or  moral 
constitution  ;  or  when  it  is  influenced  through 
the  medium  of  language,  by  other  minds ;  and 
also  when  it  merely  follows  the  current  of 
thought,  and  is  in  that  state  in  which  it  may  be 
likened  to  a  person  sitting  at  a  window,  who 
idly  gazes  at  the  crowd  that  passes  before  him. 
This  is  the  state  of  the  mind  in  sleep  ;  and  also 
in  what  is  called  reverie.  It  is  only  in  an  im- 
proper sense  that  we  can  be  said  to  think,  when 
thus  indolently  musing.  The  mind  acts,  either 
when  it  exerts  its  power  over  matter — that  is, 
over  the  muscles  of  the  body  ;  or  over  itself,  by 
directing,  changing,  or  fixing  at  pleasure,  the 
course  of  its  thoughts.  The  possession  of  this 
active  power  is  essential  to  what  is  termed 
moral  agency,  or  accountableness ;  without  it, 
the  mind,  like  the  minds  of  animals,  is  swayed 
and  governed  by  external  and  internal  influences. 
The  same  power  shows  itself  in  all  those  acts 
of  life  by  which  man  raises  his  condition  above 


24 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


that  of  the  brutes.  Energy  and  dignity  of 
character  bear  proportion  to  the  degree  in  which 
the  mind  is  more  active  than  passive. 

If  the  human  mind  were  merely  ruled,  from 
one  moment  to  another,  by  its  appetites  and 
passions,  it  would  never  imagine  a  better  con- 
dition than  the  one  it  is  in,  nor  fix  its  attention 
upon  the  means  proper  to  attain  an  end.  What 
is  called  attention,  is  the  exercise  of  the  active 
principle  of  the  mind.  It  is  usual  to  speak  of 
physical  causes  as  active ;  but  when  any  series 
of  natural  changes  is  scrutinized,  it  appears  that 
what  at  first  we  called  a  cause,  is  itself  the 
effect  of  some  preceding  event,  which  was,  in 
its  turn,  also  an  effect  We  come,  at  length,  to 
what  are  called  the  hidden  powers  of  nature, 
such  as  gravitation — chemical  affinity — the  prin- 
ciple of  life,  and  so  forth ;  and  these,  though 
beyond  human  knowledge,  are,  probably,  them- 
selves only  effects  of  some  relation  between  one 
element  and  another.  Strictly  speaking,  Mind 
is  the  only  active  principle.  The  movements 
of  nature  are  the  effects  of  the  Divine  Mind. 
The  changes  that  take  place  in  the  world  of 
living  and  conscious  beings,  are  the  effects  of 
the  living  power  which  the  Creator  has  im- 
parted to  man  and  animals. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


25 


ADJUNCT, 

From  adjunctum,  joined  to.  The  words  ad- 
junct and  accident  are  thus  distinguished  ; — an 
accident  is  a  quality  or  condition  that  may  or 
may  not  belong  to  the  thing  spoken  of:  an  ad- 
junct is  a  thing  which  may  or  may  not  be  at- 
tached to  something  else.  The  binding  is  an 
adjunct  of  a  book :  the  brightness  of  the  paper, 
and  blackness  of  the  ink,  are  its  accidents. 
Praise  is  an  adjunct  of  virtue;  celebrity,  of 
genius.  Mental  refinement,  or  taste,  is  an  ac- 
cident of  virtue ;  self-confidence,  of  genius. 


AFFECTIOxV. 

From  affectus,  changed  or  qualified  by  the 
operation  of  some  cause.  The  properties  of 
any  body  are  called  its  affections,  in  distinction 
from  the  matter  or  substance  of  the  body,  which 
we  are  prone  to  think  of  as  a  something  to 
which  its  properties  are  attached.  In  trutli,  we 
are  acquainted  with  nothing  but  those  qualities 
or  affections,  which  make  themselves  known  to 
us  through  the  senses ;  and  all  the  usual  quali- 
ties, taken  together,  are,  so  far  as  our  know- 
ledge extends — all  the  thing.  The  distinction, 
therefore,  between  substance  and  affection,  is 
not  real  or  important.     This,  and  many  such 


26 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


terms,  though  still  occasionally  employed,  belong 
to  the  obsolete  metaphysics  and  logic  which 
were  in  fashion  two  centuries  ago. 


AFFIRMATIVE  and  NEGATIVE, 

Are  terms  belonging  to  the  art  of  reasoning 
and  of  disputation.  All  discourse  may  be  re- 
solved into  a  series  of  propositions,  each  of 
which  declares  or  asserts  that  somethings  or  is 
not ;  may  be,  or  may  not  be ;  that  one  thing  is 
equal,  or  like  to,  unequal,  or  unlike  to,  some 
other  thing.  Every  verb  with  its  nominative ; 
or,  if  it  be  transitive,  with  its  nominative  and 
objective  cases,  is  an  affirmative  proposition ; 
or  becomes  a  negative  one  by  the  addition  of  a 
negative  particle.  The  altered  termination 
w^hich  fixes  the  tense  of  the  verb  is  a  concise 
way  of  attaching  to  the  affirmation  another 
affirmation,  which  conveys  the  time  of  the 
alleged  fact.  Again,  the  mood  is  a  third  affir- 
mation, succinctly  attached  to  the  principal  one, 
and  which  declares  the  circumstances  of  possi- 
bility, or  doubt,  or  desire,  which  belong  to  it. 
An  adverb  is  another  condensed  proposition, 
attached  to  the  first.  For  example, — **  Alex- 
ander might  long  have  ruled  the  world."  This 
affirmation  contains  four  distinct  assertions,  as, 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


27 


1st,  an  implied  negative ;— Alexander  did  not 
long  govern  the  world.  2d,  An  affirmative  im- 
plied ;— Alexander  had  the  pow  er  of  long  go- 
verning the  world  ;— ^.  e,  if  he  had  restrained 
his  appetites  and  passions.  3d,  An  affirmation 
of  the  time;— he  inight  have  done  so:  viz.  in 
that  distant  age  in  which  he  lived.  4th,  An 
affirmative  conclusion  ;— If  Alexander  had  not 
destroyed  himself,  it  is  probable  that  his  con- 
quests would  have  remained  in  his  possession 
to  the  end  of  the  longest  term  of  human  life. 

We  do  not  often  stop  to  recollect  how  much 
meaning  is  condensed  within  five  or  six  words 
by  the  aid  of  grammatical  forms.     If  it  were 
not  that  these  methods  of  compression  enable 
language   to    keep  pace  with  the  rapidity  of 
thought,  it  would  be  almost  useless  as  a  medium 
of  intercourse ;  for  the  mind  could  not  confine 
itself  to  a  movement  so  very  much  slower  than 
that  which  is  natural  to  itself     Let  any  one 
attempt  to  listen  continuously  to  a  narrative, 
every  word  of  which  should   be  spelt  by  the 
speaker ;  he  would  find  it  utterly  impossible  to 
do  so. 


AGENT. 


Whatever  is  supposed  to  be  endowed  with 
power  is  called  an  agent.     When  the  word  is 


28 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


applied  to  physical  causes — as  we  speak  some- 
times of  chemical  or  mechanical  agents,  it  is 
understood  to  be  used  in  a  tropical  or  improper 
sense.  Strictly  speaking,  Minds  are  the  only 
agents.     See  Active,  Power,  and  Cause. 


AGGREGATE, 

From  dggrego,  to  gather  together  as  a  flock 
of  sheep.  Things  which,  when  collected  or 
brought  into  contact,  form  a  whole  in  the  mind 
only,  and  are  not  susceptible  of  any  actual  com- 
bination, may  be  said  to  form  an  aggregate.  The 
word  is  used  with  the  strictest  propriety  when 
the  things  or  qualities  so  associated  make  up 
some  complete  abstract  notion. 

The  aggregate  of  qualities,  acquirements, 
natural  advantages,  and  external  recommenda- 
tions, which  are  necessary  to  form  an  accom- 
plished statesman,  or  a  successful  advocate, 
comprise  many  special  endowments,  or  faculties, 
which  would  not  be  called  for  to  complete  the 
character  of  an  accomplished  gentleman.  We  • 
form  an  abstract  notion  of  what  a  statesman  or 
lawyer  ought  to  be ;  and  the  pecuHar  qualities 
which  we  think  of  as  necessary,  make  up  the 
aggregate  of  his  endowments. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


29 


AGREEMENT, 

Is  something  less  than  absolute  sameness. 
Identity  excludes  every  difference,  even  of  sub- 
stance or  person.  Sa?neness  implies  the  pre- 
sence of  two  or  more  things,  which  being  com- 
pared, are  found  to  have  no  other  difference 
than  that  of  substantial  or  personal  identity. 
Agreement  may  subsis't  between  things  that  are 
alike  only  in  one  quality,  or  in  one  point  of  rela- 
tionship. John  yesterday,  and  John  to-day,  is 
identically  one  and  the  same  person.  Two  circles 
struck  with  the  same  radius,  are  the  same  in  all 
respects,  except  absolute  identity.  Between  a 
chest  of  tea  and  a  bale  of  raw  silk,  there  may 
be  an  agreement  of  exchangeable  value ;  that 
is  to  say,  the  one  may  be  purchasable  by  the 
same  number  of  pieces  of  money  as  the  other. 


ANALOGY ; 

From  avaXoyia,  couformlty  of  reason,  or  causa- 
tion. Analogy  is  a  real  or  true  agreement,  or 
similarity  of  causes.  A  similarity  in  appear- 
ances, or  in  effects,  or  in  incidental  circumstances, 
is  the  foundation  of  metaphor,  allegory,  emblem, 
and  rhetorical  figure.  Analogy  addresses  itself 
to  the  reasoning  faculty.  Allegory  and  meta- 
phor address  the  imagination.     Analogy,  care- 


''^i^*^^^^^tl0a^^l^0*0*0^l^0^0^0^ 


30 


ELEMENTS     OF     THOUGHT 


fully  pursued,  may  afford  a  solid  foundation  of 
argument.     Metaphors  prove  nothing,  and  are 
useful  only  in  the  way  of  illustration,  or  embel- 
lishment.    Whenever  we  anticipate  or  predict 
certain  effects  to  take  place,  on  the  supposition 
that  certain  causes,  with  which  in  some  other 
case  we  have  become  acquainted,  are  in  opera- 
tion, we  reason  from  analogy.     After  it  had 
been  observed  that  rice  flourishes  in  the  hot  and 
humid  plains  of  Egypt,  it  was    by  reasoning 
from  analogy  that  it  was  inferred  that  it  might 
advantageously   be    cultivated    in    the    sultry 
swamps  of  Carolina.     The  heat  of  the  climate 
and  the  abundance  of  water,  are  presumed  to 
be  the  causes  of  the  productiveness  of  rice ; 
and  it   is   inferred  that  an  ardent  sun  and  a 
marshy  soil  will,    in   any  country,   favor   the 
growth  of  the  same  species  of  grain.     We  rea- 
son from  analogy  when  we  suppose  that  the 
stars,  like  the  sun,  are  surrounded  with  planets, 
which  derive  from  them  light  and  heat.     The 
same  Divine   WisdiiUi  which  is  seen  to  have 
made  this  admirable  arrangement  in  one  in- 
stance, is  presumed  to  have  made  it  also  in  others. 
When  we  see  that  every  part  of  the  earth's 
surface,  and  every  drop  of  water,  is  crowded 
with  animated  beings,  we  reason  from  analogy 
in   supposing   that   the   Divine    Benevolence, 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


31 


which  has  filled  one  spot  of  his  universe  with 
life,  has  done  the  same  in  other  places  of  his  do- 
minion. The  strength  of  such  an  argument 
from  analogy  consists  in  an  implied  series  of 
propositions  of  this  sort :  The  Divine  Wisdom 
and  Goodness  display  themselves  around  us  in 
the  production  of  innumerable  orders  of  sentient 
beings.  These  attributes  of  the  Divine  nature 
are  unchanging  and  universal.  They  are  pre- 
sent in  one  system  as  well  as  in  another.  It  is 
therefore  certain  that  they  produce  alike  in  all 
systems  their  proper  effects,  unless  some  special 
reason  interposes  to  confine  them.  An  argu- 
ment from  analogy  is  strong ;  but  not  absolutely 
conclusive,  or  demonst?'ative  ;  because,  as  we 
carry  our  reasoning  from  a  circle  that  is  known 
to  us,  to  one  that  is  unknown,  we  can  never  be 
assured  that  there  may  not  be,  within  that  un- 
known sphere,  some  antagonist  cause  at  work, 
of  which,  in  our  own  sphere,  we  see  no  traces. 
Nevertheless,  an  argument  from  analogy  falls 
very  little  short  of  demonstrative  force,  when 
we  reason  upward  from  effects  to  causes;  or 
infer  that  causes  must  be  the  same^  when  the 
effects  are  so.  As  if  it  were  found  that  rice 
flourishes  wherever  the  climate  is  hot,  and  the 
soil  humid,  we  might,  with   confidence,  infer 


mtf 


32 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


that  heat  and  huniiditj  are  ia  some  manner  the 
causes  of  the  productiveness  of  that  grain. 

It  is  an  argument  of  this  latter  kind  which 
has  been  so  successfully  pursued  by  Bishop 
Butler,  in  his  Analogy  of  Natural  and  Revealed 
Religion,  wherein  he  shows  that  the  same  great 
principles  which  take  effect  in  the  world,  as  we 
see  it  to  be  constituted,  prevail  also  in  the  sys- 
tem of  Christianity  ;  whence  it  maybe  inferred 
that  both  proceed  from  the  same  Author.  Or  at 
least  Christianity  can  never  be  reasonably  re- 
jected on  pretence  that  it  is  irreconcileable 
with  the  actual  constitution  of  the  moral  sys- 
tem, for  a  strict  analogy  subsists  between  the 
two. 

Errors  in  argument  very  frequently  arise  from 
confounding  resemblances  or  metaphors,  with 
analogies.  Minds  imperfectly  cultivated,  are 
peculiarly  open  to  this  sort  of  mistake.  The 
beauty  or  appropriateness  of  some  comparison, 
captivates  the  imagination,  and  imposes  on  the 
understanding ;  and  so  truth  is  lost  sight  of 
amid  the  illusions  of  poetry.  Thus,  for  exam- 
ple, it  may  be  said  that  the  mind  of  man  is  like 
a  garden,  which,  if  neglected,  will  become 
choked  with  rank  and  noxious  vegetation  ;  but 
which,  when  sedulously  cultivated,  produces 
whatever   is   beautiful,  fragrant,  delicious,   and 


♦ 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


33 


useful.  So  far  the  resemblance  holds  good; 
and  the  metaphor  well  serves  the  purpose  of 
illustration.  But  if  a  real  analogy  between  the 
vegetable  world  and  the  intellectual  and  moral 
system  were  presumed  to  exist,  many  utterly 
erroneous  consequences  might  be  drawn  from 
it : — as  for  instance,  it  might  then  be  said  that, 
though  the  feeble  tribes  of  the  garden  may  need 
culture,  the  robust  and  magnificent  species  of 
the  forest  spurn  the  hand  of  art,  and  tower  the 
highest  where  they  are  the  least  interfered  with : 
— and  so  that  the  noblest  natures  can  receive 
no  advantage  from  culture  !  This  were  to  argue 
on  the  absurd  supposition  that  the  internal  struc- 
ture of  oaks,  and  of  human  minds  is  the  same. 

ANALYSIS, 

From  avaXuw,  to  unloose  or  dissolve.  Abstrac- 
tion is  the  separation  of  some  single  quality  or 
property  from  all  others,  without  giving  any 
attention  to  those  other  qualities.  Analysis  is 
the  separation  of  some  compound  body  into  its 
several  component  parts,  while  we  give  equal 
attention  to  all  those  parts  or  elements.  Abstrac- 
tion carries  the  mind  from  object  to  object, 
wherever  a  certain  quality  can  be  detected. 
Analysis  fixes  the  mind  upon  a  single  object, 

2* 


>  m  mm> 


lam^^i^t^m^ 


^A^^^k^N^S^ta^^tfl^^^^^^^^l^^^^^^^^^^ 


•■  —  -^^■^-^'^^—  —  '^'-■^'^—'^—■^  — ^ "^""i^u — Ln i.rinfLn_n.rij~j~i, 


84 


ELEMENTS      OP      THOUGHT. 


until  all  its  parts  have  been  brought  to  light. 
In  chemistry,  analysis  is  the  separation  of  all 
the  elements  that  may  be  combined  in  any  sub- 
stance. Thus,  atmospheric  air,  when  analysed, 
is  found  to  consist  of  two  gases,  and  often  to 
contain  some  portion  of  others.  Water  is  the 
union  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen.  Chemical 
phrases  express,  in  a  concise  manner,  those  com- 
binations that  have  been  discovered  by  analysis. 
The  notions  or  feehngs  of  the  mind  admit  also 
of  being  analysed;  and  to  do  so  with  absolute 
precision,  requires  a  peculiar  excellence  of  the 
intellectual  faculties;  an  excellence  which  is  the 
principal  ingredient  in  the  philosophic  character. 
The  power  of  abstraction,  and  the  power  of 
analysis,  when  both  possessed  in  an  eminent 
degree,  fit  the  mind  to  pursue  the  higher  and 
more  abstruse  branches  of  science. 

An  analysis  of  the  notions,  sensations,  or 
states  of  the  mind,  demands  close  attention,  and 
some  practise  also,  to  effect  it  with  absolute  pre- 
cision. An  easy  example  or  two  of  this  sort  of 
analysis  may  thus  be  given. — We  suppose  there 
to  be  now  present  to  the  mind  the  idea  of  a 
country  mansion,  with  its  garden,  and  lawn, 
and  shrubbery.  This  idea,  or  image,  or  mental 
picture,  as  we  might  call  it,  though  made  up  of 
various  parts,  is  yet  all   of  one  kind :  it  is  a 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


35 


mental  perception  of  objects  which  have  actually 
passed  through  the  organ  of  vision.     But  we 
now  suppose  there  to  be  joined  to  this  image  a 
feeling  or  conviction,  that  the  image  is  not  com- 
pounded by  the  fancy;  but  that  it  corresponds 
to  a  real  object,  and  that  we  have  seen  that 
object,  at  a  certain  past  time :  the  image  is  con- 
nected in  the  mind  with  a  train  of  events — a 
journey,  or  a  visit.   This  conviction  is  expressed 
by  the  word   me7nory;    and  we   say  that  we 
recollect,  or  remember,  having  see  such  a  resi- 
dence.    But  beside  the  image,  and  the  recollec- 
tion of  it,  there  is  perhaps,  in  the  mind,  some 
vivid  emotion  of  pleasure  or  regret,  arising  from 
circumstances  that  occurred  at  the  time:    we 
there  parted  with  a  dear  friend,  or  there  enjoyed 
the  society  of  some  distinguished  persons.    Now 
these  emotions  of  pleasure  or  regret,  and  this 
conviction  of  past  time,  are  so  intimately  con- 
nected with  the  image  of  the  mansion,  that  we 
find  it  impracticable  to  recal  or  dwell  upon  the 
idea  without  bringing  up  also  the  memory  and 
the  emotion.     And  unless  an  effort  of  the  mind 
is  made — an  effort  of  analysis,  we  feel  as  if  there 
were  but  one  undivided  and  indivisible  idea  or 
remembrance  present  to  us.      Or  to   take  an 
instance  of  another  sort. — The  notion  excited 
in  the  mind  by  the  words  Prodigality  and  Par- 


36 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


simony,  may  at  first  seem  to  be  simple  and  un- 
compounded ;  but  not  so  when  we  ask  ourselves 
what  precisely  we  mean  by  the  terms.  Is  the 
mere  spending  of  a  large  income  prodigality! 
or  is  the  spending  of  a  small  one  parsimony? 
no ;  something  more  belongs  to  the  idea.  To 
spend  a  large  income  well  and  liberally,  is  not 
to  be  prodigal,  but  munificent.  The  spending 
a  small  one  with  care  and  self-denial,  is  frugahty. 
To  be  prodigal  is  to  spend  much  wastefully,  or 
without  reason,  or  utility.  To  be  parsimonious 
is  to  spend  less  than  reason  and  charity  demand ; 
it  is  to  refrain  from  those  expenses  which  a 
man's  income  would  fully  cover,  and  so  to  re- 
frain, for  the  sake  of  accumulating  money. 

This  sort  of  analysis  of  complex  notions  is 
indispensable  to  accuracy  of  thought,  and  to  pro- 
priety in  the  use  of  language. 

What  is  a  straight  line?  What  is  a  circle? 
Our  idea  of  them  seems  siniple,  and  at  first  we 
may  doubt  whether  they  are  capable  of  being 
analysed;  but  we  shall  find  that  both  may  be 
described,  and  therefore  must  be  complex :  for 
to  describe  a  thing  is  to  mention  its  component 
parts  or  elements.  A  line  is  a  continued  series 
of  points ;  a  straight  line  is  that  series  which 
makes  the  shortest  distance  between  its  two 
extremes.  A  circle  is  a  succession  of  points,  all 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


37 


equally  distant  from  one  and  the  same  point, 
called  its  centre.  The  analysis  of  complex 
notions  leads  naturally  to  a  discovery  of  the 
properties  and  relative  value  of  the  things 
analysed. 

Those  who  do  not  possess,  or  who  have  not 
cultivated  and  exercised  the  faculties  of  abstrac- 
tion and  analysis,  when  required  to  explain 
what  they  mean  by  some  word  which  expresses 
a  complex  abstract  notion,  such,  for  example,  as 
Liberty,  seek  for  a  synonymous  word,  and 
reply.  Liberty  is  freedom  ;  or  they  find  a  particu- 
lar instance,  and  say  "  a  man  who  is  not  in  prison 
has  liberty."  But  this  sort  of  answer,  though 
sufficient  on  ordinary  occasions,  can  serve  no 
purpose  when  exactness  of  thought  is  required, 
as  in  cases  of  argument.  It  is  a  fault  of  an 
opposite  kind  to  busy  one's  self  in  the  vain 
attempt  to  analyse  ^mj^Ze  abstract  notions,  such, 
for  example,  as  those  expressed  by  the  words 
space,  existence,  pain,  pleasure,  &c.  Persons  who 
have  more  activity  and  subtilty  than  strength  or 
clearness  of  understanding,  are  prone  to  this 
error;  they  delight  in  whatever  is  abstruse, 
confound  the  obscure  with  the  abstract;  are 
reluctant  to  assent  to  simple  and  perspicuous 
propositions ;  and  while  perpetually  in  search 
of  what  may  seem  new  and  profound,  become 


~  ^i"  ~ii~if  j~  ~  ~M^rt.»^j 


38 


ELEMENTS      OP      THOUGHT. 


restless  and  variable  in  their  opinions:  and 
employ  themselves  with  infinite  labour  upon 
endless  and  unintelligible  questions.  They  in- 
vent or  introduce  new  names  for  common  ideas; 
and  often  believe  themselves  to  have  made  great 
discoveries  in  abstruse  philosophy,  which  how- 
ever none  can  comprehend ;  or  they  laboriously 
affirm  and  demonstrate  what  no  one  denies ;  or 
what  has  no  meaning. 


APPETITE ; 

From  dppeto,  to  desire.  All  those  desires 
which  arise  from  bodily  organs,  and  which  are 
necessary  to  the  preservation  of  the  animal  sys- 
tem, are  called  appetites ;  and  are  usually  dis- 
tinquished  from  those  which  belong  more  to  the 
mind,  and  which  are  called  passions  or  emotions. 
In  his  appetites  man  is  not  greatly  distinguished 
from  the  inferior  orders,  but  essentially  so  in  his 
passions ;  for  although  the  dog,  the  horse,  the 
lion,  the  elephant,  are  susceptible  of  anger,  pride, 
ambition,  as  well  as  of  affection ;  these  emotions 
are  little  more  than  transitory  impulses ;  but  the 
passions  and  affections  of  the  human  heart  take 
permanent  possession  of  the  mind,  and  rule  the 
character  and  conduct. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


APPREHENSION ; 


39 


From  appreliendo,  to  take  hold  of.  This 
word  is  used  when  the  mind  fully  admits  the 
ideas  intended  to  be  conveyed  by  a  proposition ; 
or  when  the  terms  of  an  argument,  and  their 
relation  one  to  another  are  recognized  as  being 
familiar  and  unquestionable.  Apprehension  is 
distinguished  from  the  next  act  of  the  mind, 
which  is  to  form  a  judgment  of  the  truth  or  false- 
ness of  some  proposition  founded  upon,  or 
derived  from  what  is  known.  If  it  were  affirmed 
that  sparrows  build  nests  of  clay  under  the 
eaves  of  houses,  we  should  indeed  at  once  appre- 
hend the  assertion  ;  all  its  terms  are  intelligible, 
and  relate  to  matters  familiarly  known;  but  we 
immediately  deny  it  to  be  true ;  the  affirmation 
is  perspicuous,  but  false.  It  is  otherwise  if  an 
uninformed  person  is  told  that  the  class  ?w«w- 
malia  suckles  its  young ;  for  in  this  case  he  can 
neitlier  assent  to  the  proposition  nor  deny  it: 
he  does  not  apprehend  it — the  terms  being  un- 
known to  him.  Many  judgments  are  formed 
on  the  assumption  that  we  apprehend,  or  are 
familiar  with  the  terms,  when  in  fact  this  is  not 
the  case.  Phrases  may  be  familiar  to  the  ea?^ 
which  are  not  so  to  the  mind. 


I 


40 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


ARGUMENT, 


Is  the  artificial  process  by  which  some  propo- 
sition that  is  open  to  doubt,  or  which  may  be 
denied,  is  shewn,  or  probably  shewn  to  be  true, 
or  worthy  of  belief,  in  a  higher  or  a  lower  degree. 
A  proposition  that  may  be  established  beyond 
the  possibility  of  doubt  is  said  to  be  demons- 
trably certain.  But  this  sort  of  infallible  reason- 
ing belongs  to  very  few  except  mathematical 
truths,  and  matters  of  testimony,  when  the  evi- 
dence is  of  the  most  satisfactory  kind.  A  sound 
argument  consists  of  a  number  of  propositions, 
each  one  of  which  is  separately  true,  and  true 
also  in  its  relation  to  the  one  which  precedes, 
and  the  one  which  follows  it.  It  is  necessary 
also  to  a  sound  argument,  that  its  several  propo- 
sitions should  stand  in  a  just  order.  It  is  more- 
over implied,  in  a  complete  and  satisfactory 
argument,  that  the  person  to  whom  it  is  addressed 
already  admits,  or  assents  to,  each  of  the  sepa- 
rate propositions ;  and  that  he  will  grant  the 
truth  of  the  connexion  affirmed  to  exist  between 
them  when  clearly  exhibited.  If  he  denies, 
either  some  one  of  the  propositions,  or  some  one 
of  the  connexions,  then  means  must  be  used  for 
ascertaining  the  truth  in  that  particular  instance. 


r 
I 


I 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


41 


before  any  further  progress  can  be  made  in  the 
controversy.     We  take  an  example  of  the  most 
famihar   sort,   and   one   that  will   exhibit   the 
difference  between  demonstation  and  argument. 
B.  affirms  that  in  going  from  London  to  Nor- 
wich,  it  is  better  to  pass   through   Dunmow, 
Clare,  and  Bury,  than  to  take  the  road  through 
Chelmsford,  Colchester,  and  Ipswich.    C.  denies 
this  assertion.     B.  then  says  he  Cdn  demonstrate 
the  truth  of  his  proposition  ;  and  forthwith  pro- 
ceeds to  compute  the  distances  from  place  to 
place ;  that  is,  he  affirms,  in  due  succession,  a 
number  of  ad??iit ted  truths ;  such  as  that  Rom- 
ford is  twelve  miles  from  London,  Brentwood 
six  miles  from  Romford,  and  so  on  throughout 
the  route ;  and  he  connects  and  computes  these 
several   distances  on  admitted  principles,  and 
truly  sums  up  the  entire  series.     So  far  this  is 
a  demonstration,  and  is  unanswerable  when  com- 
pared with  a  similar  computation  of  the  other 
route.     But   C.  replies,  *  You  have  indeed  de- 
monstrated that  the  road  through  Dunmow  is 
shorter  than  that  through  Chelmsford ;  but  yet 
have  not  convinced  me  that  one  had  better  go 
that  way  than  the  other;  on  the    contrary,    I 
can  bring  an  argument  to  prove  that  the  longer 
road  is  actually  preferable  to  the  shorter;  and 
that  in  fact  time  will  be  gained  by  going  eight 


Ml 


'*^^>''^^'^>^>'^«^«''*w^^>^^^^^^>^^%'WViM^lWW^^«iM^^^IMiki«^iWVSi<^«^ 


42 


ELEMENTS     OF      THOUGHT. 


or  ten  miles  about/  For  this  purpose  he  affirms 
a  number  of  facts,  none  of  which  perhaps  his 
opponent  will  deny;  but  which  are  of  too  in- 
definite a  kind  to  form  part  of  a  methematical 
demonstration,  although  very  proper  to  be  con- 
sidered in  the  general  argument.  These  in- 
definite facts  are  such  as — the  narrowness  and 
ruggedness  of  the  roads — the  probable  delay 
arising  from  the  want  of  horses,  and  so  forth. 
Now  these  assertions,  though  founded  in  truth ; 
may  have  been  misstated  or  exaggerated;  and 
hence  it  may  become  necessary  to  examine 
each  separate  proposition,  of  which  the  general 
argument  consists;  and  the  disputants  nmst 
agree  upon  all  the  particulars,  before  they  can 
agree  upon  the  conclusion. — That  is  to  say,  the 
necessary  conditions  of  every  sound  argument 
must  be  complied  with  on  both  sides;  each 
proposition  must  be  assented  to,  and  its  con- 
nexion with  the  one  which  precedes,  and  the 
one  which  follows,  must  also  be  admitted  by 
both  disputants. 

It  is  evident  then  that  an  argument  is  strictly 
conclusive  only  when  all  the  facts  contained  in 
it  are  truly  known  by  the  disputants,  and  are 
understood  also  in  their  relation  one  to  another. 
An  argument  is  of  no  avail  for  discovering 
things  unknown  ;  but  can  serve  only  to  set  forth 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


43 


the  connexion  of  a  certain  fact  with  another, 
which,  hitherto,  we  have  not  perceived  to  be 
related  to  it 

A  very  large  proportion  of  all  controversies  are 
fruitless  and  inconclusive,  simply  because  the 
disputants,  on  both  sides,  in  their  eagerness  to 
carry  their  opinion,  or  to  confound  their  oppo- 
nent, assume  many  things  to  be  known  and  un- 
questionable, which  are  not  so ;  or  because  they 
neglect  to  ascertain  the  sense  in  which  they  them- 
selves use  the  terms  they  employ ;  at  the  same  time 
they  refuse  to  give  due  attention  to  the  explana- 
tions of  their  opponent's  meaning.  Thus  argu- 
ment is  converted  into  wrangling;  and  often  ter- 
minates in  a  personal  contest.  Thus  it  is,  too, 
that  differences  of  opinion  are  perpetuated,  and 
that  men  learn  to  love  truth  only  when  it  favours 
the  faction  to  which  they  attach  themselves,  and 
to  hate  and  fear  it  when  it  favours  an  adversary. 
Beside  that  accuracy  and  strength  of  under- 
standing which  is  the  first  requisite  in  the  dis- 
covery of  truth,  it  is  not  less  necessary  to  possess 
a  conscientious  preference  of  truth  to  interest, 
favour,  or  prejudice,  and  especially  so  when  re- 
ligious principles  are  in  question.  In  this  in- 
stance there  is  need  that  the  mind  should  be 
freed  from  those  evil  inchnations  and  those  uni- 


44 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


versal  corrupt  prejudices  which  belong,  in 
greater  or  less  degrees  to  every  human  mind, 
and  which  render  every  mind  inimical  to  the 
great  principles  of  Christianity. 

ARRANGEMENT, 

Differs  from  Classification,  which  is  a  sorting 
of  things  according  to  their  real  differences ; 
whereas  this  is  a  sorting  them  for  some  parti- 
cular purpose,  in  the  manner  that  may  be  pre- 
scribed by  special  reasons  of  convenience. 
The  books  of  a  library  may  be  classified  ac- 
cording to  the  subjects  of  which  they  treat ;  or 
they  may  be  arranged  in  that  order  which  will 
bring  those  most  often  wanted  within  reach. 
It  is  often  of  more  practical  importance  to  ar- 
range our  thoughls  in  an  artificial  manner,  such 
as  shall  give  the  mind  a  ready  command  over 
its  stores,  than  to  think  precisely  in  the  mode 
that  is  rigidly  philosophical. 

Skill  and  address  in  the  arrangement  of  our 
thoughts  is  peculiarly  advantageous  to  those 
whose  business  it  is  to  teach  or  to  persuade 
others ;  while  habits  of  analysis,  classification, 
and  abstraction,  are  proper  and  indispensable  to 
those  who  addict  themselves  to  the  discovery 
of  truth. 


u 


it 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


ART, 


45 


Is  distinguished  from  science,  rather  by  an  ac- 
cidental, than  a  real  difference.  Art  is  the  know- 
ledge of  general  facts,  and  science  is  so  too.  But 
it  is  only  that  part  of  such  knowledge  which  is 
immediately  convertible  to  practical  purposes 
that  is  called  art ;  while  that  which  is  either 
not  at  all  applicable  to  common  purposes,  or 
only  so  in  a  remote  manner,  is  called  science. 
A  knowledge  of  the  chemical  laws  of  fermen- 
tation is  applicable  to  the  preparation  of  an 
ordinary  beverage,  and  when  so  applied  is  called 
the  art  of  brewing.  If  no  such  fermented 
liquor  were  in  use,  then  the  knowledge  of  the 
same  facts  would  stand  undistinguished,  as  part 
of  the  science  of  chemistry. 

The  art  of  navigation  (in  a  principal  branch 
of  it)  is  an  application  of  the  knowledge  of  the 
places  and  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies, 
to  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  a  ship's  latitude 
and  longitude.  If  men  never  adventured  them- 
selves upon  the  wide  bosom  of  the  sea,  they 
might  still  know  the  same  facts ;  but  would  call 
their  knowledge  science.  In  the  natural  order 
of  discovery,  art,  in  a  rude  form,  precedes 
science ;  and  then  science  instructs  art ;  and 
again,  these  amended  arts  give  man  so  much 
command  over  the   operations  of  nature,  that 


46 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


wealth  is  accumulated  ;  and  many  individuals, 
in  every  community,  are,  by  that  means,  set  free 
from  the  necessity  of  labouring  for  subsistence, 
of  whom  some  addict  themselves  to  the  culti- 
vation of  philosophy,  from  the  influence  of  mere 
taste.  In  this  manner  new  discoveries  are 
made  ;  and  these,  more  or  less  directly,  improve 
the  arts  of  life ;  and  so  a  perpetual  advance- 
ment goes  on  by  the  mutual  influence  of  me- 
chanical skill  and  philosophical  principles. 

ASSOCIATION  OF  IDEAS. 

It  is  the  law  or  usage  of  the  human  mind 
long  to  retain  any  connexion,  even  of  the  most 
accidental  kind,  which  has  once  been  formed 
between  two  or  more  thoughts  or  states  of  feel- 
ing. If  one  of  these  linked  or  associated  ideas 
is  brought  back  to  the  mind,  the  other,  most 
often,  returns  with  it.  No  one  can  need  in- 
stances of  this  sort  to  be  mentioned,  for  every 
moment  presents  them  to  every  mind.  It  is 
however  important  to  distinguish  what  may  be 
called  the  natural,  or  spontaneous  association 
of  ideas,  from  that  which  is  the  consequence  of 
certain  habits  of  the  mind.  The  law  of  spon- 
taneous association  shows  itself  most  com- 
pletely in  dreaming,  when  ideas  of  all  kinds 


\\ 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


47 


follow  one  the  other,  in  a  disorderly  and  fantas- 
tic manner ;  and  yet  so  that  we  can  (when 
dreams  are  recollected  with  sufficient  distinct- 
ness) often  perceive  the  link  or  tie  which  made 
one  image  succeed  to  another.  In  musing  or 
reverie  the  same  law  of  accidental  connexion 
makes  itself  apparent  in  the  succession  of  ideas 
and  emotions.  The  prattle  of  children,  and 
the  idle  chat  of  uncultivated  or  frivolous  per- 
sons, very  commonly  presents  the  same  sort  of 
fortuitous  succession  of  ideas,  connected  only 
by  incidental  and  unimportant  circumstances 
of  similarity,  or  of  juxta-position,  in  time  or 
place.  The  strength  and  culture  of  the  mind 
may  be  fairly  estimated  by  the  degree  in  which 
it  ordinarily  yields  itself  to  this  current  of  spon- 
taneous or  accidental  associations. 

When  certain  habits  of  mind  have  been 
formed  and  settled  by  exercise  and  application, 
they  displace  and  supersede,  to  a  great  extent, 
the  law  of  accidental  association.  A  mind 
naturally  vigorous,  and  which  has  acquired 
much  control  over  its  movements,  and  has  ad- 
dicted itself  to  particular  employments,  no 
longer  follows  the  fortuitous  course  of  ideas ; 
but  pursues,  in  some  one  chosen  path,  the  real 
or  rational  connexion  of  ideas  one  with  another. 
That  is  to  say,  the  idea  which  follows  the  one 


48 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


last  present  to  the  mind,  will  be  that  which  in 
fact  and  nature,  is  the  most  nearly  related  to  its 
predecessor.  Thus,  if  the  whole  series  of  ideas 
were  expressed  or  uttered,  those  who  listened 
to  it  would  not  have  to  search  for  the  Hnk 
which  connected  one  thought  with  another,  hut 
would  perceive  it  in  the  very  nature  of  the 
subject. 

The  mathematician,  the  mechanician,  the 
statesman,  the  poet,  the  artist,  the  man  of  busi- 
ness,  each  acquires  his  proper  habit  of  associa- 
tion, and  each  is  prompt  and  successful  in  his 
line,  just  in  proportion  to  the  rationality  and 
the  closeness  of  the  connexions  that  have  been 
formed  in  his  mind.  This  principle  of  the  as- 
sociation of  ideas  is  sometimes,  or  by  some 
writers,  called  the  law  of  Suggestion.  The 
meaning  of  the  two  phrases  is  much  the  same. 


ATTENTION. 

Not  even  the  most  frivolous,  childish,  or 
feeble  mind,  is  always,  or  entirely,  governed  by 
the  fortuitous  association  of  ideas  (spoken  of  in 
the  preceding  article.)  Nor  how  strong  soever 
may  be  any  particular  habit  of  thinking,  is  any 
mind  absolutely  incapable  of  breaking  off  its 
customary  meditations,  and  of  fixing  itself  upon 


ELEMENTS      OF     THOUGHT 


19 


another  set  of  ideas.  Every  one  is  conscious 
of  possessing  a  power  (more  or  less  perfect)  of 
detaining  some  one  thought,  or  class  of  thoughts, 
in  the  mind,  and  of  considering,  or  viewing  a 
particular  subject  successively,  in  all  its  parts 
and  relations.  This  power  is  called  Attention. 
It  is  the  proper  and  distinguishing  excellence  of 
the  human  mind;  and,  in  connexion  with  the 
faculty  of  abstraction,  forms  the  essential  differ- 
ence between  man  and  the  brute,  as  well  intel- 
lectually as  morally.  The  degree  in  which  it 
is  possessed  distinguishes  also  one  human  mind 
from  another. 

The  exertion  of  this  power  of  attention  sup- 
poses some  motive  or  desire  to  be  present,  or 
some  inducement  to  be  within  view,  which  at- 
tracts the  mind  in  one  direction  rather  than 
another.  It  is  a  great  excellence  in  the  mental 
conformation,  when  a  tranquil  motive  will  en- 
sure a  high  degree  of  attention  ;  and  moreover, 
when  attention  can  be  readily  and  fully  trans- 
ferred from  one  object  to  another ;  and  it  is  a 
still  higher  excellence  when  attention  can  be 
given  in  an  efficient  degree^  to  several  objects  at 
the  same  time. 

A  sluggish  mind  is  one  which  can  be  roused 
to  attention  only  by  the  most  urgent  or  stimu- 
lating motives.     A  weak  mind  is  one  that  may 

3 


I 


'ft 


50 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


be  quickly  roused  to  attention,  but  which  as 
quickly  spends  itself  by  the  effort.  An  acute 
mind  is  one  that  is  capable  of  a  very  vigorous, 
momentary  effort.  A  profound  mind  is  one  ca- 
pable of  long-continued  attention,  upon  the 
same  subject ;  and  which  can  sustain  its  atten- 
tion by  motives  of  the  most  tranquil  sort.  A 
comprehensive  and  efficient  mind  is  capable,  both 
of  long-continued  efforts  of  attention,  and  of 
what  may  be  called  multifarious  attention  :  that 
is  to  say,  it  does  not  lose  itself  in  its  regard  to 
a  single  class  of  ideas,  but  sees  all  objects  in 
their  various  connexions  and  dependencies. 
Yet  whatever  may  be  the  natural  power  of  the 
mind,  in  these  respects,  it  is  susceptible  of  vast 
increase  and  improvement,  by  a  well  conducted 
education.  Indeed  the  difference  between  an 
educated  and  uneducated  person  (supposing 
their  natural  faculties  to  have  been  equal)  is 
manifested  in  nothing  so  conspicuously  as  in 
the  greater  command  over  its  powers  of  atten- 
tion which  the  former  has  acquired. 

ATTRIBUTE; 

From  attrihio,  to  give  to,  or  impute.  A 
quality,  or  manner  of  feeling  or  acting,  asserted 
to  be  essential  to  any  being,  is  called  an  attri- 


\ 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


51 


bute  of  that  being.  The  word  expresses  or 
implies  the  act  of  assigning  such  or  such  a  pro- 
perty to  a  substance  or  person ;  and  is  most 
often  employed  in  theology,  and  when  the  di- 
vine perfections  are  spoken  of. 

AXIOM; 

From  cJf  .'w/xa,  a  sentence  or  affirmation,  worthy 
to  be  received.      By  philosophical  usage  the 
term  is  applied  only  to  propositions  that  are  at 
once  unquestionable,  or  self-evident  and  funda- 
mental; or  important,  on  account  of  the  conse- 
quences which  flow  from  them.     Mathematical 
axioms  are  such  as— That  the  whole  is  greater 
than   any  of   the  parts ;  or,  that  equal  things, 
added    to    equal,   n)ake    equal.       Metaphysical 
axioms  are  such  as  this— That  there  can  be 
nothing  more  in  an  effect,  than  was  contained 
in  its  cause.     It  is  an  axiom  in  morals,  that  the 
will  of  God  is  the  rule  of  right  and  wrong. 

BEING  : 

The  most  comprehensive  of  all  simple  ab- 
stract  terms.  It  expresses  the  notion  which 
results  from  our  own  consciousness,  thought  of 
as  a  tvhole  ;— we  feel  that  we  are,  or  that  we 
exist,     God  is  emphatically  called  the  Supreme 


52 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


Being  ;  both  because  He,  and  He  alone,  is 
self-existent ;  and  because  He  is  tlie  author  or 
cause  of  all  other  existences. 


BELIEF, 

Is  that  state  of  mind  which  is  produced  by 
arguments  that  appear  to  be  good,  or  sufficient. 
Belief  rests  upon  evidence  of  the  kind  that  is 
not  absolutely  demonstrative,  or  irresistible  ; 
hence  it  is  susceptible  of  various  degrees  of 
strength,  proportioned  either  to  the  intrinsic 
force  of  the  evidence,  or  to  the  power  of  the 
understanding  to  perceive  its  force.  There  is 
much  difference  in  different  minds  in  this  re- 
spect. Some  instantly  and  clearly  discern  the 
soundness  of  an  argument,  or  the  consistency 
of  testimony,  and  retain  ever  after  an  unshaken 
conviction  of  the  truth  of  the  fact  or  principle 
as  so  established.  Other  minds  can  but  con- 
fusedly catch  the  connexion  of  reasons  or  evi- 
dences, and  almost  immediately  lose  whatever 
rational  conviction  they  may,  for  a  moment, 
have  acquired ;  or  if  they  adhere  to  their 
opinion,  do  so  blindly,  and  often  with  many  se- 
cret misgivings.  Some,  on  the  other  hand,  in- 
capable of  comprehending  evidence,  or  impa- 
tient of  the   effort  necessary  for  the  purpose, 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


53 


embrace  opinions,  just  as  they  choose  their 
friends,  by  favour  and  prejudice,  and  adhere  to 
them  with  a  passionate  resolution,  and  defend 
them  with  vehemence  and  dogmatism. 

It  is  a  general,  though  not  universal  principle, 
that  the  calmness  or  the  violence  with  which 
matters  of  belief  are  entertained,  bears  propor- 
tion to  the  soundness  or  the  unsoundness  of  the 
mental  process  by  which  conviction  has  been 
attained.  Those  who  by  patient  attention  to 
argument  have  convinced  themselves  of  the 
truth  of  certain  opinions,  are,  for  the  most  part, 
ready  to  exercise  patience  and  forbearance  to- 
wards an  opponent ;  while  he  who  is  conscious 
of  being  unable  to  give  a  good  reason  for  his 
belief,  betakes  himself  either  to  flippancy  and 
banter,  or  to  contumely,  when  his  opinion  is 
impugned. 

It  is  important  to  remark  that,  in  almost  all 
the  affairs  of  life,  even  when  the  most  momen- 
tous interests,  or  life  itself,  are  at  stake,  we  are 
ordinarily  required  to  act  upon  the  strength  of 
rational  belief,  and  must  not  wait  for  demon- 
stration, or  certainty.  Nay,  on  some  of  the 
most  signal  occasions,  we  proceed  on  the 
ground  only  of  some  probable  opinion,  which 
falls  very  far  short  of  full  persuasion.  But  it 
is  found  (if  a  large   number  of  instances  are 


><»*■»■»»-   .,*-.  ^^^  r    -I  ->.  ^ 


54 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


taken  into  the  acconnt)to  be  more  advantageous, 
and  less  really  hazardous,  to  act,  and  to  venture 
upon  some  degree  of  probabihty,  than  to  adhere 
habitually  to  the  impulse  of  a  suspicious  and 
timid  caution.  It  is  on  the  whole  safer  to  be 
bold  and  believing,  than  sceptical.  In  by  far 
the  larger  number  of  instances,  we  are  called  to 
rely  upon  testhnony,  rather  than  to  act  upon 
our  personal  knowledge  of  facts ;  and  it  is  found 
that  human  testimony  (if  certain  cases  are  ex- 
cepted where  there  is  a  peculiar  temptation  to 
falsify)  is  a  very  sufficient  ground  of  confidence. 
It  is  so  especially  when  testimony  is  supported 
by  incidental  proofs  (see  Testimony).  To 
withhold  belief  in  such  cases,  evinces  either 
an  infirm  judgment  or  a  petulant  and  captious 
temper. 

It  is  by  no  means  always  the  case  that  we 
have  the  power  of  understanding  the  whole  of 
what  we  are  required,  by  good  evidence,  to  be- 
lieve. The  contrary  most  often  happens ;  that 
is  to  say,  a  certain  fact  is  fully  established,  and 
yet  nothing  more  is  known  than  the  general 
fact,  or  than  its  external  significance.  In  the 
mathematical  sciences  there  are  not  few  propo- 
sitions which,  though  demonstrably  certain,  are 
at  the  same  time  apparently  incredible  or  im- 
possible; so  that  though  they  cannot  but  be 


•*••• « > ... ...>. 


ELEMENTS      OP      THOUGHT. 


55 


assented  to,  they  can  never  be  followed  home 
by  the  human  mind.     Nevertheless,  such  facts 
or  principles  are  taken  confidently  as  the  foun- 
dation  of  other  principles.     There  are  other 
truths  which,  though  not  seemingly  incredible, 
yet  so  surpass  the  powers  of  the  human  mind 
to  grasp  them,  that,  while  they  are  necessarily 
admitted  as  certain,  we  can  advance  no  further, 
or  little  further,  than  to  blind  assent.     Of  this 
sort  is  the  notion  of  eternity — or  of  duration, 
without  beginning,  as  well  as  without  end :  and 
of  this  kind,  too,  are   other  great  principles  of 
natural  religion,  and  much  that  relates  to  the 
omniscience,  the  power,  the  providence,  and  the 
moral  government  of  God.     These  are  subjects 
concerning  which  certain  comprehensive  pro- 
positions may  be  affirmed,  with  the  most  per- 
fect confidence,  even  while  the  mind  feels  its 
utter  inability  to  comprehend  what  it  assents 
to,  or   to  reconcile    one    such    principle   with 
another. 

Those  hidden  powers  that  are  developed  in 
the  movements  and  changes  of  the  material 
world,  such  as  gravitation,  chemical  and  mag- 
netic attraction,  electricity,  vegetable  and  animal 
life,  and  so  forth,  demand  assent,  while  nothing 
concerning  them  can  be  understood,  beyond  the 
external  facts  which  make  themselves  known  to 


•'•'^^•■•^•^^•^*^^^*^^^^^^0^0^^^0^ 


56 


ELEMENl'S      OF      THOUGHT 


**«#%»^^*^^»«f%^^^^'W^>^^^^N^i»<^^»^li»^^ 


the  senses.  Nothing  then  can  be  more  absurd, 
or  unphilosophical,  than  the  determination  ex- 
pressed by  some  persons  that  they  will  believe 
nothing  which  they  do  not  understand.  'J'o  carry 
such  a  purpose  into  effect  on  all  subjects,  would 
be  to  reduce  a  man  to  universal  ignorance  and 
idiotcy.  Rational  belief  stands  midway  be- 
tween credulity  and  scepticism ;  both  of  which 
are  faults,  as  well  of  the  understanding  as  of 
the  temper.  Credulity  is  the  error  of  sanguine, 
imaginative,  and  weak  minds,  which,  in  their 
eagerness  to  receive  and  hold  whatever  dazzles 
the  fancy,  or  moves  the  sensibilities,  or  awakens 
pleasing  emotions  of  wonder  and  admiration, 
believe  whatever,  of  this  sort,  may  be  presented 
to  them,  without  inquiring  upon  what  evidence 
it  rests,  or  perhaps  rejecting  contrary  testimony. 
It  may  be  noted  as  a  frequent  fact,  that  those 
who  believe  the  most  readily,  and  in  opposition 
to  reason,  are  the  most  slow  to  believe,  or  hard 
to  be  convinced,  where  evidence  is  good  and 
abundant.  The  cause  of  this  is  easily  assigned. 
— Good  evidence  appeals  to  the  understanding ; 
but  the  credulous  have,  by  the  long  indulgence 
of  their  credulity,  enfeebled  their  understand- 
ings, and  have  become  actually  incapable  of  per- 
ceiving the  force  of  argument  :  at  the  same 
time,  the  fruitless  effort  which  they  may  make 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


57 


in  a  single  instance,  to  do  so,  chills  and  con- 
founds the  mind,  and  dispels  those  lively  feel- 
ings of  confidence  with  which  they  are  wont 
to  entertain  other  convictions.  They  can  be- 
lieve only  by  impulse,  not  by  reason. 

Scepticism,  though  apparently   an   opposite 
error,  not  seldom  proves  itself  to  be  nearly  allied 
to  credulity :  the    reason    is,   that    both   spring 
from   infirmity  of  the   understanding,   or  what 
might,  if  we  were  to  use  a  figurative  expression, 
be  termed  a  paralysis  of  the  reasoning  faculty. 
By  pride,  or  jealousy,  or  petulance,  or  coldness 
of  temper,  the  habit  of  distrusting  all  evidence 
has  been  indulged,  until  it  has  grown  so  strong, 
that  even  the  most  conclusive  reasons  fail  to 
take  effect  upon   the  mind  :  all  things  appear 
alike  uncertain  ;  a  dimness  affects  the  faculties. 
But  as  the  human  mind  cannot  exist  without 
its  convictions,  of  some  sort,  it  often  becomes, 
in  this  enfeebled  state,  the  prey  of  some  childish 
delusions.     Many  noted  sceptics  have  been  ab- 
surdly superstitious,  or  credulous,  in  certain  par- 
ticulars     It  may  be  affnmed  that  credulity  is, 
on  the  whole,  much  less  absurd,  and  less  mis- 
chievous too,  than  scepticism  ;  because  it  is  less 
at  variance  with  the  constitution  and  course  of 
the  system  in  which  man  is  placed.     Upon  the 
great  field  of  human  life,  belle/  is  the  general 

3* 


58 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


rule  ;  disbelief  belongs  only  to  the  exceptions 
from  that  rule :  he,  therefore,  who  always  be- 
lieves, will  be  much  less  often  in  the  wrong, 
than  he  who  always  doubts.  The  credulous 
has  the  mass  of  ordinary  facts  on  his  side :  the 
sceptic  has  only  the  single  instances. 

CATEGORY. 

Karrivopla,  a  class  of  things  concerning  which 
something  is  affirmed  absolutely  ;  not  hypothe- 
tically,  or  liable  to  a  condition.  This  is  a 
technical  term  of  logic.  In  popular  use,  a  cate- 
gorical assertion  is  a  positive  one,  admitting 
neither  of  exception  nor  uncertainty. 


CAUSE  and  EFFECT. 


The  human  mind  is  not  merely  acted  upon 
through  the  senses,  by  external  objects,  but  it 
acts  also  upon  matter :  that  is  to  say,  upon  the 
muscular  system  ;  and  by  that  means  upon 
foreign  bodies.  It  also  acts  upon  its  own 
thoughts,  changing  and  ruling  them  at  pleasure. 
In  consequence  of  this  constitution  of  our  na- 
ture, we  produce  many  changes  in  the  things 
around  us.  The  consciousness  of  being  able 
to  do  so,  generates  the  notion  which  is  called 
Power  ;  and  then  whatever  has,  or  is  imagined 


'  *  *  *  fc » *  »,„»^^,_^,__j 


*  ^  ^  ^  "    —  m^t~Hl~^'Mftt-t.f\.tl 


ELEMENTS      OP      THOUGHT. 


59 


to  possess,  a  power  to  produce  changes  in  other 
things,  or  in  itself,  is  called  a  Cause ;  and  the 
change  so  produced,  is  called  an  Effect     The 
words  cause  and  effect  are  a  pair  of  inseparable 
or  correlative  terms,  indicating  the  presence  or 
the  supposed  presence,  of  that  faculty  to  pro- 
duce changes  which  we  feel  to  belong  to  our 
own  minds,  and  which  we  call  power.     In  the 
exercise  of  this  power  of  mind,  we  first  imagine, 
and  invent,  and  contrive,  and  then,  by  muscular 
actions,  we  put  the  material  substances  around 
us  into  new  forms,  corresponding  to  the  con- 
ception we  had  formed ;  and  these  new  combi- 
nations of  matter  are  found  to  answer  the  end 
we  had  in  view.     Now  this  ordinary  process  of 
our  own  minds  furnishes  us  with  a  very  simple 
and  convincing  argument,  whence  we  infer  the 
existence  of  an  Almighty  and  Intelligent  Being, 
who,  in  a  far  higher  degree  than  ourselves,  pos- 
sesses both  reason  and  power ;  the  effects  of 
which   are  displayed  on  every  side,  in  the  ad- 
mirable  contrivances  of    the    material   world. 
We  thus  attain  the  idea  of  a  First  Cause ;  and 
assign  to  it  all  that  actually  exists,  as  its  effect. 
Having  acquired,  from  our  consciousness,  the 
notion  of  power,  followed   instantly  by  some 
proper  effect,  we  fall  into  a  natural,  and  almost 
involuntary  custom,  of  imputing  or  imagining 


k  <^>^>S>fc.Aj'h^^>fcM'^A 


60 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


W-^w-",-*-"      ■ 


the  existence  of  power,  wherever  we  find  some 
one  event  to  precede  immediately   and  invari- 
ably  another,  which  is  called  its  effect.      We 
carry  this  supposition  much  farther  than  we  are 
philosophically  warranted  in   doing,  and   thus 
learn  to  speak  of  the  powei-s  of  nature,  of  the 
power  of  chemical  agents,  &c.,  when,  in  truth, 
we  know  nothing  but  the  fact,  that  a  certain  par- 
ticular  event   always  follows  another.       The 
warmth  and  the  showers  of  spring  are  followed 
by  the  bursting  of  buds,  and  the  rise  of  plants 
from  the  earth  ; — the  rising  of  the  sun  is  followed 
by  the  ascent  of  mists  from   the  valleys  ; — the 
friction  of  two  hard   bodies  is  followed  by  a 
sensible  heat ; — and  in  these,  and  innumerable 
other  instances,  we  unthinkingly  impute  power 
to  the   antecedent  event,  calling  it  the  cause; 
and  call  the  consequent  event  its  effect.     What 
may  actually  be  the  nature  of  the  connexion 
between  the  one  and  the  other  is  absolutely 
unknown  :  but  it  is  only  in  an  improper  sense 
that  any  material  substance  can  be  called  a  cause. 
Whenever,  even  by  a  mere  coincidence,  one 
event  has  been   observed  frequently  to  accom- 
pany another,  there  is  a  propensity  in  the  mind 
to  regard  the  first  as  the  cause  of  the  second. 

But  we  never  suppose  this  without,  at  the 
same  time,  imputing  to  the  one  some  sort  of  in- 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


61 


fluence  over  the  other.  Thus,  when  in  the 
minds  of  the  vulgar,  certain  trivial  occurrences, 
such  as  the  croaking  of  a  raven,  or  the  breaking 
of  a  goblet,  or  the  spilling  of  salt,  are  supposed 
to  be  the  precursors  of  calamity,  there  is  also 
imagined  to  exist  an  invisible  influence,  which 
connects  the  one  event  with  the  other. 

The  mere  connexion  or  sequency  (as  it  is 
called)  of  events,  does  not  give  rise  to  the  idea 
of  cause  and  effect,  unless  there  be  room 
(whether  justly  or  not)  to  impute  power  to  one 
of  them.  If,  by  the  road-side,  mile  after  mile, 
trees  are  seen  to  be  growing  in  pairs,  no.  one 
imagines  that  the  first  tree  in  each  pair  is  the 
cause  of  the  second.  But  when  it  is  seen,  on  a 
large  meadow,  that  wherever  a  heap  of  decayed 
vegetable  matter  has  lain,  the  grass  is  much 
more  rank  than  in  other  places,  it  is  involuntarily 
believed  that  the  heap  was,  in  some  manner, 
though  unknown,  the  cause  of  that  increased 
vegetation.  It  may,  perhaps,  hereafter  be  dis- 
covered, that  there  is  nothing  in  the  manure 
which  can,  with  any  propriety,  be  called  power ; 
nevertheless  it  is  certain  that  there  is  some 
relation  between  the  chemical  properties  of  the 
manure,  and  the  growth  of  the  plant ;  just  as 
there  is  a  real  relation  between  the  act  of  put- 
ting a  weight  into  a  scale,  and  the  rise  of  the 


W"^*!!!^^^*^^  fi 


^^^^Arik^K^«^«|^^«l^ 


62 


'**'^'^'^w*"'*>^-*'»^  *  l«^^^«^.^%H^ 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


opposite  end  of  the  beam.  This  relation, 
whether  known  or  unknown,  being  real  and 
constant,  niay,  without  inconvenience,  be  spoken 
oi  asif'W,  were  cause  and  effect.  It  is  only  ne- 
cessary always  to  recollect  that  i)ower,  in  the  full 
and  strict  sense  of  the  word,  belongs  exclusively 
to  MIND  ;  and  that  what  are  called  the  powers  of 
nature  are  nothing  more  than  secret  relations, 
between  one  property  or  form  of  matter  and 
another. 

CLASSIFICATION, 

Isjhe  sorting  of  things  that  differ  in  some 
respects,  and  are  alike  in  others  :  the  greatest 
difference  being  the  rule  of  separation,  and  the 
greatest  likeness  the  rule  oi  association.  Classi- 
fications are  always  founded  on  some  real  and 
intrinsic  qualities  of  the  things  sorted ;  whereas 
arrangements  are  founded  upon  accidental  qua- 
lities or  circumstances.  Arrangements  are  made 
for  convenience  and  the  accomplishment  of  a 
particular  purpose.  Classifications  are  formed 
for  the  permanent  advantage  of  the  mind,  which 
can  become  conversant  with  a  multitude  of 
objects  only  when  they  are  distributed  into  sorts, 
corresponding  with  their  real  and  intrinsic  dis- 
tinctions. An  analysis  is  made  by  observing 
differences  only :  a  classification  is  accomplished 


"O"**-***.^-^**.* 


ELEMENTS      OP      THOUGHT. 


63 


by  looking,  first  at  resemblances,  and  then  at 
differences.  An  analysis  serves  to  make  us  ac- 
quainted with  things  of  which  hitherto  we  have 
been  ignorant.  A  classification  is  useful  for 
presenting  a  simple  and  comprehensive  view  of 
things  already  known. 

The  assortments  that  are  made  of  the  objects 
of  natural  history  are  properly  called  classifica- 
tions, and  are  affected  by  bringing  together  all 
the  animals  that  agree  in  some  one  distinct  and 
unalterable  peculiarity,  such  as  shall  be  liable  to 
no  uncertainty,  or  confusion,  in  particular  in- 
stances.     Thus,    according   to    the    system  of 
Linnaeus,  all  animals  that  suckle  their  young  are 
included  in  one  class  called  Mammalia.     All 
birds  are  included  in  another ;  all  that  live  in- 
differently   in  air  and    water,  in  a  third  ;    all 
fishes  in  a  fourth;  all  insects  in  a  fifth;  and 
worms  in  a  sixth.     But  then,  if  all  the  animals 
of  the  first  class,  for  example,  are  brought  toge- 
ther, it  is  found  that,  though  alike  in  the  im- 
portant circumstance  of  suckling  their  young, 
they  are  unlike  in  a  thousand  other  particulars ; 
so  that  it  becomes  necessary  to  classify  this  class. 
For  the   purpose  of  doing   so  with   precision, 
another  particular  and  invariable  circumstance  is 
fixed  upon,  and  which  is  liable  to  no  uncertainty. 
Such  is  found  to  be  the  number  and  position  of 


64 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


the  teeth  ;  and  there  are  known  to  be  seven 
constant  forms  of  diversity  in  this  particular ; 
which  therefore  divide  the  class  Mammalia  into 
seven  orders.  i^gain,  each  order  comprises 
animals  widely  differing  one  from  another,  and 
needing,  therefore,  a  new  classification,  for  it 
brings  together  men,  monkeys,  rabbits,  and  bats. 
These  are  sorted  into  four  genera,  or  kinds. 
But  each  genus  has  also  different  kinds ;  as,  for 
example,  the  monkey  tribe,  of  which  tbere  are 
almost  innumerable  varieties  :  these  varieties  of 
a  genus  are  called  sjjecies.  Thus,  it  appears, 
classification  must  be  carried  on  so  long  as  any 
number  of  beings  are  observed  to  agree  in  one 
or  more  particulars  (if  those  particulars  are  de- 
finite and  constant)  and  yet  to  disagree  in 
others. 


COMMON  TERMS, 

Or  names,  are  words  which,  in  consequence 
of  some  sort  of  classification,  are  applied  to 
many  individuals  that  are  alike  in  some  re- 
spects; or  in  all  but  identity.  Thus  the  word 
animal  is  a  term  common  to  all  sentient,  loco- 
motive, voluntary,  and  corporeal  beings.  The 
word  quadruped  is  common  to  all  animals  that 
have  four  legs  ;  the  word  dog  to  all  quadrupeds 
of  that  genus;  and  the  word  mastiff  X.o  a  spe- 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


65 


cies  of  dog.  But  Caesar  is  7ny  dog  or  yours : 
and  though  his  name  may  be  appropriated  to 
ten  or  twenty  dogs,  it  is  proper  to  each  as  his 
individual  distinction.  Comuion  terms  belori'^ 
to  things.  Abstract  terms  belong  to  qualities, 
Connnon  terms  are  used  in  classification  ;  ab- 
stract terms  are  employed  in  generalization. 


COMPLEX, 

Is  that  which  consists  of  several  elements, 
which  are  to  be  separated,  or  made  known  by 
analysis. 

CONCEPTION, 

Is  the  bringing  before  the  mind,  by  a  volun- 
tary act,  some  image  of  what  has  heretofore 
been  perceived ;  and  which  yet  is  thought  of 
apart  from  any  distinct  recollection  of  past  time, 
otherwise  the  idea  would  belong  to  memory. 
Sensation  and  perception  take  place  when  an 
external  object  is  actually  present  to  the  senses. 
Imagination  is  complex  conception  ;  that  is  to 
say,  it  is  the  joining  together  of  images,  in  new 
forms,  or  combinations.  We  entertain  the  con- 
ception of  a  palace ;  but  we  imagine  a  palace 
of  gold,  or  a  river  of  molten  brass,  or  a  centaur, 
or  a  griffin.     The  power  of  vivid  conception  is 


66 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


important  to  the  poet ;  for  the  mind  works  from 
the  stock  of  its  conceptions,  not  from  its  im- 
mediate perceptions  : — but  it  is  still  more  im- 
portant to  the  painter,  who  can  only  become  a 
mere  copyist,  if  his  conceptions  are  faint  or 
confused.  Propriety  of  description,  and  appro- 
priateness and  copiousness  in  the  use  of  lan- 
guage, depend  in  a  great  measure,  upon  the 
vigor  of  the  faculty  of  conception. 


CONCLUSION. 


A  single  affirmation  is  a  proposition  : — as  that 
A  is  equal  to  B.  But  if  it  were  necessary  to 
prove  this  equality,  by  stating,  in  a  series  of 
propositions,  the  component  parts  of  A  and  B ; 
then  this  last  affirmation,  which  brought  all  the 
preceding  ones  to  a  point,  would  be  the  conclu- 
sion. The  last  proposition  in  an  argument  is 
not  called  the  conclusion  because  it  concludes 
or  finishes  it ;  but  because  it  is  the  truth,  for  the 
sake  of  which  all  the  preceding  propositions 
were  advanced  : — it  is  that  which  comprises,  or 
shuts  up  in  one,  the  train  of  facts,  bringing  the 
last  into  contact  with  the  first,  as  thus : — 1.  An 
habitual  disregard  of  truth  draws  upon  a  man 
the  distrust  and  contempt  of  all  who  have  to 
do  with  him.     2.  But  if  a  man  be  the  object  of 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


67 


distrust  and  contempt  among  his  neighbours,  he 
will    be  compelled  to  deal  with  them  always 
under  a  great  disadvantage  ;  for  his  most  solemn 
asseverations  in  matters  of  fact  will  produce  on 
their  minds  an  impression  the  very  reverse  of  that 
which  he  intends ;  so  that  he  becomes  his  own 
adversary  whenever  he  urges  his  rights  or  his 
pretensions.     3.  But  he  who  labours  under  a 
disadvantage  of  this  sort,  will  find  it  a  bar  to 
his  success,    in    whatever   he    undertakes.     4. 
Therefore,  an  habitual  disregard  of  truth  will, 
in  most  cases,  impede,  or  utterly  prevent  a  man's 
prosperity.     This,  then,  is  our  conclusion. 


CONCRETE, 

From  concresco,  to  grow  together,  or  to  be 
formed  into  a  mass.  When  a  quality  is  spoken 
of  as  joined  with  other  qualities,  the  word  ex- 
pressing it  is  used  in  a  concrete  form  ;  as  white 
paper,  equitable  conduct ;  whiteness  and  equity 
are  abstract  terms ;  that  is  to  say,  the  qualities 
are  spoken  of  apart  from  any  particular  sub- 
stance. Or  all  the  properties  of  a  thing  are 
spoken  of  together,  as  a  whole,  and  that  whole 
is — the  concrete  ; — opposed  to  the  abstract. 


68 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


CONSCIOUSNESS. 

This  word,  though  used  often  in  an  indistinct 
manner,  is  employed  most  properly  when  taken 
to  represent  tlie  mind's  act  of  looking  in  upon 
itself,  as  the  sid^ject  of  all  its  feelings  and  various 
operations.  1  he  mind,  most  commonly,  is  en- 
gaged fully  with  some  sensation,  or  conception, 
or  emotion,  or  ahstract  idea;  but  sometimes  it 
reflects  upon  itself  as  the  permanent  and  iden- 
XvQ.'i\  feeler  and  actor.  The  faculty  of  memory 
is  especially  concerned  in  this  notion  of  con- 
sciousness ;  and  when  the  mind  thus,  and  with 
the  aid  of  memory,  looks  inward,  it  gains  the 
notion  of  personal  identity.  It  is  however  plainly 
an  error  to  suppose  that  identity  consists  in  this 
notion  of  it ;  so  that  if  a  man  retained  no  re- 
collection of  yesterday,  and  did  not  at  all  think 
of  self  he  would  not  in  fact  be  the  same  to-day 
that  he  was  yesterday. 

CONDITIONAL. 

Whatever  will  not  he,  or  will  not  happen,  or 
must  not  be  affirmed,  unless  something  else  ex- 
ists, or  happens,  or  is  true,  that  dependent  fact 
or  proposition  is  conditional,  '' If  it  be  fine  to- 
7norrow,  I  shall  walk  to  town  :"  the  event  of  my 
walking  then  is  conditional ;  not  absolute. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


69 


If  virtue  is  to  he  tried,  men  must  be  placed  in 
circumstances  wherein  they  are  tempted  to  do 
wrong  That  men  rmist  be  exposed  to  temp- 
tation, is  not  true,  or  certain,  unless  it  be  true, 
that  virtue  is  to  be  tried. 

CONSEQUENT. 

In  a  conditional  proposition,  such  as  the  one 
advanced  above,  the  second  afifirmation,  which 
depends  upon  the  first,  is  the  consequent. 


CONTINGENCY  ; 

From  contingo,  to  touch  upon,  or  happen. 
In  popular  language,  whatever  event  takes  place 
of  which  we  do  not  discern  the  cause,  why  it 
should  have  happened  in  this  manner,  or  at  this 
moment,  rather  than  another,  is  called  a  contin- 
gent event ;  or  an  event  without  a  cause :  as 
for  example,  the  falling  of  a  leaf  on  a  particular 
spot,  or  the  turning  up  of  a  certain  number, 
when  dice  are  thrown. 

But  any  one  who  reflects  must  perceive  that 
though,  in  familiar  speech,  such  expressions  are 
allowable,  there  is  no  philosophical  propriety, 
that  is  to  say,  no  truth  in  them. 

Contingency  and  chance  are  words  of  no 
positive  meaning ;  but  which  may  yet  be  con- 


==^ 


ELEMENTS      OP      THOUGHT. 


veniently  employed  when  we  have  to  express 
our  absolute  ignorance  of  the  cause  of  an  event 
The  leaf  falls  on  a  particular  spot  in  conse- 
quence of  the  combined  influence  of  gravitation 
and  the  movement  of  the  air:  and  if  we  could 
know  precisely  the  force  and  direction  of  the 
wmd,  when  the  leaf  was  floating  in  the  air  we 
might,  combining  this  with  the  laivs  of  gravita- 
tion, predict  the  spot  on  which  it  would  alight  • 
—and  then,  we  should  no  longer  speak  of  that 
event  as  contingent.     The  rising  of  the  sun 
to-morrow  is  not  spoken  of  as  a  contingent 
event,  because  it  is  thought  of  as  certainly  fol- 
^wmg   from    the   established  order  of  causes 
But  the  fineness  of  to-morrow  we  think  contin- 
gent, because  we   are   ignorant  of  the   many 
causes  upon   the  concurrence  of  which  fine 
weather  depends.     Yet,  if  we  knew  all  the  laws 
of  the  atmosphere,  and  the  actual  state  of  the 
lower  heavens  to-day,  then  the  fineness,  or  the 
ram  and  wmd  of  to-morrow,  would  be  spoken 
of  just  as  we  speak  of  the  rising  of  the  sun. 

And  thus  too  the  future  actions  of  men  are 
thought  of  as  contingent,  because  the  motives 
of  human  conduct  are  far  too  multifarious,  too 
much  hidden,  and  liable  to  too  many  disturbing 
influences  from  without,  to  be  known,  or  even 
surmised  beforehand.     We  can  go  no  further 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


71 


'   t 

II 


in    our   anticipations  of  the   conduct  of  men, 
than  to  say  conditionally— if  such  and   such 
events  take  place,  it  is  probable   that   M.    or 
N.  will    act   in   this   or   that    manner.      Our 
notion  of  contingency  and  of  certainty  depends 
so  much  upon  our  knowledge  or  ignorance  of 
causes,  that  involuntarily  we  think  an  event  that 
is  to  happen  to-morrow,  much  less  contingent 
than  a  similar  event  that  is  to  take  place  a  year 
hence ;  although  it  is  evident,  both  stand  pre- 
cisely upon  the  same  ground,  as  to  the  causes 
whence  they  are  to  spring,  or  by  which  they 
are  to  be  governed. 

Every  event  has  a  cause  ;  in  this  sense  there- 
fore nothing  is  contingent.     But  in   philoso- 
phical language  there  is  another,  and  a  very 
proper   sense  of   the  word   contingency,  and 
which  is  nearly  synonymous  with    the"  word 
condition,  and  is  opposed  to  the  word  necessity. 
Mathematical  principles  are  necessary  ;  that  is 
to  say,  nothing  could  make  them  otherwise  than 
they  are.     It  cannot  even  be  imagined  that  the 
three  angles  of  a  triangle  should  be   equal  to 
less  or  more  than  two  right  angles.     The  ex- 
istence and   attributes  of  God  are  also  in  the 
same   sense    necessary.     But  the  existence  of 
any  particular  creature,  or  class  of  creatures,  or 
the   actual    conformation   or  powers  of  such 


11 


72 


V.A.A.>b.'«^     -J*  J* 


ELEMENTS     OF     THOUGHT. 


*  -"u^W^^^-V** 


beings,  are  contingent;  that  is  to  say,  they 
might  not  have  existed  at  all,  or  they  might 
have  been  otherwise  constituted  than  they  are. 

CONVERTIBLE  TERMS 

Are  such  as  may  be  exchanged,  the  one  for 
the  other,  without  affecting  the  sense,  or  des- 
stroying  the  truth  of  the  proposition  in  which 
they  occur.     Convertible  terms  are  not  always 
synomjmous,  or  of  the  same  meaning  abstrac- 
tedly ;    but  yet  they  are  of  the  same  value  in  a 
particular  instance.     Man  is  responsible  to  his 
Creator  for  his  conduct.— Every  moral  agent  is 
responsible  to  the  Supreme  Being  for  his  ac- 
tions.    In  these  two  propositions  we  assert  the 
same  general  truth  ;  but  in  other  terms,  and  in 
reference  to  snch  a  proposition,  the  words  man 
and  moral  agent ;— and  the  words  Creator  and 
Supreme  Being ;  and  the  words  actions  and  con- 
duct, are  convertible  ;  though  not  synonymous. 
If  they  were   strictly  synonymous,  we  might 
employ  them  on  all  occasions,  the  one  for  the 
other  without  error.     But  this  is  not  the  fact. 
We  must  not  say  every  moral  agent  is  mortal ; 
for  angels  are  not  so  ;  nor  say  every  man  is 
responsible  for  his  actions  ;    for  madmen  are 
not  so. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


CORRELATIVE  TERMS 


73 


Arc  such  as  have  no  sense,  strictly  speaking, 
apart  from  some  other.  Thus  the  \woyAs  father 
and  son,  husband  and  irife,  suppose,  or  tacitly 
include  the  other  term.  The  words  creature 
and  Creator,  king  and  subject,  and  all  adjectives 
of  comparison,  are  correlatives.  If  we  speak 
of  something  that  is  better,  or  greater,  or  wiser, 
we  suppose  something  worse,  or  smaller,  or 
less  wise. 

DATA, 

The  plural  of  datum,  a  thing  given  or  granted. 
Those  facts  or  principles  which  are  known  and 
acknowledged,  and  from  w  liich  inferences  are 
to  be  drawn,  are  called  the  chta:  as  when  the 
actual  order  and  position  of  mud,  clay,  sand, 
rock,  &c ,  in  the  crust  of  the  earth,  arc  de- 
scribed, these  are  the  data,  whence  some  theory 
is  to  be  derived  that  shall  adequately  explain 
the  formation  of  that  crust. 

DEFINITION. 

To  define  a  thing  is  to  mention  some  parti- 
cular mark,  or  circumstance,  which  universally 
and  infallibly  distinguishes  it  from  those  things 
to  which  it  is  most  nearly  allied.     A  definition 


V 


74 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


consists  of  the  genus  and  the  difference  ;  that  is 
to  say,  it  mentions  the  class  to  which  the  thing 
belongs ;  and  then  what  makes  it  to  differ  from 
other  things  of  that  class.  One  hifallible  mark 
is  enough  for  a  definition  ;  for  if  an  object  be 
but  made  known  beyond  possibihty  of  mistake, 
whatever  more  is  added,  contributes  nothing  to 
our  certainty.  What  is  added  to  a  definition  is 
desmption.  An  elephant  is  a  quadruped  (this  is 
i\iQ  genus)  having  an  elongated  and  flexible  pro- 
boscis (this  is  the  difference).  If  we  go  on  to 
say  that  his  color  is  a  dingy  brown ;  his  ears 
large  and  pendulous  ;  his  tail  like  that  of  a  hog, 
&c.,  this  is  description. 

The  definition  of  words  is  not  like  the  defi- 
nition of  things ;  for  the  ideas  attached  to  words 
are  variable  and  vague,  and  dependent  upon  the 
knowledge,  prejudice,  and  habits,  of  those  who 
use  them.  To  define  the  sense  of  a  word  is  to 
describe  the  thing,  or  notion,  to  which  we  apply 
it.  We  can  fix  our  meaning,  or  secure  it 
against  mistake,  only  by  declaring,  as  often  as 
necessary,  that  we  intend  by  it  such  and  such 
things,  or  notions.  By  the  word  virtue,  some 
persons  understand  mere  fortitude  and  manli- 
ness of  character  ;  others  understand  by  it  only 
the  avoidance  of  open  offences  against  justice 
and  temperance  ;  while  those  who  think  ancj 


^^*^»»E1VTS      OF      THOUGHT.- 


speak  more  accurately  would  apply  the  word 
virtue  to  nothing  less  than  that  universal  good^ 
ness  which  springs  from  the  love  of  God,  and  of 
our  fellow-creatures.  But,  in  so  using  it,  we 
must  guard  against  common  errors  by  affixing 
to  our  discourse  a  description  of  our  notion 
which  may  serve  to  dejine  the  sense  of  the' 
term. 

m 

DEMONSTRATION, 

Is  a  sliowing  or  making  manifest.     Demon- 
strative reasoning  is  applicable  only  in  those 
cases  where  the  objects  to  which  it  relates  may 
be  fully  seen  and  known,  as  it  were  l)y  a  glance. 
If  some  degree  of  obscurity  or  uncertainty  be- 
longs to  any  one  of  tlie  things  spoken  of,  no 
demonstration  of  the  truth  of  the  proposition 
can  be  had  ;  or  before  the  argument  can  proceed 
the  obscurity  must  be  cleared  up  by  a  full  ex- 
amination of  the  obscure  portion  of  the  problem 
When  it  is  affirmed  that  2  and  3  are  equal  to 
4  and  1,  the  mind  at  a  glance,  or  by  an  instan- 
taneous effort,  perceives  the  trutli  of  the  propo- 
sition ;  or  even  if  it  could  be  doubted,  it  might 
be  rendered  incontestable  by  taking  five  coun- 
ters and  dividing  them  into  two  parcels,  first  of 
3  and  2,  and  then  of  4  and  ].     But  if  it  be 
said  that  342  is  a  7th  part  of  2,394,  although 


J 


'^■i'N*^^ 


76 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


this  affirmation  is  equally  certain  and  demon- 
sir  able  as  the  other,  there  are  very  few  minds 
that  would  instantaneously  perceive  the  truth  of 
it     And  it  will  therefore  be  necessary,  before  it 
can  be  intelligently  assented  to,  as  an  unques- 
tionable truth,  to  dissect  it,  if  we  might  so  speak, 
or  to  attend   separately,  to  the   particulars  of 
which  the  proposition  consists :  and  in  going 
through  such  a  dissection  each  of  these  parti- 
culars will  be  an  affirmation  or  axiom,  so  simple 
that  the  truth  of  it  may  be  perceived  at  once. 
The  arithmetical  processes  of  division,  multi- 
plication, &c.  are   nothing  else  than  concise 
methods  of  attending  in  due  order  to  all  the 
constituent  parts  of  a  complicated  proposition, 
and  by  this  means  of  ascertaining  the  amount 
of  the  whole.     After  we   have  so  attended  to 
each  part,  we  may  rely  as  fully  upon  the  truth 
of  the  result  as  we  do  upon  the  certainty  of  the 
simplest   proposition.     It  makes  no  difference 
in  the  certainty  of   a    mathematical    product, 
whether  the  path  by  which  we  reach  it  is  long 
or  short.      Thus  for  example,  to  discover  at 
what  instant  of  time  an  eclipse  of  the  moon 
will  take  place  fifty  years  hence,  may  require  a 
very  operose  and  coniplicated  calculation;  never- 
theless the  fact,  though  future,  may  as  certainly 
be  known  as  tbat  3  times  9  are  27. 


1 


I 
\ 


fl 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


77 


V  I 


The  great  practical  difference  between  what 
is  properly  called  demonstrative  reasoning,  and 
the  other  kinds,  is  this,  that  the  one  is  capable 
of  being  drawn  out  to  any  length,  without  in- 
creasing the  probability  of  error.     But  in  every 
other  kind  of  argument,  if  we  pass  circuitously 
through  a  great  number  of  propositions,  several 
of  which  are  in  some  degree  obscure,  the  pro- 
bability of  error  is  great.     In  such  cases  the 
only  satisfactory  means  of  attaining  certainty 
is  by  endeavoring  to  establish  the  same  point  in 
several   independent  lines  of  argument.       But 
when  a  proposition  has  been  so  established  by 
two,  three,  or   more    series  of    proofs,  which 
though  distinct  and  unconnected,  meet  all  in 
the  same  point,  we  may  rely  upon  the  result  as 
confidently  as  if  it  were,  in  the  strictest  sense, 
demonstrated.     For  nothing  but  truth  can  give 
consistency  to  a  multitude  of  insulated  facts. 
It  is  thus  that,  in  courts  of  justice,  the  guilt  or 
innocence  of  the  accused  is  placed  beyond  all 
doubt  by  the  agreement  or  discrepancy  of  several 
independent  lines  of  evidence  ;  as,  for  example, 
when  the  accordant  testimony  of  a  number  of 
unconnected  witnesses  is  confirmed  by  its  coin- 
cidence with  facts,  the  truth  of  which  is  ascer- 
tained in  some  manner  that  has  no  connexion 
whatever  with  that  testimony.     And  it  is  thus 


a 


^l»— i»^»gg*gSig3 


78 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


too  that  the  truth  of  Christianity  may,  with 
strict  propriety,  be  said  to  be  demonstrated :  in- 
asmuch as  the  assumption  of  its  truth  is  the 
only  means  of  reconcihng  a  vast  number  of  in- 
dependent facts,  which  facts  rest  upon  evidence 
that  is  not  to  be  disputed.  If  some  one  line  of 
argument  were  thought  to  fall  short  of  absolute 
certainty,  the  doubt  is  removed  by  the  agree- 
ment of  that  single  argument  with  three  or  four 
other  series,  or  chains  of  evidence. 

DESCRIPTION, 

Differs,  as  we  have  seen,  from  definition.  A 
description  is  complete  when  it  has  enumerated 
the  most  obvious  or  remarkable  peculiarities  of 
an  object ;  a  definition  is  complete  w  hen  it  has 
fixed  upon  the  single  peculiarity  which  distin- 
guishes the  object  from  others  nearly  resem- 
bhng  it. 

DESIGN. 

What  does  not  take  place  by  accident,  nor 
is  effected  simply  for  its  own  sake ;  but  is  the 
fruit  of  an  intelligent  purpose  to  produce  a  cer- 
tain effect,  is  said  to  be  the  result  of  dengn. 
That  is  to  say,  it  indicates,  not  merely  the  pre- 
sence of  some  power,  producing  a  change  ;  but 
of  knowledge  also,  and  of  choice  or  intention. 


ELEMENTS      OF     THOUGHT. 


79 


I 


The  fitness  or  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  it  is 
manifest,  has  been  perceived ;  and  that  same  effect 
has  been  desired  by  the  Power  that  produced 
it.  Design  implies — motive,  knowledge,  and 
power.  When  a  house  is  overthrown  by  a 
hurricane,  it  is  true  that  the  velocity  of  the  air 
was  a  proper  means  for  effecting  the  overthow ; 
but  there  was  no  purpose  or  intention  in  the 
tempest  to  produce  this  effect.  We  do  not 
always  suppose  the  presence  of  an  intelligent 
power  whenever  we  perceive  means  conducing 
to  an  end.  As,  for  example ;  if,  in  travelling 
over  a  desolate  region,  we  find  the  trunk  of  a 
tree,  lying  across  a  deep  and  rapid  stream,  so 
as  to  form  a  bridge,  it  is  by  no  means  certain 
that  it  was  placed  there  for  any  such  purpose  ; 
it  may  have  fallen  in  that  position  from  the  spot 
where  it  grew,  in  consequence  of  the  decay  of 
the  root  on  the  side  next  the  stream.  Some 
other  than  an  intelligent  cause  might  have  pro- 
duced the  effect.  But  if  we  find  three  or  four 
trunks  of  trees,  laid  in  order  across  the  stream, 
and  firmly  bound  together,  there  is  then  not 
merely  a  combination  of  things  subserving  an 
important  purpose — not  merely  a  fortunate  co- 
incidence, but  it  is  such  a  combination  as  be- 
speaks intelligence :  there  is  a  language  in  this 
combination  which  we  understand,  and  which 


80 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


says — a  mind — a  hnowing  powei'  has  brought 
these  things  together,  and  for  a  specific  purpose. 
It  is  then,  1st,  a  combination  of  parts;  and,  2d, 
a  combination  effecting  some  special  object; 
and,  3d,  a  combination  showing  that  the  real 
relations  of  things  have  been  understood,  which 
proves  the  existence  of  an  intelhgent  cause.  It 
is  thus  that  we  infer  irresistibly  the  being  and 
agency  of  the  omnipotent  and  omniscient 
Creator  from  the  organization  of  plants  and 
animals ;  and  indeed  from  the  entire  structure 
of  the  material  system. 

DIFFERENCE, 

In  a  logical  sense,  is  that  one  quality,  or  cir- 
cumstance, Avhich  distinguishes  a  thing,  or  a  set 
of  things,  from  others  which  it  resembles  in 
other  respects. 

The  difference  makes  the  species  within  a 
genus ;  and  to  name  the  gen7/s  and  the  diffir- 
ence,  is  to  give  a  definition.  The  circumstance 
of  not  shedding  its  foliage  in  winter,  is  the 
difference  which  distinguishes  one  species  of 
oak  from  others. 

DISJUNCTIVE  PROPOSITIONS, 

Are  those  in  w  Inch  something  is  affirmed  as 
true  of  so7?ie  one,  of  two  or  more  things  that 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


81 


are  mentioned  ;  as — The  vase  was  broken  by 
James,  or  Thomas,  or  John  ;  07ie  of  the  three 
must  have  broken  it.  If  then  we  can  prove 
that  it  w^as  not  broken  by  James,  nor  by 
John,  the  conclusion  follows  that  Thomas 
broke  it. 

DILEMMA : 

AiXrifjLfxa,  when  two  conditional  propositions 
are  advanced,  out  of  w  hich  a  choice  must  be 
made,  a  dilemma,  or,  taking  hold  of  two  ways, 
is  said  to  be  presented :  as  thus ;  it  might  be 
said  to  a  servant,  "  You  were  present  when 
your  master's  house  was  plundered  ;  or  you 
were  not.  If  present,  you  connived  at  the  rob- 
bery, by  not  resisting  or  revealing  it.  If  absent, 
you  abandoned  what  had  been  committed  to 
your  care ;  and,  therefore,  in  either  case,  you  are 
culpable."  The  servant  in  this  case  could  not 
escape  from  the  dilemma. 

DISPOSITION. 

To  dispose,  is  to  place  a  multitude  of  things 
in  a  particular  order,  for  the  sake  of  conveni- 
ence. The  word  arrangement,  which  is  nearly 
of  the  same  meaning,  is  properly  applied  to 
things:  the  word  disposition,  to  the  ideas  or 
themes  of  a  discourse. 

4* 


82 


ELEMENTS      OP      THOUGHT, 


DISTINCTION, 

Is  the  expressing,  in  words,  some  difference 
which  has  been  observed.  To  make  a  distinc- 
tion without  a  difference,  is,  therefore,  to  utter 
an  unmeaning  proposition :  as  if  one  were  to 
say,  "  I  deprived  jou  of  your  rights  ;  but  I  did 
you  no  wrong." 


DISTRIBUTION, 

Is  the  assigning  of  things  to  the  places  or 
compartments  which  have  been  prepared  to  re- 
ceive them.  There  nmst  aheady  have  been  a 
classification  of  some  kind,  when  a  distribution 
is  made.  Minds  fond  of  classification,  and  of 
order,  think  very  much  by  the  method  of  dis- 
trihution  ;  that  is  to  say,  whatever  new  subject 
is  presented  to  their  consideration,  they  rid 
themselves  of  perplexity,  not  so  much  by  a 
strict  and  true  analysis  of  it,  as  by  distributing 
the  parts  of  which  it  seems  to  consist,  accord- 
ing to  their  customary  mode  of  classifying 
all  things. 

DIVISION, 

Is  the  separating  one  and  the  same  thing 
into  parts,  or  parcels,  one  of  which  is  of  the 
same  quality  as  another ;  it  is  therefore  distin- 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


88 


guished  from  analysis,  which  is  the  separation 
of  the  unlike  component  parts  of  a  compound 
body. 

DOUBT, 

Is  some  degree  of  belief,  or  supposition,  that 
what  has  been  affirmed  is  true.  Disbehef  is 
knowledge  that  it  is  not  true.  To  admit  a  propo- 
sition carelessly,  or  without  regard  to  evidence, 
is  credulity  :  to  affirm  such  a  proposition  posi- 
tively, and  authoritatively,  is  dogmatism.  To 
refuse  assent  to  evidence,  proportioned  to  its 
force  or  validity,  is  scepticism ;  that  is  to  say,  it 
is  to  prefer  doubt  or  io^noraiice  to  knowledge, 
in  some  instance  where  a  degree  of  certainty  is 
actually  attainable.  For  any  one  to  profess  to 
disbeheve  a  proposition  when  he  does  not  know 
that  it  is  false,  is  an  absurdity  of  the  same  sort 
as  to  embrace  opinions  without  evidence :  it  is 
a  real  dogmatism  concealed  under  the  affecta- 
tion of  avoiding  dogmatism. 


DURATION 

Is  successive  existence.  Time  is  successive 
existence  measured  into  equal  parts.  We  acquire 
the  notion  of  duration,  or  of  continuous  exist- 
ence, thus : — when  a  thought,  or  sensation, 
or  feeling,  ceases  to  engage  the  j^rijicipal  atten- 


84 


*-N.V.V  .**•..<« 


ELEMENTS   OF   THOUGHT. 


E  L  K  M  E  N  T  S   OF   THOUGHT. 


85 


ll*"N<*N-  ^>l,N., 


tion  of  the  mind,  it  does  not  instantaneously 
and  entirely  disappear ;  but  seems  gradually  to 
fade  or  retire,  while  another  image  or  sensation 
is  taking  its  place;  just  as  when,  in  travelling, 
the  objects  we  have  passed  keep  in  sight  for  a 
while.     The  mind  does  not  pass  from  one  state 
to  another  by  sudden  starts,  but  by  insensible 
transitions.     We  learn  in  this  manner  to  think 
of  continued   existence,  or  of  successive  con- 
sciousness.    And  moreover  by  the  constitution 
of  the  mind,  an  image,  or  sensation,  or  feeling 
often    returns  to  it  after  a  long   interval   has 
elapsed,  accompanied  by  the  particular  circum- 
stances which  were  joined  with  it  when  first  it 
occurred  ;  and  we  are  then  impressed  with  the 
conviction  that  it  is  not  new  to  the  mind,  but  a 
repetition  only  of  what  long  ago  occupied  the 
thoughts:  this   is    memory;  and  memory,  to- 
gether with  the  insensible  passage  of  the  mind 
from  one  state  to  another,  imparts  the  notion  of 
duration.     In  a  manner  analogous  to  this,  we 
acquire   the   notion  of  extension    by  touching 
successively  the  contiguous  parts  of  a  solid  body, 
and  by  fixing  the  eye,  successively,  upon    its 
parts.     The  notion  of  extension  is  acquired  by 
means  of  the  senses ;  the  notion  of  duration  is 
purely  mental. 


EFFECT, 

Is,  in  a  strict  sense,  a  change  produced  by 
jwxce?'  (see  Cause)  ;  but,  in  popular  language, 
whatever  event  invariably  and  immediately  fol- 
lows another,  in  such  way  that  the  idea  of 
power  may  be  attributed  to  the  first,  is  called 
its  effect.  Thus,  the  dissolving  of  ice  before 
the  fire,  is  said  to  be  the  effect  of  heat ;  it  being 
supposed  that  heat  has  a  power  to  dissolve 
ice.  But  if  the  facts  be  examined  more  atten- 
tively, it  will  seem  quite  as  proper  to  say  that 
water,  in  a  solid  state,  has  a  power  to  bring 
heat  into  combination  with  itself,  as  to  speak 
of  the  power  of  heat.  The  fluidity  of  water 
is  the  result  of  a  mixture  which  takes  place 
w^here  the  two  elements  are  brought  into  con- 
tact;  and  it  is  fair  to  presume  that  it  takes 
place  in  consequence  of  a  fitness  of  the  one 
to  the  other. 

ESSENCE. 

All  those  properties,  or  qualities,  which  are 
supposed  to  be  necessary  to  any  thing,  or  with- 
out which  it  could  not  exist,  are,  when  so 
existing  together,  deemed  to  constitute  its 
essence.  These  essential  qualities  are  dis- 
tinguished from  sucli  as  are  accidental,  or  separ- 
able, or  are  mere  adjuucls.     Three  right  lines 


i 


86 


ELEMENTS      OP      THOUGHT. 


joining  are  the  essence  of  a  triangle  ;  if  one 
be  wanting,  or  if  the  three  do  not  fall  one  upon 
another,  there  is  no  triangle.  But  whether  this 
triangle  be  formed  by  the  tracing  of  ink  upon 
paper,  or  by  the  junction  of  beams  in  a  build- 
ing, or  by  the  stretching  of  cords  on  the  earth, 
is  a  mere  circumstance,  not  affecting  the  essence, 
and  not  altering  any  of  its  properties.  A  living 
body  united  to  a  reasonable  soul,  is  the  essence 
of  a  man  :  the  form  of  that  body  may  be 
varied,  or  its  parts  removed,  and  the  dispositions 
of  the  mind  changed  :  but  the  man  remains,  so 
long  as  body  and  soul  are  united. 


EVIDENCE, 

Is  a  fact,  or  a  series  of  facts,  adduced  for  the 
purpose  of  proving  the  truth  of  some  other  fact 
that  has  been  affirmed.  It  is  asserted  that  John 
Smith  stole  Samuel  Brown's  coat,  and  the 
evidence  adduced  is,  the  two  facts,  1st,  that 
John  was  seen  to  enter  Samuel's  apartment, 
during  his  absence  ;  and,  2d,  that  a  coat,  which 
Samuel  knows  to  be  his  own,  was  found  in 
John's  possession  :  very  little  is  wanting  in  this 
evidence  to  render  it  a  complete  proof  of  the  al- 
leged  theft,  audit  maybe  deemed  absolutely  con- 
clusive, if  the  additional  fact  can  be  ascertained, 
that  John  had  been  overheard,  before  the  theft, 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


87 


agreeing  with  a  companion  for  the  sale  of 
Samuel's  coat,  if  he  could  steal  it.  The  con- 
clusiveness of  evidence  consists  in  such  a  con- 
junction of  a  number  of  facts,  that  there  re- 
mains only  one  way  in  which  they  can  all  be 
consistently  explained  ;  and  when  that  one  way 
does  actually  bring  them  all  to  an  agreement. 

EXISTENCE, 

Is  the  same  as  being.      That  which  is,  is 
said  abstractedly  to  he,  or  to  have  exigence. 


EXPERIMENT. 

When  what  is  passing  before  our  eyes  is  at- 
tentively observed,  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring 
a  knowledge  of  the  causes,  or  established  order 
of  things,  we  are  said  to  learn  by  observation. 
But  we  learn  by  experiment,  when,  for  the  same 
purpose,  we  put  what  we  suppose  to  be  causes, 
in  operation.  After  certain  events  have  been 
observed  to  take  place,  we  form  a  conjecture  as 
to  the  cause  of  them  ;  and  on  the  ground  of 
this  conjecture,  or  hxjpothesis,  as  it  is  called,  we 
make  experiments.  For  example;  if  the  cause 
of  the  aurora  borealis,  or  northern  lights,  is 
sought  for,  we  observe  the  appearances  they 
assume  at  different  times ;  and  by  comparing 


88 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


these  appearances— the  colors,  the  coruscations, 
the  movements— with  tliose  of  the  electric  fluid, 
or  of  ignited  gases,  or  of  phosphoric  fluids,  we 
endeavor  to  trace  the  efTect  to  its  cause ;  or,  at 
least,  to  establish  a  probable  supposition  on  the 
subject.       But    these    aerial    changes    are   far* 
beyond  our  reach,  and  therefore  cannot  be  sub- 
jected  to  experiment.     Not  so  that  other  at- 
mospheric phenomenon— thunder  and  lightning. 
Dr.  Franklin   surmised   that   lightning  is  the 
same  active  and  brilliant  element  which  is  pro- 
duced by  the  friction  of  amber,  and  some  other 
substances.     This  was  his  hypothesis,  or  sup- 
position.    To  ascertain  its  truth,  he  flew  a  kite 
beneath  a  thunder  cloud,  having  a  small  wire 
attached  to  the  string.     From  the  lower  end  of 
this  wire  he  drew  sparks  which  exhibited  all 
the  properties  and  appearances  of  those  pro- 
duced by  an  electrical  machine :    this  experi- 
ment proved  his  first  conjecture  to  have  been 
well  founded.     The  science  of  chemistry  is  al- 
most wholly  founded  upon  experiment :  that  is, 
the  bringing  of  various  substances  together,  for 
the  purpose  of  discovering  in  what  manner  they 
act,  one  upon  another.     The  mere  observation 
of  such  chemical  changes  as  take  place  in  the 
course  of  nature,  would  affbrd  a  very  Hmited 


ELEMENTS       OF      THOUGHT. 


89 


knowledge  on  such  subjects,  and  would  leave 
almost  all  doubtful  matters  undecided. 

EXTENSION. 

The  notion  acquired  by  the  sense  of  touch, 
in  moving  the  hand  on  the  surface  of  a  solid 
body,  and  by  comparing  this  sensation  with  the 
sight  of  the  same  body,  conveys  to  the  mind 
the  notion  of  extension.  From  this  abstract 
idea  we  may  separate  the  idea  of  solidity,  or 
resistance,  and  it  is  then  designated  by  the  word 
space.  Or  we  may  add  to  it  the  idea  of  succes- 
sive parts,  numbered,  and  we  gain  the  notion  of 
distance.  Or  again,  to  the  notion  of  extension 
may  be  added  the  idea  of  successive  points,  re- 
lated to  each  other,  and  we  then  think  oijigure 
or  shape. 

FACT. 

Either  a  particular  event,  proper  to  be  ad- 
duced as  evidence,  in  proof  of  something  affirm- 
ed ;  or  a  common  event,  happening  in  the  ordi- 
nary course  of  nature,  and  proper,  therefore,  to 
form  part  of  an  inductive  argument  (see  Induc- 
tion), is  called  a  fact.  In  the  former  sense, 
facts  are  the  basis  of  judicial  proceedings.  A 
series  of  facts  constitute  a  history.  In  the  latter 
sense,  facts  are  the  materials  from  which  the 
physical  sciences  are  formed. 


90 


ELEMENTS  OF  THOUGHT. 


ELEMRNTS   OF   THOUGHT. 


91 


FALLACY. 

An  argument  which  seems  conclusive,  but  is 
not  so,  is  fallacious ;  that  is  to  say,  deceptive. 
When  such  fallacies  are  designedly  framed,  for 
the  purpose  of  misleading  those  to  whom  they 
are  addressed,  they  are  called  sojMsms.     A  fal- 
Jacy  takes  place—]  st.  When  some  one  of  the 
things  affirmed  in   an  argument,  and  which  is 
important  tQ  the  conclusion,  is  not  true.     2d, 
When    the   connexion   between   one  fact  and 
another  is  not   truly  stated.      3d,  When  the 
words  implied  are  used  in  one  sense,  in  one 
part  of  the  argument,  and  in  another,  in  another 
part :  or  w  hen  the  sense  assigned  to  such  terms 
is  so  vague  or  ambiguous,  that  an  error  slips  in, 
as  it  were,   unperceived,  in   the  course  of  the 
argument.      For  instance  :    the    argument  by 
which   papists  defend    the    usurpation   of  the 
bishop  of  Rome  is  fallacious,  because  the  facts 
affirmed  are  not  true,  or  not  known  to  be  as 
they  are  stated.     Our  Lord,  it  is  said,  conferred 
upon  St.  Peter  a  universal  power,  or  jurisdic- 
tion, over  the  souls  and  consciences  of  all  man- 
kind ;  this  authority  St.  Peter  transferred  to  his 
successor,  the  first  bishop  of  Rome ;  and  it  has, 
in  like  manner,  been  handed  down  from  bishop 
to  bishop,  through  all  ages.     To  resist  the  au- 


f 


thority  of  the  pope,  is  therefore  to  rebel  against 
the  Lord.  Now  even  if  it  were  granted  that 
St.  Peter  received  an  authority  of  this  kind 
from  Christ,  it  is  not  true,  or  at  least  can  never 
be  proved  to  be  so,  that  he  transferred  it  to  any 
other.  Again,  it  is  not  true,  or  can  never  be 
proved  to  be  so,  that  the  first  bishop  of  Rome 
was  appointed  by  St.  Peter,  or  was  in  any 
other  sense  his  successor,  than  that  in  which 
Clemens,  and  Polycarp,  and  Ignatius,  w^ere  the 
successors  of  Paul,  and  John,  and  Peter.  This 
argument  is  also  fallacious  by  its  taking  for 
granted  the  connexion  of  one  fact  (even  if  in 
itself  true)  w  ith  another.  Again ;  the  pretended 
proof  of  the  real  presence  of  Christ's  body  in 
the  sacramental  bread,  is  a  fallacy,  by  attribut- 
ing a  literal  sense  to  words  w  Inch  the  nature  of 
the  subject,  as  well  as  our  Lord's  usual  mode 
of  teaching,  demands  to  be  understood  in  a 
tropical  or  figurative  sense.  And  that  such  is 
the  true  value  of  the  words  is  proved  by  apply- 
ing the  same  rule  of  interpretation  to  other 
instances.  To  detect  fallacies,  requires  that 
the  truth  of  all  the  facts  either  affirmed  or  implied^ 
should  be  inquired  into ;  that  the  alleged  depen- 
dence of  one  fact  upon  another  should  be  ex- 
amined ;  and,  that  the  sense  assigned  to  each  of 
the  important  terms  should  be  ascertained. 


92 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


93 


GENERALIZATION, 

In  the  Strictest  sense,  is  gathering  tip,  from 
a  multitude  of  facts,  a  conclusion,  or  inference, 
or  rule,  which  is  applicable  to  all,  or  which  is 
suggested  by  all.     By  an  effort  of  abstraction, 
we  separate  some  one  property,  or  peculiarity,' 
from   among  others ;  and  after  observing  this 
peculiarity  in    a   number  of  instances,  we  di- 
gest, or  bring  together,  the  co??i?non  part  of  all 
the  instances  :  this  mental  process  is  generaliza- 
tion.    The  propensity  to  generalize,  constitutes 
what  is  called  the  philosophical  temper.     It  is 
a  desire  to  know,  wol  particular  facts,  but  those 
universal  facts  which,  when   known,  enable  us 
to    explain  whatever  particular   facts  present 
themselves  to  our  notice.     When  the  tendency 
of  a  certain  mode  of  conduct,  as,  for  instance, 
procrastination,  has  been  observed  in  a  great 
number   of    cases,  we    bring    the    conviction 
that  has  gradually   formed  itself  in  our  mind, 
into  the  form  of  a  general  proposition,  which,' 
though  it  may  be  worded  variously,   contains 
the  ininciple,  or  truth— that,  to  defer  till  to- 
morrow what  should  be  done  to-day,  is  a  course 
of  conduct  which  often  ends  in  ruin  or  disgrace. 
This  general  truth  we  may  safely  apply  to  any 
new  instance  of  the  same  kind,  and  may  pre- 


dict the  issue,  as  at  least  probable.  Or,  when 
we  learn  from  history  that  nations  addicted  to 
agriculture  have  been  easily  subjugated,  unless 
they  were  also,  to  some  considerable  extent^ 
commercial,  we  derive  the  general  inference — 
that  the  combination  of  agriculture  and  com- 
merce is  favorable  to  the  political  strength  of  a 
nation.  The  process  of  deriving  these  infer- 
ences from  a  number  of  facts,  is  generalization. 

GENUS  and  SPECIES, 

Are  correlative  terms,  the  one  having  no 
meaning  apart  from  the  other.  The  resem- 
blance or  sameness  of  many  things  that  are  not 
absolutely  alike,  brings  them  together  in  our 
minds ;  and  we  call  the  collection  a  genus,  or 
family.  When  the  differences  which  distin- 
guish some  from  others  is  noted,  we  distribute 
them  into  species,  (See  Definition  and 
Difference.) 

hypothesis, 

From  tifokcfig,  a  supposition.  Experiments, 
made  with  the  intention  of  discovering  the 
causes  of  the  effects  we  observe,  would  be  vague 
and  fruitless,  if  we  did  not,  in  each  instiance, 
follow  some  probable  conjecture  or  hypothesis. 


94 


ELEMENTS      OP      THOUGHT 


That  is  to  say,  a  cause  is  first  guessed  at,  and 
then  experiments  are  instituted  for  the  purpose 
of  trying   whether    we    have    been    right   or 
wrong  in  our  surmise.      If  wrong,  we  guess 
again,  and  make  a  new  trial.     An  hypothesis, 
therefore,  is   not    an    unproved  mpposition,  to 
which  we  give  an  idle  assent ;  but  a  means,  or 
instrument  for  gaining  true   knowledge.     The 
instance  adduced  under  the  word  Experiment, 
may  be  again  referred  to,  for  showing  the  use 
of  an  hypothesis.     The  American  philosopher 
asked,  "  What  is  lightning  V     His  supposition 
or   hypothesis   was— it    is    electricity— or   the 
brilliant  and  active  fire  which  is  generated  by 
the  friction  or  resin,  or  amber.     It  was  to  prove 
or  disprove  his  hypothesis  that  he  made  his  ex- 
periment.     Or,  to   take  another  example:  we 
have  observed  that  a  certain  spot  in  a  meadow 
produces  a  greater  quantity  of  grass  than  the 
rest  of  the  field.     We  remember,  too,  that  a 
heap  of  various  matters,  rubbish,  ashes,  litter, 
«&c.  had  for  some  time  lain  upon  that  spot ;  now 
(supposing  that  we  were   entirely  ignorant  of 
the  virtues  of  manure)   we  should,  as  it  were 
involuntarily,  imagine  that  the  heap  of  rubbish 
had   been,   in   some  way,  the   cause  of  the  su- 
perior fertiUty  of  the  spot.     To  ascertain  the 
correctness  of  this  hypothesis,  we  cover  another 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


95 


spot  with  earth,  or  sand,  in  order  to  find  whether 
the  mere  circumstance  of  covering  the  sward, 
for  a  time,  was  the  reason  of  the  fact  in  ques- 
tion.    But  no  such  eflfect  is  found  to  be  pro- 
duced in  this  instance.     Our  next  supposition 
is,  that  some  one  of  the  several  matters  con- 
tained in  the  first  heap  was  the  true  cause  we 
are  in  search  of,  and  we  proceed  to   deposit  a 
parcel    of    each   ingredient — ashes,    sea-weed, 
stable  litter,  decayed  vegetables,  &c.  separately, 
on  diffierent  spots ;  and,  after  the  lapse  of  some 
time,  observe  that,  on  one  there  is  no  increased 
fertility,  while  the  others  exhibit  increased  ver- 
dure in  various  degrees.     This  experiment,  or 
trial,  has  determined  our  hypothesis.     It  is  in 
this   manner  that  all  substantial  knowledge  of 
the  laws  of  nature   is   acquired.     And  almost 
every  addition  to  our  knowledge  suggests  some 
new  hypothesis,  and  leads  to  new  discoveries. 

IDEA. 

This  word   is  /)ften  applied   to  any  kind  of 
thought,  or  notion,  or  belief;  but  its  more  proper 
use  is  restricted  to  such  thoughts  as  are  images 
of  visible   objects,  w^iether    actually  seen    and 
remembered,  or  compounded  by  the  faculty  of 


96 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


imagination.  The  words  notion,  or  opinion, 
would  often  be  well  substituted  for  the  word 
idea, 

IDENTITY, 

Is  absolute  sarneyiess   in   substance;    and  is 
affirmed    more    usually  of   persons,    than    of 
things.     John  yesterday,  and    John  ten  years 
ago,  and  to-day,  is  identically  the  same  person, 
although  the  matter  of  his  body  has  undergone 
many  changes,  as  well  as  the  dispositions  and 
habits  of  his  mind.      The  conviction  or  con- 
sciousness of  personal  identity,  or  of  continued 
sameness,  from  the  commencement  to  the  end 
of  life,  is  conveyed  by  memory ;  but  does  not 
depend  upon,  or  consist  in  memory.     A  man 
who  by  disease,  or  intemperance,  loses  all  recol- 
lection of  his  early  years,  does  not  cease  to  be 
the  same  person,  though  he  is  ignorant  of  being 
so.     We  grant  that  to  be  identically  the  same, 
through  a  long  course  of  time,  which  has  un- 
dergone none  but  gradual  and  partial  changes. 
It  is  thus  that  the  human  bady,  in  its  course 
from  infancy  to  age,  is  thought  of  as  identically 
the  same.     The  identity  of  the  soul,  or  rational 
power,  is  believed   to  depend  upon  its  unalter- 
able and  imperishable  spirituality. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


IMAGINATION. 


97 


The  power  of  the  mind  to  decompose  its 
conceptions,  and  to   recombine   the  elements  of 
them  at  its  pleasure,  is  called  its  faculty  of  ima- 
gination.      Imagination   is  distinguished  from 
memory,  not  merely  by  the  activity  of  the  mind 
in  the  former  case,  but  by  the  diversified  com- 
poshion  of  its  ideas.     To  think  of  the  heavens, 
as  glowing  like  a  furnace,  and  peopled  with 
aerial  armies,  is  to  imagine,  or  to  bring  together 
the  parts  of  many  actual  conceptions.     This 
sort  of  mental  creation  is   carried   on,  usually, 
under  the  influence  of  the   taste  for  what  is 
beautiful    and    sublime.       To    imagine    things 
neither  pleasing,  nor  grand,  nor  in  any  way 
adapted  to  excite  agreeable  emotions,  belongs 
to    a  fantastic  or  disordered    mind.     Poetical 
genius  seems  to  include,  1st,  A  power  of  ab- 
straction in  the  senses,  which  enables  the  mind 
to  separate    the  qualities   and    appearances  of 
objects  one  from  another :  for  unless  they  were 
so  separated,  they  would  not  offer  themselves 
ready  for  recombination  ;  2d,  A  power  of  vivid 
conception  ;  3d,  A   great    susceptibility  to  the 
emotions  of    beauty    and    sublimity  ;    4th,    A 
prompt  correspondence  between  these  emotions 
and   the   moral  sentiments ;  5th,  A  nice  judg- 

5 


•-V     .      .-N.- 


98 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


ment,  in  fixing  the  boundary  between  sobriety 
and  extravagance ;  6th,  A  quick  recollection 
of  words :  and  7th,  An  ear,  or  sense  of  the 
rhythm,  or  mutual  relations  of  words,  as  mere 
sounds, 

IMPOSSIBLE  ; 

That  which  cannot  be  affirmed,  or  imagined, 
without  involving  some  absurdity  ;  as,  that  all 
the  parts  of  a  thing  together  should  make  more 
or  less  than  the  whole.  When  it  is  said,  as 
sometimes,  that  it  is  impossible  that  God  should 
do  so  and  so,  all  that  can  be  properly  intended 
is,  that  a  contradiction  in  terms,  or  a  direct 
absurdity,  is  contained  iu  the  supposition  of  the 


contrarv. 


IMPRESSION. 


Whenever,  either  through  the  senses,  or  from 
its  own  feelings,  the  mind  has  undergone  a 
change,  or  has  passed  from  one  state  to  another, 
passively,  it  is  said  to  have  received  an  iinpres- 
sion — in  allusion  to  the  image  that  is  imprinted 
upon  softened  wax. 


INDEFINITE  PROPOSITIONS, 

Are  those  which  do  not  limit  the  affirmation 
they  contain,  or  declare  whether  it  be  universal, 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


99 


or  proper  to  a  part,  or  an  individual.  "Men 
are  creatures  of  habit,"  9?iight  be  understood 
to  mean,  that  77iani/  men,  or  so??ie  men  are  so  ; 
though  the  nature  of  the  proposition  implies 
that  it  is  intended  to  be  universal.  An  indefi- 
nite form  of  speaking  is  proper  when  no  ambi- 
guity is  likely  to  arise;  as  if  it  were  said, 
"Men  are  mortal;"  but  then  the  abstract  forni 
is  preferable—"  Man  is  mortal."  If  it  were 
said—"  Men  are  knaves,"  the  indefinite  form  of 
the  proposition  would  seem  to  convey  a  false 
assertion— namely,  that  all  men  are  knaves. 


INDUCTION, 

Is  the  drawing,  or  leading  off  an  inference, 
or  general   fact,   from   a   number  of  instances. 
Or,  it  is  the  summing  up  of  the  result  of  obser- 
vations and  experiments.     It  was  Lord  Bacon 
who  introduced  this  term  into  philosophy ;  and 
who  moreover  taught  the  true  method  of  ac- 
quiring a  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  nature,  by 
attending  to  facts,  and  by  carefully  comparino- 
a  great  number  of  instances  ;  instead  of  the  old 
method  of  philosophising,  which  consisted  in 
forming  a  theory,  or  supposition,  independently 
of  all  facts,  and   then   explaining  the   appear- 
ances of  nature  on  the  blind  assumption  that 


<.•   •».'VV^*.-v%.^ 


100  ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 

the  theory  was  true.  The  old  method  was  the 
shortest  and  easiest ;  but  it  w^as  utterly  falla- 
cious. The  niodcrn,  or  Baconian  method,  is 
laborious,  and  difficult ;  but  it  is  successful,  and 
has  proved  in  the  highest  degree  beneficial. 
See  the  words  Experiment  and  Hypothesis. 


INFERENCE. 

Is  a  fact  or  truth,  affirmed  on  the  ground  of 
its  known  or  supposed  connexion  with  some 
other  fact,  or  truth,  which  is  already  established, 
or  admitted.  A.  and  B.  are  known,  or  believed, 
to  be  inseparable  companions :  if  therefore  we 
see  A.  we  infer  that  B.  is  not  far  distant.  The 
confidence  with  which  we  rely  upon  tlie  truth 
of  inferences,  results  from  that  persuasion, 
which  is  natural  to  the  human  mind,  and  which 
is  insensibly  produced  by  the  uniformity  of 
nature  (and  it  springs  also  from  the  conscious- 
ness of  power)  that  every  effect  has  a  cause, 
and  that  tbe  connexion  between  causes  and 
effects  is  invariable  :  or  that  events  which  have 
been  seen  constantly  to  succeed  one  the  other, 
in  a  certain  order, will  continue  to  do  so.  The 
manner  in  which  inferences  are  to  be  drawn  from 
facts,  may  be  thus  exemplified: — On  landing 
upon  an  unknown  shore,  we  observe  the  prints 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


101 


of  human  feet  on  the  sands,  and  infer  that  the 
country  is  inhabited  ;  for  the  mould  of  a  human 
foot  must  be  the  result,  not  of  the  impression  of 
the  waves,  but  of  a  cause  proper  to  its  produc- 
tion ;  and  this  can  be  nothing  else  but  the  foot  of 
man.  These  prints  are  fresh,  and  are  found  below 
the  level  of  high  water. — We  infer  then  again, 
that  some  human  being  is  not  far  distant ;  for 
the  action  of  the  waves  must  (according  to  the 
established  order  of   nature)   have  obliterated 
them,  had  they  been  impressed  before  the  last 
flow  of  the  tide.     Again,  the   prints  are  those, 
not  only  of  naked  feet,  but  of  feet  that  have 
never  been   confined   by  the  habit  of  wearing 
shoes  : — it  is  then  prohable,  if  not  certain,  that 
these  men  are  savages.     In   these   instances  of 
assuming  a  fact,  of  which  we  have  none  but 
indirect  evidence,  all  the  confidence  of  our  be- 
Hef  springs  from  the  persuasion,  both  that  every 
effect  must  have  a  cause,  and  that  every  effect  must 
have  a  cause  suited  to  it,  in  all  its  conditions.    Or, 
in  other  words,  that  every jiart,  ^inAjvoperty,  and 
circumstance  of  an  effect,  must  have  a  cause  pro- 
per to  itself.     Independently  of  any  process  of 
reasoning,  effects  with  which  we  are  familiar, 
instantaneously  suggest  to  the  mind  their  causes ; 
—the  inference  is  immediate. 

Inferences  are  liable  to  be  erroneous,  chiefly 


102 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


from  two  causes :  1st,  Certain  events  are  sup- 
posed   to   be   connected,  as  cause  and  effect, 
when  the   connexion  between  them  is  in  truth 
merely    accidental.       Superstitious   inferences 
are  of  this  sort;  as,  for  instance,  when  some 
trivial  occurrence,  or  simple  accident,  is  supposed 
to  be  a  prognostic  of  calamity  or  death,  because 
in  fact  it  has  happened   more  than  once  soon 
before  some  such   disastrous  event.     This  is  a 
false  inference,  because   there  is  no  real   con- 
nexion between  such  occurrences  and  the  mis- 
fortunes or  death  with  which  they  have  been 
associated.     2dly,   Inferences  are  false,  when, 
from  among  two  or  more  causes  that  might 
have  produced  a  certain  effect,  we  hastily  fix 
upon  one,  without  attending  to  the  others ;  as 
thus :— A  letter  is  received  professing  to  contain 
a  note  or  cheque ;  but  it  is  not  in  fact  there ; 
and  moreover  the  seal  presents  some  appear- 
ance of  having  been  broken,  and  repaired ;  and 
the  letter  passed  through  the  hands  of  a  servant, 
whose  integrity  we  have  some  reason  to  doubt. 
The  inference  which  immediately  suggests  itself 
is,  that  this   servant  has  withdrawn   the   note. 
But  it  is  not  a  conclusive  inference,  and  may 
actually  appear  to  have  been  a  false  one.     On 
writing  to  his  correspondent,  the  person  learns 
that,  after  he  had  sealed  the  letter,  he  re-opened 


ELEMENTS     OF     THOUGHT. 


103 


it  to  add  a  postscript,  and  that,  in  so  doing,  the 
note  fell  out,  and  was  not  seen  until  after  the 
letter  was  dispatched.  This  mode  of  account- 
ing for  the  fact  might  have  been  imagined,  as 
well  as  several  other  suppositions,  and  ought  to 
have  prevented  the  hasty  inference  which  im- 
plied the  dishonesty  of  the  servant.  Nothing 
is  more  characteristic  of  a  sound  and  calm  mind, 
than  the  habit  of  suspending  the  judgment 
when  evidence  is  ambiguous ;  or  of  abstaining 
from  plausible  but  inconclusive  inferences. 
Weak  minds  from  fear,  and  ardent  minds  from 
presumption,  usually  fix  upon  the  first  or  most 
obvious  inference  which  the  circumstances  of 
the  case  suggest.  The  important  distinction 
between  a  conjecture  and  an  inference  should 
always  be  kept  in  mind  :  the  former  is  the  sup- 
position of  a  particular  cause,  where  more  than 
one  are  before  us,  from  which  to  choose.  An 
inference,  when  just,  is  the  only  cause  that  can 
be  rationally  assumed,  by  which  to  account  for 
the  effect  in  question. 


INFINITE  ; 


That  which  has  no  limits;  or  to  which  limits 
have  not  actually  been  assigned.  A  line  is  said 
to  be  infinite,  though  not  more  than  an  inch  in 


104 


ELKMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


105 


length,  if  drawn  as  a  mere  line,  without  regard 
to  Its  length  :  a  finite  line  is  one  that  is  hounded 
bj  two  given,  or  known    points.     The  word 
infinite  is  very  frequently  used  iniproperly,  in- 
stead  of  the  \n ox A^  perfect,  or  ahsolute.     When 
qualities  are  spoken  of  which  can  neither  be 
numbered  or  measured,  there  can  be  no  proper 
idea  attached  to  the  phrase,  if  they  are  called 
either  finite  or  infinite.     Snow  is  not  infinitely 
but  perfectly  white.     If  the  divine  attrif)utes  of 
wisdom,  power,  goodness,  are  spoken  of  as  in- 
finite, It  is  only  by  an  allowable  accommodation 
of  the  term.     All  that  is  intended  is,  that  the 
perfections  of  the  Divine  Being  surpass  all  our 
knowledge,    or    faculties    of    comprehension 
God  IS  perfectly,  and  absolutely,  rather  than  in- 
finitely,  wise,  holy,  and  good. 

INSTINCT. 

Many  of  the  animal  tribes,  and  insects,  and 
especially  birds,  perform  operations  which  implv 
not  merely  forethought,  and  a  calculation  of 
cause  and  effect,  but  a  perfect  Imoivledge  of  the 
most  difficult  problems  of  geometry ;  as,  for  in- 
stance—the construction  of  the  honey-coinb, 
which,  in  the  figure  and  combination  of  thJ 
cells,  is  strictly  conformed  to  the  highest  mathe- 


matical principles.  And  yet  this  knowledge 
cannot  be  imagined  to  reside  in  the  animal. 
For  if  it  did,  we  should  see  that  it  would  be 
more  or  less  perfect  in  different  individuals  ;  and 
would  be  improved  by  experience,  and  would 

show  itself  in  other  modes,and  on  other  occasions ; 
and  we  should  almost  certainly  find  mistakes  to 
be  sometimes  committed.  But  the  contrary  in 
all  these  points  is  the  fact.  We  are  compelled, 
therefore,  to  impute  the  knowledge  and  the  fore- 
thought to  the  Creator,  and  to  consider  the 
animal  only  as  the  unconscious  or  unreasoning 
instrument  of  what  it  performs.  This  blind 
mode  of  operation — quite  inconceivable  by  the 
human  mind,  is  what  we  mean  by  the  word 
Instinct.  Reason,  as  distinguished  from  instinct, 
is  the  knowledge  of  the  relation  between 
means  and  end  ;  or  cause  and  effect.  And  in 
this  sense  animals  are,  though  in  an  inferior 
degree,  endowed  with  reason.  They  act  just 
as  man  acts,  from  knowledge  and  forethought, 
in  a  considerable  part  of  their  movements. 

INTELLECTUAL  POWERS, 

Are  distinguished  from  the  animal  appetites, 
and  from  the  moral  faculties,  or  sensibilities : 
that  is  to  say,  from  all  mere   sensations,  and 

5* 


•■^•s^  *  ««u% 


106 


ELEMENTS      OF     THOUGHT. 


desires,  and  emotions,  and  tastes.  To  perceive 
external  objects,  to  conceive  of  them,  to  re- 
member, to  imagine,  to  compare,  to  judge,  to 
abstract,  and  to  analyse,  to  connect  thought 
with  thought,  according  to  the  real  relation  be- 
tween one  notion  and  another  ; — these  are  the 
employments  of  the  intellectual  powers ;  and 
these  occupations  of  the  mind,  though  most 
often,  if  not  always  connected  with,  or  preced- 
ed, or  followed  by  desires  or  emotions,  of  some 
sort,  are  essentially  different  from  loving,  hating, 
fearing,  hoping,  &c. 


INTUITION, 

From  intueor,  to  look  upon,  or  to  look  into 
with  some  attention.  Whatever  relation  of  one 
thing  to  another  may  be  perceived  or  under- 
stood imtanthj,  and  without  the  aid  of  any  in- 
termediate  comparisons,  is  said  to  be  known  by 
intuition:  as  that  these  two  lines  are  of  equal 
length. 


But  if  it  were  affirmed  that  these 


are  to  each  other  as  seven  is  to  ten,  very  few 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


107 


persons  would  intuitively/ perceive  the  truth  of  the 
assertion ;  and  to  prove  it  we  must  have  recourse 
to  a  comparison  of  the  parts  of  both ;  or,  in 
other  words,  to  a  number  of  intuitions.  This 
sort  of  proof  is  a  demonstration  which  differs 
from  intuition,  by  its  consisting  of  several  in- 
tuitive truths.  Truths  intuitively  perceived  are 
called  axioms. 


INVENTION. 

This  word,  though  derived  from  the  Latin 
invenio,  to  find,  or  meet  with,  has  acquired  a 
different  sense,  and  signifies  to  devise,  or  imagine, 
or  to  put  together.  It  is  thus  applied  to  two 
very  different  operations  of  the  mind,  namely, 
poetical,  and  mechanical  invention.  Poetical 
invention  is  the  bringing  together  images  and 
sentiments  adapted  to  excite  certain  pleasurable 
emotions,  or  to  enkindle  the  imagination,  and 
gratify  taste;  and  it  depends  upon  the  ready 
perception  of  external  resemblances,  or  apparent 
analogies.  But  mechanical  invention  results 
from  an  effort  of  abstraction,  in  discerning  and 
bringing  together  certain  properties  of  bodies, 
for  the  production  of  a  particular  result.  An 
end  is  proposed ;  as  for  instance,  the  raising  of 
a  massive  stone  to  its  lofty  place  in  a  building. 
How  shall  this  be  done? — naked  human  strength 


108 


ELEMENTS      OP     THOUGHT. 


IS  altogether  insufficient.     In  what  way  then 
may  human  strength,  or  other  forces,  be  applied 
to  the  stone  witJi  such  advantage  as  shall  render 
the  operation  facile,  safe,  and  not  too  costly  ? 
The  exchange  between  power  and  time,  which 
IS  effected  by  the  lever,  the  inclined  plane,  the 
screw,  the  pulley,  are  then  thought  of;  and  a 
choice  is  niade,  first  among  these  various  means, 
and  then  among  the  various  modes  of  apnlvin<r 
each.  '  "^    "= 

The  vast  difference  between  the  reasoning 
faculty  of  man  and  animals,  is  especially  dis- 
played in  the  extent  to  which  the  power  of 
devising  means  for  the  attainment  of  an  end  is 
carried  by  man,  in  consequence  of  his  greater 
power  of  abstraction :— the  most  simple  instru- 
ment, or  tool,  is  a  product  of  the  faculty  of  ab- 
straction ;  nor  is  there  reason  to  suppose  that, 
even  if  the  paws  of  animals  were  better  fitted 
than  they  arc  to  the  holding  of  tools,  animals 
could  construct  or  employ  them,  unless  their 
mental  faculties  were  also  enlarged. 

Men  and  beasts  alike  betake  themselves  to 
the  shelter  of  trees,  or  rocks,  during  a  storm  • 
thus  far  they  both  seek  to  accomplish  an  end 
by  the  use  of  means.  But  the  animal  advances 
no  further  than  to  recollect,  on  after  occasions, 
the  connexion  between  the  tree,  or  rock,  and 


»„i»   •*>*  1^  "N-'W 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


109 


the  feeling  of  protection  from  rain  and  wind, 
which   it  has  afforded.     Man   not  merely  re- 
members this  connexion,  but  thinks   abstract- 
edly of  the  several  objects  which  have  screened 
him  from  the  tempest.     He  thinks  of  shelter ; 
this  is  an  abstract  notion,  and  having  formed  it, 
whether  consciously  or  not  to  himself,  he  per- 
ceives that  it  may  belong  to  other  things  than 
the  tree,  or  the  rock,  or  the  cavern  ;  and   he 
brings    together,    in    the    most    advantageous 
manner,  such  materials  as  will,  when  so  united, 
realize  most  completely  his  abstract  idea  : — the 
hut  of  the  savage,  constructed  of  rough  branches 
and  wattled  boughs  and  leaves  and  dried  grass, 
is  nothing  else  than  the  embodying  of  an  ab- 
straction.    The  same  may  be  said  of  all,  even 
the  most   finished  works  of  human  ingenuity. 
When  animals — the   bee,  or  the  beaver,  or  the 
white   ant — embody  an   abstract  idea,  they  do 
so  in  an  invariable  manner : — they  commit  no 
blunders  ; — make  no  improvements ; — and  ex- 
ercise their  skill  at  once,  and  without  instruction. 
This  is  manifestly  not  the  product  of  a  mental 
process,   like  that  of  man,  when   he   exercises 
invention.      We   must   therefore    attribute  the 
knowledge  to  the  Creator,  and   designate  the 
unintelligent   agency  by  another  term  ;  or  call 
it  INSTINCT.      Invention   is  distinguished  from 


110 


ELEMENTS     OF     THOUGHT, 


discovery,  which  is  the  finding  out  something 
already  existing  ;  whereas  invention  is  a  sort  of 
creation.  The  finding  out  the  polarity  of 
the  magnet  was  a  discovery  :  the  apphcation  of 
that  discovery  to  the  purposes  of  navigation, 
by  suspending  a  magnetic  wire  on  a  pivot,  over 
a  circular  index,  was  an  invention. 

JUDGMENT, 

Is  the  action  of  the  mind  in  deciding,  or  pro- 
nouncing, concerning  two  things,  when  placed 
in  comparison,  that  they  are  equal,  or  unequal ; 
hke,  or  unHke ;  that  the  one  contains  the  other, 
or  bears  such  or  such  a  relation  to  it.  It  is  by 
successive  judgments,  or  by  the  regular  compar- 
ing of  one  idea  or  notion  with  another,  until 
we  reach  some  one  which  at  first  was  seen  in 
the  distance,  that  a  process  of  reasoning  is 
carried  on. 

The  excellence  of  the  judgment,  as  a  faculty 
of  the  mind,  depends,  in  the  first  place,  upon 
the  clearness  of  its  ideas,  the  precision  or  jex- 
actness  of  its  power  of  abstraction  ;  and  upon  its 
power  of  attention.  But  the  moral  character,  or 
the  habitual  motives  of  the  mind,  have  very 
much  to  do  with  the  soundness  and  excellence 
of  the  judgment     This  will  appear  if  we  ex- 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


Ill 


amine  the  real  meaning  of  those  epithets  which 
are  most  frequently  applied  to  the  judgment, 
by  way  of  distinction.  Most  of  them  express 
the  freedom  of  the  mind  from  some  sort  of  pre- 
judice, or  improper  motive,  or  disturbing  in- 
fluence. The  mind  never  acts  without  some 
motive ;  now  the  ruling  motive,  when  it  is  to 
exercise  judgment,  should  manifestly  be — the 
desire  to  arrive  at  a  true  result.  A  nd  this  motive 
should  be  both  vivid  and  permanent,  or  it  will 
not  prevail  over  opposite  impulses,  or  over  the 
inertness  of  the  mind.  The  phrase,  a  sound 
judgment,  means  that  the  mind  has  so  healthy, 
or  vigorous  a  habit  of  pursuing  truth,  that  it  is 
not  diverted  or  led  astray  by  those  tastes,  or 
prejudices,  or  preferences,  which  are  always  at 
hand  to  influence  our  decisions.  A  calm  judg- 
ment is  one  which  is  not  swayed  or  intimidated 
by  the  passions  or  vehemence  of  other  men ;  or 
which  can  serenely  carry  on  its  intellectual 
operations,  amid  many  surrounding  agitations. 
A  cool  judgment  is  nearly  the  same  thing;  or 
if  distinguishable  from  the  calmness  o{  t\\Q  ]v\Ag- 
ment,  it  refers  to  freedom  from  external  disturb- 
ances :  while  coolness  relates  to  such  as  are  in- 
ternal;  namely — a  nervous  irritability  of  the 
body ;  a  lively  and  excitable  imagination  ;  an 
excessive  sensibility  of  the  moral  feehngs  ; — or 


112 


ELEMENTS   OP  THOUGHT. 


ELEMENTS   OF   THOUGH  T 


113 


the  prevalence  of  malignant  passions.  Those 
who  are  distinguished  bv  this  cahnness  and 
coolness  of  judgment  possess  a  great  advantage 
in  their  transactions  with  others ;  for  it  is  a  rare 
excellence,  and  enables  a  man  both  to  attain  a 
true  result  more  certainly,  and  to  attain  it  more 
speedily  than  those  with  whom  he  has  to 
do.  While  they  are  carried  hither  and  thither, 
by  their  prejudices,  their  wishes,  their  hopes,  or 
their  fears,  he  has  gained  a  just  view  of  the 
business  in  question ;  and  is,  at  his  leisure,  cal- 
culating all  the  consequences  of  the  line  of  con- 
duct he  means  to  pursue.  It  may  however  be 
observed,  that  this  calmness  and  coolness  of 
mind,  when  belonging  to  vulgarity  and  sordid- 
ness  of  character,  commonly  generates  a  self- 
conceit,  or  vanity,  which  becomes  an  indirect 
motive,  and  leads  the  understanding  astray. 
Men  of  this  sort,  in  order  to  gain  the  immediate 
gratification  of  having  reached  an  unfair  ad- 
vantage over  the  simple,  confine  their  views  to 
the  present  moment ;  and  while  they  snatch  at 
a  trifling  profit,  are  blind  to  their  own  greater 
and  future  interests.  Cunning,  or  worldly  wis- 
dom, is  the  usual  designation  of  this  sort  of 
intellectual  short-sightedness,  which  is  produced 
in  vain  and  vulgar  minds  that  possess  the  ad- 
vantage of  a  cool  judgment. 


The  epithets  acute,  profound,  and  comiirehcn- 
sive,  appUed  to  the  judgment,  express  diffl'rent 
degrees,  or  kinds,  of  activity,  and  of  force,  in 
the  intellect.  Next  to  the  many  perverting 
motives  which  are  the  great  sources  of  errors 
of  judgment,  a  principal  cause  of  false  or  im- 
perfect conclusions  is  that  indolence,  or  inert- 
ness, from  which  very  few  minds  are  altogether 
exempt.  In  many  minds  intellectual  action 
ceases,  or  falters,  before  the  process  of  compar- 
ing objects  or  notions  is  completed.  These 
unfinished  comparisons,  if  deemed  to  be  perfect, 
are  necessarily  false  judgments.  The  activity, 
or  the  energy,  which  resists  this  inertness,  dis- 
plays itself  in  different  modes,  as  for  example : 
— A  mind  that  is  capable  of  a  short  vigorous 
effort,  will  complete  a  single  process  of  thought, 
and  produce  a  perfect  comparison  of  two  or 
three  objects.  This  is  what  constitutes  an  acute 
judgment.  A  7?/7?/^?/wrf  judgment  is  one  that  is 
capable  of  long-continued  and  patient  exertion, 
and  in  which  the  desire  of  truth  is  tranquil  and 
steady,  so  that  every  comparison  is  carefully 
made,  and  the  entire  series  of  comparisons  is 
pursued,  until  the  matter  in  question  is  examined 
in  all  its  breadth  and  depth. 

When  a  vivid  and  steady  desire  of  truth   is 
conjoined  with   modesty  and  with  great  tran- 


114 


ELEMENTS      OP     THOUGHT. 


quillitj,  and  ingenuousness  of  temper,  there  will 
be  a  frequent  return  of  the  mind  to  the  same 
subject,  as  if  to  examine  anew  its  former  con- 
clusions.    This  will  leave  room  for  the  admis- 
sion of  new  considerations,  which   heretofore 
may  have  been  neglected ;  and  thus  frequent 
amendments,  or  revisions  of  such   conclusions 
will  take  place :  and   a  habit  will  be  formed  of 
suspending  the  mental   process  in  expectation 
of  new  light  or  more  evidence.     These  habits 
form  what  is  termed  a  ^^w;;;-^//^^z.sw  judgment; 
or  an  enlarged  mode  of  thinking.     Acute  minds 
are  often   hurried  into  error  from  the  want  of 
this  sort  of  revision  of  their  opinions;  and  pro- 
found  minds   are  liable  to  err  by  the  too  con- 
tinuous and  unbroken  fixing  of  the  mind  upon 
a  single  train  of  ideas ;  so  that  facts  or  princi- 
ples whicb,   though  nearly  connected  with  the 
subject  before   them,  Uc  on  one  side,  are  over- 
looked.— It  is  thus  often   that  the  learned  lose 
themselves  in   depths,  where   common    minds 
easily  find  their  way.     Acuteness,  profoundness, 
and  even  comprehensiveness  of  judgment,  are 
not  seldom  found  apart  from  evenness  or  serenity 
of  temper ;  in  such  cases  the  intellectual  excel- 
lence shows  itself  only  in  favorable  seasons,  or 
when  no  vivid  motive  agitates  the  spirit.     Some 
persons  exhibit  consunnnate  ability,  and  great 


*»%A»*V^*,^*y* 


ELEMENTS   OF   THOUGHT. 


115 


soundness  of  judgment  in  managing  other  men's 
affairs,  or  in  giving  advice  where  they  are  not 
personally  interested  ;  though  ihey  invariably 
mismanage  their  own  concerns: — m  their  own 
concerns,  their  intellectual  faculties  are  perturbed 
by  their  hopes,  fears,  passions,  or  anxieties.  It 
is  thus,  often,  that  studious  men,  who  display 
the  highest  degree  of  acuteness  or  force  of 
mind,  while  occupied  in  their  closets,  with 
literary  or  scientific  matters,  act  like  children, 
if  exposed  to  the  agitations  of  public  life. 


LIBERTY, 

As  an  abstract  term,  is  opposed  to  necessity, 
and  means  the  absence  of  restraint,  or  hin- 
drance, or  interruption  in  the  performance  of  an 
action,  or  the  fulfilment  of  any  desire.  (See 
Necessity.) 

LOGIC, 

Considered  as  a  science,  explains  the  opera- 
tion of  the  mind  in  reasoning,  or  in  discovering 
truth.  As  an  art  it  teaches  the  method  of 
managing  the  faculties  of  abstraction,  generah- 
zation,  and  judgment,  to  the  greatest  advantage ; 
and  gives  rules  also  for  detecting  fallacious  or 
sophistical  arguments.  Logic  has,  in  modern 
times,  been   much   neglected  and  despised,  in 


116 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


consequence  of  the  futile  matter,  or  the  un- 
meaning jargon,  with  which,  formerly,  it 
abounded.  It  is  well  that  the  ancient  system 
of  wrangling  about  trifles  should  be  discarded ; 
but  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  the  mind  maybe 
greatly  strengthened  and  aided  by  that  sort  of 
training  and  exercise  which  is  scarcely  at  all 
attempted  in  modern  education.  A  man  may 
be  both  strong  and  brave  who  is  taken  un- 
trained from  the  plough ;  but  neither  his  strength 
nor  courage  will  be  of  much  service  in  a  field 
of  battle,  until  he  has  learned  to  employ  both 
with  the  precision,  promptitude,  and  subordina- 
tion, which  are  taught  by  the  military  exercise. 
And  thus  too,  good  sense,  and  strength  of  mind, 
are  often  baffled  or  overthrown  by  the  subtilty 
of  a  crafty  reasoner,  merely  because  the  mind 
wants  the  training  which  a  sound  and  rational 
system  of  logic  might  afford. 


MAJOR,  MINOR,  and  MIDDLE  TERMS 866 

SYLLOGISM. 


MATTER, 


That  which  occupies  space,  which,  when  so 
occupied,  is  called  extension.  Matter  becomes 
known  to  the  mind  by  its  obstructing  the  move- 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


117 


ments  of  the  body,  and  by  its  affecting  at  the 
same  time  the  organ  of  sight.  Having  gained 
the  knowledge  of  that  which  is  solid  and  visible, 
we  think  of  it  as  a  substance,  which  supports, 
or  contains  all  the  various  qualities  of  color, 
figure,  density,  fragrance,  taste,  &c.  that  affect 
the  senses.  All  we  have  knowledge  of  is  either 
7nind  or  matter.  The  former  feels,  and  knows, 
and  moves  the  latter ;  the  latter  makes  impres- 
sions on  the  senses,  and  resists  the  power  of 
movement. 


MEMORY, 

Is  the  presence  of  some  image  or  notion  in 
the  mind,  attended  by  those  accidental  circum- 
stances which  connect  it  with  our  past  consci- 
ousness. It  is  this  faculty  of  memory  which 
maintains  in  the  mind,  from  day  to  day,  and 
from  year  to  year,  the  conviction  of  personal 
identity,  amid  the  greatest  changes  of  disposi- 
tion, or  external  condition.  And,  by  a  tacit 
inference  from  this  feeling  of  past  and  continuous 
existence,  we  learn  to  look  forward  to  a  remote 
futurity.  The  faculty  of  memory,  in  different 
minds,  has  various  excellencies  and  defects.  In 
some  minds  it  is  ready ;  that  is  to  say,  it  in- 
stantly brings  forward  the  particular  recollec- 
tions that  are  required  by  the  occasion.     In 


118 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


otiiers  it  is  retentive  of  whatever  has  once  been 
impressed  on  it ;  bin  does  not  act  so  promptly, 
when  called  to  produce  its  evidence.     In  others 
It  receives  with  great  facihty  new  impressions ; 
retains  them  in  perfection  for  a  short  time  but 
very  quiciilj  loses  every  trace  of  its  acquisitions. 
The  memory  is  perhaps  more  nearly,  than  any 
other  faculty,  connected  with  the  state  of  the 
bram  as  a  hodihj  organ  ;— it  is  most  perfect  in 
youth,  and  is  the  first  of  the  mental  powers  to 
exhibit  the  effects  of  age :  it  is  impaired,  or 
sometimes  entirely  lost,  in  consequence  of  in- 
juries on  the  head ;  and  has  been  recovered 
when  such  injuries  have  been  remedied.     The 
memory  also  is   susceptible  of  very  great  im- 
provement, by  exercise ;  and,  on  the  contrary 
becomes   almost   torpid,   if   neglected.      The' 
training   and    exercise  of  the  memory  should 
therefore  be  a  principal  business  of  education. 
1  here  is  however  nothing  which  more  enfeebles 
the  reasoning  powers,  and  checks  the  imagina- 
tion, than  an  excessive  or  exclusive  exercise  of 
the  memory. 

METAPHYSICS. 

The  knowledge  of  things  actually  existing 
whether  material  or  immaterial,  is  comprehended 
under  the  different  branches  of  physical  or  na- 


ELEMENTS   OF   THOUGHT. 


1J9 


tural  philosophy  ;  such  as  natural  history,  me- 
chanical philosophy,  chemistry,  &c.  or  pneiima- 
tology,  which   is   the  science   of   mind.       But 
there  are  abstract  or  universal  truths — principles 
which  would  be  true  whether  or  not  the  world 
and  its  inhabitants  existed  ;  or  if  the  world,  and 
all  it  contains,  were   altogether  unlike  what  it 
is.     The  knowledge  of  these  universal  truths, 
and  their  relation  one  to  another,  is  taught  by 
metaphysics.     The  pure  mathematics,  or  higher 
principles  of  geometry  and  arithmetic,  stand  in 
the  same  relation  to  mechanical  science,  and  to 
what  is  called  the  mixed  mathematics,  which 
exists  between  metaphysics  and  the  philosophy 
of  the  human  mind.     As  for  example— the  pro- 
portion between  the  diameter  and  circumference 
of  a    circle,  which   is  nearly  as   113  to   355, 
would  be  the   same,  though  no  material  world 
existed,  and  is  absolutely  independent  of  all  the 
laws   and    arrangements  of  the  actual  world. 
But  such  principles  as  the  laws  of  gravitation, 
which  regulate  the  movements  of  the  planets,' 
and   the  attractions  and  repulsions    that  exist 
among  different   bodies,  and  the  refraction  of 
Hght,  are  facts  in  the   constitution  of  the  ma- 
terial system,  and   are  learned   by  observation 
and   experiment.      And   thus,  in  like  manner, 
those  facts  which  have  been  mentioned  under 


120 


E  L  E  M  E  IV  T  S      OF      THOUGHT. 


the  articles  Judgment,  Memory,  Imagination, 
belong  to  the  real  and  actual  constitution  of  the 
human  mind  ;  which  might  have  been  otherwise 
framed  than  it  is.  But  such  trutlis  as  these— 
Every  effect  must  have  a  Cause— There  must 
be  a  First  Cause— and  a  Self-existent  Being, 
are  abstract  and  unchangeable  principles;  and 
belong  to  Metaphysics, 


METHOD, 

Is  the  arranging  of  our  knowledge  in  that 
order  which  renders  it  most  intelligible  to  others, 
whom  we  wish  to  instruct.  It  is  a  disposition, 
having  in  view  a  specific  object.  Methodical 
halHts  of  thinking  should  not  be  mistaken  for 
philosophical  habits,  in  which  there  is  more  of 
analysis,  and  of  generalization,  than  of  obvious 
arrangement. 

MIND, 

Is  that  which  perceives,  feels,  remembers, 
acts,  and  is  conscious  of  continued  existence. 

MODE. 

The  manner  or  conditions  under  which  a 
thing  exists,  is  called  its  mode  :— figure  and 
color  are  modes  of  matter.  This  term  is  merely 
logical,  and  of  little  utility. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


121 


NATURE. 

All  the  properties  or  qualities,  taken  together, 
which  are  deemed  proper  to  a  thing,  or  insepa- 
rable from  it,  constitute  its  nature  or  essence. 
The  word  nature  is  a  mere  term  of  conveni- 
ence, which  briefly  signifies  all  the  ordinary 
or  most  important  qualities  of  the  thing  we 
speak  of. 

NECESSITY. 

As  an  abstract  term,  is  opposed,  1st,  to  Con- 
tingency,  which  means  either  the  happening  of 
events  without    any   cause    why    they    should 
happen,  and  then  necessity  means  only  that 
every  effect  has  a  cause ;  or  contingency  means 
that  there  is  no  absurdity  or  contradiction  in  sup- 
posing that  something  which  does  exist,  might 
not  have  existed ;  as  for  example,  some  parti- 
cular species  of  animals ;  for  we  can  conceive 
very  well  of  a  world   in  w4iich  there  were  no 
lions,  or  no  elephants : — lions  and  elephants  are, 
therefore,  contingent,  not  necessary  beings.     Or, 
2dly,  Necessity  is  often  opposed  to  liberty ;  but 
an  improper  or  unintelligible  sense  is  assigned 
to  the  word,  when  so  employed,  unless  it  is 
merely  intended  to  affirm,  that  no  cause  can 
operate  beyond  its  sphere,  or  that  no  being  can 

6 


122 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


go  beyond  its  powers  and  faculties ; — but  then 
some  such  word  as  limitation  is  to  be  preferred. 
A  stone  necessarily  remains  where  it  Hes,  until 
it  be  moved  by  some  foreign  cause.  An  animal 
necessarily  pursues  the  instincts  of  its  nature ; 
and  a  necessity  of  nature  denies  to  man  the 
liberty  of  soaring  through  the  air.  These  forms 
of  speaking  add  nothing  to  the  clearness  or 
precision  of  our  notions ;  and  have  arisen  out 
of  absurd  disputations.  Necessity,  certainty, 
possibility,  impossibility,  i&c.  are  words  (as  they 
are  familiarly  used)  which  indicate  only  a  higher 
or  lower  degree  of  knowledge  of  the  hidden 
causes  of  things.  One  man  regards  a  future 
event  as  contingent — probable — possible,  which 
another  pronounces  to  be  necessary,  certain,  or 
impossible.  As  thus: — A  bowing  wall,  or  a 
tottering  house,  is  looked  at  by  two  persons; 
one,  if  asked  whether  it  will  stand  a  year 
longer,  replies,  <*  That  it  viay  stand  so  long,  but 
its  doing  so  is  contingent,  or  probable,  or  im- 
probable." But  the  other,  who  is  a  builder,  and 
who  has  examined  the  foundations  and  the 
fissures,  and  held  his  plumb-hne  to  the  up- 
rights, affirms,  that  the  whole  will  fall  to  the 
ground  in  a  few  days  ; — he  says  it  will  neces- 
sarily fall :  that  is  to  say — he  who  speaks  iwc^zr^ 
the  causes  on  which  the  event  depends ;  the 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


123 


other  is  ignorant  of  them,  and  thought  the 
event  in  question  a  chance.  (See  Contingency 
and  Liberty.) 

NEGATIVE  and  POSITIVE, 

Are  correlative  terms,  when  causes  or  qualities 
are  spoken  of.  Beneficence  is  a  positive  virtue. 
Justice  may,  in  a  sense,  be  called  a  negative 
virtue ;  for  it  may  be  defined  as  consisting  in 
not  invading  the  rights  of  others.  Negative 
and  affirmative  are  the  correlative  terms,  if  ap- 
plied to  propositions.  As — *'  Piety,  with  con- 
tentment, is  great  gain  :"  this  is  a  positive  pro- 
position.    *'  Riches  will  not  ensure  happiness," 


IS  negative. 


NOMINAL  and  REAL, 

Are  terms  occurring  in  the  history  of  intel- 
lectual philosophy,  and  refer  to  an  absurd  dispute, 
long  carried  on  with  great  violence  and  rancor, 
on  the  question,  whether  general  ideas,  or  essen- 
tial forms,  have  any  real  existence — no  one  can 
say  where — as  Plato  imagined  ;  or  whether 
they  are  nothing  more  than  the  notions  formed 
in  the  human  mind,  after  contemplating  things, 
as  genus  and  qyecies.  The  adherents  of  the 
former  opinion  were  called  Realists,  those  of  the 
latter  Nominalists. 


~»~  J^ 


124 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


125 


NOTION. 

The  word  idea  is  most  properly  applied  to 
images  of  things  in  the  mind,  retained  or  re- 
called ;  while  the  word  notion  signifies  complex 
abstractions  of  some  kind,  such  as  those  of 
justice,  truth,  equality,  disproportion,  &c. 

ORDER, 

Is  a  fixed  succession  of  many  things — which 
succession  has  reference  to  some  intention,  and 
is  the  consequence  of  arrangement.  Or  the 
word  order  is  used  more  abstractedlv,  in  rela- 
tion  to  number,  spoken  of,  not  in  the  aggregate, 
but  as  consisting  of  successive  integers,  the 
relative  place  of  each  being  noted — as  the  7th, 
8th,  9th. 

OPINION. 

Facts  or  principles  which  rest  upon  demon- 
stration are  known.  Facts  established  by  good 
and  sufficient  evidence,  are  helieved.  Abstract 
or  speculative  principles,  confirmed  by  argu- 
ments which  we  deem  conclusive  or  satisfac- 
tory, though  they  may  not  seem  so  to  others, 
are  matters  of  opinion.  We  know,  or  may 
know,  that  a  square,  raised  upon  a  hypothenuse, 
is  equal  to  the   two  squares  together,  that  are 


raised  upon  the  upright  and  base  line  of  a  right- 
angled  triangle.  We  believe  that  Brutus  killed 
Caesar.  It  is  our  opinion,  that  a  Umited  mon- 
archy is  preferable  to  a  democracy.  The  word 
opinion  is  most  frequently  applied  to  abstract 
propositions,  which  are  matters  of  dispute,  and 
which  excite  a  lively  interest,  such,  for  example, 
as  political  or  religious  principles. 

The  circumstances  of  education,  habit,  and 
interest,  or  association  ;  or  even  the  tastes  and 
incHnations  that  belong  to  the  imagination,  have, 
with  most  men,  more  influence  in  the  determi- 
nation of  their  opinions,  than   the  mere  argu- 
ments that  support  such  principles.     It  is  to  be 
remembered,  that   in  questions  which   do  not 
admit  of  demonstrative  reasoning,  or  on  which 
the  evidence  is  not  of  the  most  obvious  and 
irresistible  kind,  there  is  always  room  for  the 
establishment  of  a  contrary  supposition ;  so  that 
even  the   most  improbable  opinion,  if  viewed 
exclusively  in  the  light  of  those  few  evidences 
which  give  it  an  appearance  of  truth,  may  seem 
reasonable.     And  if  the  mind  has  acquired  the 
habit  of  timidly,  or  resentfully,  or   perversely 
turning  away  from  all  evidence  but  that  which 
favors  its  prejudices,  or  interests,  its  pride,  or  its 
indolence,  it  may  hold  or  defend  an  error  of 
opinion,  without  direct  insincerity,  or  conscious 


126 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


dishonesty.  And  after  a  while,  the  inconcki- 
sive  evidence,  which  at  first  perhaps  by  no  means 
satisfied  the  understanding,  has  made  itself  so 
famihar,  so  intelligible,  and  has  assumed  so  fair 
an  aspect,  and  has  insensibly  drawn  to  itself  so 
many  little  corroborations,  that  all  doubt  and 
suspicion  is  for  ever  dismissed  ;  and  the  mind 
becomes  absolutely  enslaved  by  its  own  delu- 
sions. 

Though  the  majority  of  mankind  adhere, 
through  life,  to  the  opinions  they  may  have 
adopted  from  education,  or  interest ;  instances 
of  a  change  of  opinion  are  not  uncommon. 
Such  changes  take  place  from  various  causes. 
Some  men  are  very  often  veering  from  point  to 
point,  in  consequence  of  instability  of  disposition. 
There  is  a  feeble  activity — an  irresolute  force, 
iii  the  mind,  which  at  once  prevents  its  attain- 
ing complete  conviction  on  any  disputed  matter, 
and  tempts  it  to  wander,  hither  and  thither,  in 
search  of  what  it  can  never  find— undoubted 
certainty.  A  melancholic  timidity  also,  breeds, 
in  some  minds,  a  distrust  of  all  evidence : — 
persons  of  this  temper  change  their  opinions, 
again  and  again,  from  the  mere  fear  of  having 
been  deceived  in  those  they  last  held.  There  is 
also  an  affectation  of  independence  and  freedom 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


127 


from  vulgar  prejudice,  which  impels  some  per- 
sons frequently  to  profess  a  new  creed. 

There  are  those  who  abandon  the  principles 
of  their  education  from  the  influence  of  a  strong 
peculiarity  of  temper. — The  accident  of  birth 
has  perhaps  placed  them  in  an  atmosphere 
which  they  cannot  breathe,  and  when  the  in- 
tellectual powers  expand,  they  betake  themselves 
to  what  they  feel  a  more  congenial  region.  He 
whose  temper  is  at  once  arrogant  and  timid, 
will  probably  go  over  to  the  party  which  pro- 
fesses arbitrary  principles  of  government;  he 
w  ill  abhor  republicanism  ;  rail  at  the  defenders 
of  popular  rights :  and  court  the  favor  of  the 
noble : — he  will  have  little  sympathy  with  the 
poor,  and  the  inany ;  while  he  approves  of  the 
force,  and  apologizes  for  the  corruption,  by 
which  the  privileges  of  the  fete  are  supported. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  whose  pride  and  arro- 
gance are  of  a  more  active  and  malignant  kind, 
will  be  the  friend  of  the  populace,  and  the  foe 
of  the  great  and  noble ; — he  will  profess  opinions 
which  give  a  show  of  reason  to  a  turbulent 
hostility  towards  those  who  administer  the  go- 
vernment, let  their  measures  be  what  they  may. 
The  spirit  of  contradiction,  and  the  love  of 
wrangling,  is  the  ruling  principle  in  some  minds  ; 
and  persons  affected   by  it  may  be  driven,  by 


128 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


opposition,  into  the  profession  of  any  opinion, 
how  absurd  soever,  or  contrary  to  their  former 
professions.  In  order  to  secure  themselves  as 
far  as  possible  against  the  danger  of  finding  no 
opponents,  they  declare  themselves  the  advo- 
cates of  whatever  is  most  paradoxical  and  fla- 
grantly extravagant. 

But  although  the  profession  of  this  or  of  that 
new  order  of  opinions  is  too  often  the  result  of 
improper  motives,   there    are   not  wanting  in- 
stances of  the  renunciation  of  one  set  of  prin- 
ciples,  and  the  adoption  of  another,  in  conse- 
quence of  an  ingenuous  attention  to  evidence 
and  argument.       Such   revolutions,   especially 
when  religion  is  the  subject  of  them,  and  when 
they  spring  from  genuine  motives,  will  be  at- 
tended with  modesty,  and  with  a  respectful  and 
kind  treatment  of  those  who  may  still  adhere 
to  the  principles  that  have  been  renounced.    A 
noisy  and  insolent  dogmatism  distinguishes,  not 
only  blind  and  obstinate  pertinacity,  but  versa- 
tility also  ;   and   he  who   to-day  turns   round 
offensively  upon  the  party  to  which  yesterday 
he  belonged,  may  be  expected  to-morrow  to 
make  some  new  movement,  that  shall  compel 
him  to  criminate  his  own  most  recent  profes- 
sions. 

The   great   principle— so   little    thought  of. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


129 


though  so  obvious  that  the  statement  of  it  seems 
unnecessary — That  nothing  but  Truth  can  in 
the  end  be  advantageous  or  safe,  would,  if  al- 
ways kept  in  sight,  secure  us  from  a  thousand 
influences  which  lead  us  into  error. 


PASSIVE — see  active. 


PERCEPTION, 

Is  distinguished  from  sensation  and  conception. 
The  mere  impression  produced  upon  the  mind 
through  the  senses  by  external  objects,  is  called 
a  sensation  :  and  if  this  impression  were  un- 
connected with  others,  belonging  to  different 
senses,  we  should  perhaps  not  be  led  to  regard 
it  as  caused  by  an  external  object.  Thus, 
for  example,  a  taste  or  smell,  or  the  prick  of  a 
pin,  alone,  would  be  regarded  merely  as  ^feeling 
of  the  mind.  But  when  that  which  is  tasted  is 
at  tlie  same  time  felt,  and  has  just  before  been 
seen,  we  involuntarily  combine  the  several  sen- 
sations ;  or  think  of  them  as  derived  from  one 
and  the  same  source.  And  it  is  thus,  especially, 
that  when  we  see  and  touch  an  object,  the 
two  very  dissimilar  sensations,  combined,  give 

6* 


130 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


the  conviction  of  an  external  object,  as  the  one 
cause  of  both.  Conception  is  the  recovery  of 
some  past  perception. 

PHENOMENON, 

From  ^aivo'fxsvov — something  which  makes  its 
appearance.  This  term  of  physical  science  is 
most  properly  applied  to  the  visible  objects  of 
natural  philosophy,  and  especially  to  facts  or  ap- 
pearances which  have  not  yet  been  fully  ex- 
plained. Phenomena  arc  invitations  addressed 
by  nature  to  the  rational  curiosity  of  man. 

POWER— «ee  CAUSE. 

Having  derived  the  notion  signified  by  the 
word  power,  from  our  own  conscious  abihty, 
both  to  affect  or  move  matter,  and  to  control 
our  own  thoughts,  wc  impute  it  to  whatever  is 
seen,  or  to  whatever  seems  to  produce  a  change 
upon  another  body;  and  thus  learn  to  speak  of 
the  powers  of  nature  : — but  when  these  powers 
are  closely  examined  we  find  nothing  beyond 
the  facty  that  a  certain  event  invariably  and  im- 
mediately follows  another  ;  as  that  if  fire  be 
applied  to  lead — the  solid  becomes  a  fluid. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT.  131 

PREDICATE, 

Is  that  which  is  affirmed  or  denied,  in  a 
proposition,  concerning  its  subject :  as  that — 
Etna  is — a  volcanic  mountain :  or,  Etna  has 
not  lately  vomited Jire. 

PREJUDICE. 

An  opinion  adopted  or  maintained,  without 
proper  regard  to  the  evidence  on  which  it  rests, 
and  especially  if  it  be  adhered  to  under  the  in- 
fluence of  improper  motives,  is  called  a  pre- 
judice, whether  or  not  that  opinion  be  in  itself 
well  founded.  Two  persons  may  believe  the 
same  thing,  or  hold  the  same  opinion,  the  one 
from  rational  conviction,  the  other  from  preju- 
dice. Prejudices  may  be  classed,  according  to 
the  quality  of  motives  from  which  they  spring. 
Of  these  motives,  some  are  of  a  pleasurable,  or 
comparatively  innocent,  or  social  kind ;  while 
others  are  malignant  and  pernicious.  Among 
prejudices  of  the  first  class  may  be  mentioned 
— Those  springing  from  personal  vanity. — 
When  our  own  endowments,  or  qualifications, 
or  acquirements,  or  external  advantages,  are 
placed  in  comparison  with  those  of  others,  the 
emotion  of  self-love  so  much  disturbs  the  judg- 
ment, that  we  are  in  great  danger  of  falling  into 


132 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


133 


egregious  errors  of  estiQiation,  and  often  believe 
those  virtues  or  talents  to  be  splendid,  which  in 
truth  are  only  of  an  ordinary  kind.  There  are 
prejudices  of  the  heart  which  are  rather  w^eak- 
nesses  than  vices.  Thus  the  fondness  of  parents 
for  their  children  leads  them  often  to  overrate 
their  good  qualities,  and  to  be  blind  to  their 
faults.  What  is  called  the  love  of  country,  or 
the  warm  preference  of  the  land  of  our  birth 
to  all  others,  usually  brings  with  it  some  false 
judgments,  which  cannot  be  deemed  better  than 
prejudices.  There  are  prejudices  of  a  more 
indefinite  nature,  though  perhaps  they  may  be 
traced  to  some  modification  of  self-love.  Such 
are  the  capricious  and  fond  preferences  which 
weak  minds  exhibit  tow  ards  things,  persons,  or 
pursuits,  they  have  accidentally  become  attached 
to.  And  such  is  that  eager  fondness  for,  and 
exclusive  attention  to,  frivolous  or  comparatively 
unimportant  amusements,  in  matters  of  science 
or  literature,  which  fill  some  men's  days  with 
laborious  idleness.  So  strong  are  prejudices  of 
this  order,  in  some  cases,  that  the  attainment  of 
a  rare  coin,  or  shell,  or  insect,  or  plant,  for  com- 
pleting a  collection,  or  the  purchase  of  a  scarce 
book,  shall  entirely  engross  the  mind,  and  ap- 
pear a  matter  of  more  grave  importance  than 
the  most  momentous  affairs  of  real  hfe !     Of 


such  pursuits  it  may  be  said,  that  though  they 
seem  innocent,  they  are  not  so,  if  they  with- 
draw the  mind  from  the  offices  of  charity  and 
philanthropy ;  or  render  a  man  useless  in  the 
world,  abounding  as  it  does  with  miseries  that 
might   be    alleviated    by    zeal    and    kindness. 
Prejudices    springing  from   malignant   motives 
have   already  been  referred  to  (see  Opinion)  : 
they  are  always  both  injurious  and  odious  : — 
such  are  those  which   arise  from  the   pride  of 
rank,  wealth,  or  learning  ; — from  capricious  an- 
tipathies   against   individuals  ; — from    personal 
jealousies,    or   opposition    of    interests  ; — from 
party  spirit,  in  matters  of  rehgion,  or  politics; — 
or  from  national,  provincial,  or  corporate  ani- 
mosities.     There    may  indeed    be    something 
amiable  in   the  prejudice  which   impels  a  man 
to  think  that  the  climate,  and  the  produce,  and 
the  institutions  of  his  native  land  are  the  best 
in    the   world;    though  in  fact   they  may  be 
among  the  worst.     But  the  prejudice  which 
leads  an  Englishman  to  hate,  or  to  hold  in  con- 
tempt, an  American  or  a  German,  is  altogether 

vicious. 

Candor  may  be  defined  as  a  w^illingness  to 
revise  or  examine  our  opinions,  on  subjects  in 
reference  to  which  we  are  exposed  to  the  influ- 
ence of  some  improper  motive,  and  hkely,  there- 


134 


ELEMENTS      OF      Tli  OUGHT. 


fore,  to  entertain  a  prejudice.  False  candor  is 
— a  prejudice,  against  prejudice.  That  is  to 
say,  it  is  such  a  feeble  and  foolish  jealousy  of 
being  influenced  by  prejudices,  as  prevents  our 
making  a  decided  choice  between  truth  and 
error. 

PREMISES, 

Things  laid  down,  or  aflirmed  as  known,  or 
granted,  from  which  some  conclusion  is  to  be 
derived: — as  thus,  1st,  If  all  men,  without  re- 
straint, pursue  their  private  advantage,  there 
can  be  no  security  of  life  or  property  to  any. 
2d,  But  if  there  be  no  security  to  life  or  pro- 
perty, there  will  be  no  industry.  3d,  And 
if  there  be  no  industry,  men  must  remain 
in  a  savage  state.  4th,  Therefore  some 
form  of  government,  which  shall  have  the 
power  to  restrain  the  cupidity  or  ferocity  of 
individuals,  is  necessary  to  civilization.  In  this 
argument  the  three  first  propositions  are  the 
premises,  and  arc  assumed  as  facts,  or  principles 
that  will  not  be  denied ;  the  4th  proposition  is 
the  conclusion,  which  must  be  granted,  because 
of  its  evident  connexion  with  the  premises. 

PRIMARY  and  SECONDARY  QUALITIES 

Are   distinguished    on   the   supposition  that 
certain  properties  are  inseparable  from  a  sub- 


^»^<^^^^^^.^^SJH^^i*^^fc^^l«^^^^ni^^».^^^»i^l^^l^^^^^»«.>.^«>^ 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


135 


Stance  ;  or  that  the  want  of  any  one  of  them 
would  destroy  its  essence;  while  other  qualities 
may  be  thought  of  as  present,  or  absent,  without 
affecting  the  nature  of  the  thing. — Thus  exten- 
sion and  solidity  are  called  primary  qualities  of 
matter : — color,  flavor,  fragrancy,  are  secondary. 
These  distinctions  are  of  little  importance. 

PRINCIPLE, 

From  2)rincipium,  a  beginning.  The  ele- 
ments, or  the  most  important  qualities,  or  parts 
of  a  substance,  are  called  its  principles  ;  w^ience 
its  other  properties  take  their  rise.  The  princi- 
ples of  a  science,  are  those  axioms,  or  great 
facts,  which,  though  not  always  first  discovered, 
are  first  to  be  learned,  and  which,  when  under- 
stood, lead  the  way  to  the  comprehension  of  all 
the  branches  of  a  science. 


PROBABILITY. 

This  word,  though  a  higher  sense  is  often 
attached  to  it,  represents  only  the  extent  of  our 
ignorance,  either  of  the  causes  which  will  in- 
fluence some  future  event,  or  of  the  actual  facts 
of  some  past  event,  affirmed  or  surmised  to 
have  taken  place.  Our  ignorance  leads  us  to 
think  of  facts  as  being  in  themselves,  more  or 


Sm'^,^^^^^^^l^r^^^^f^^^l0^^l^^l^t0^0t 


136 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


less  certain :  but  this  is  a  mere  prejudice  of  the 
understanding.       Historical     affirmations    are 
either  true  or  false,  absolutely :  yet,  when  not 
incontestably  established,  it  is  usual  to  speak  of 
them  in  some  such  terms  as  these. — We  say, 
for  example — It  is  probable  that  the  temple  of 
Belus  was  founded  on  the  site  of  the  tower  of 
Babel. — It  is  highly  probable  that  Plato   had 
perused  some  parts  of  the  Hebrew  Scriptures. 
— There  is  a  slight  probability  in  the  conjec- 
ture that  the  Egyptian  pyramids  were  built  by 
the  enslaved  Israelites. — It  is  in  the  highest  de- 
gree probable,  that  the  planets   are  inhabited. 
Or  w^e  speak  of  events  now  occurring  at  a  dis- 
tance,  in    a   similar   manner;  and   say — It  is 
probable  that  my  friend  has  already  left  his  home, 
and  is  on   his  way  to  pay  me  a  visit. — Or  of 
future  events  in  the  same  terms — It  is  probable 
that  a  communication  may  one  day  be  opened 
through    the    Isthmus    of    Suez,   between  the 
Mediterranean  Sea  and  the  Red  Sea.     Now 
all  these  propositions,  whether  they  relate  to 
the  past  or  the  future,  are  absolutely  true,  or 
absolutely  false. — Degrees  of  probability  belong 
altogether  to  the  degree,  or  extent,  of  our  know- 
ledge of  the  facts  (in  past  events)  or  of  the 
causes  that  are  to  influence  w  hat  is  yet  future. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


137 


PROPOSITION, 

The  affirming  or  denying  of  one  thing,  con- 
cerning another — Every  complete  sentence  is 
a  proposition,  directly  or  obliquely  declaring 
some  truth ;  and  every  such  sentence  contains 
— 1st,  A  subject ; — or  that  concerning  which 
an  affirmation  is  advanced  :  2d,  A  predicate,  or 
truth  afiirmed ;  and  3d,  A  form  of  connexion 
between  the  two,  called  a  copula :  as  thus. — 
(The  sun)  (is)  (risen).  Or,  The  people  of 
India  {the  subject)  are  {the  copuhi)  divided  into 
castes  {the  predicate).  An  argument,  or  chain 
of  reasoning,  consists  of  a  series  of  propositions, 
each  of  which,  after  the  first,  is  true,  because^ 
the  one  which  precedes  it  is  true.  Every  pre- 
ceding proposition  in  an  argument,  contains^ 
or  is  alleged  to  contain,  its  successor. 


REASON 

Has  already  been  distinguished  from  Instinct. 
It  is  distinguished  from  the  other  faculties  of  the 
mind  by  its  relating  always  to  knowledge,  and 
consisting  in  the  action  of  the  mind  upon  its 
knowledge  ;  either  separating  its  ideas,  or 
notions,  one  from  another;  or  comparing  or 
combining  them.  If  the  mind  constantly 
obeyed  external  impulses,  or  invariably  yielded 


139 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


ELEMENTS      OP      THOUGHT. 


139 


itself  to  the  current  of  its  ideas,  it  would  not 
deserve  to  be  called — an  intelligence,  or  a  ra- 
tional nature.  Its  power  over  itself,  a  power 
directed  hy  knowledge,  and  employed  for  the 
accomplishment  of  some  purpose  foreseen,  is 
what  constitutes  Reason. 


REASONING, 

In  the  acquired  sense  of  the  word,  is  not 
any  employment  of  Reason  ;  hut  that  particular 
employment  which  has  for  its  object  the  dis- 
covery of  truth,  by  tracing  the  connexion  of  one 
admitted  fact  with  another,  through  a  longer  or 
a  shorter  series  of  propositions.  In  a  sound 
argument,  that  is  to  say,  in  conclusive  reasoning, 
the  predicate  of  each  proposition  must  be  true 
of  its  subject ;  and  the  connexion  between  the 
successive  propositions  must  be  truly  stated. 
If  this  be  the  case,  then  the  last  proposition, 
for  the  sake  of  establishing  ichich  the  process 
has  been  passed  through,  may  be  assented  to  as 
certain.  Such  processes  of  reasoning  become 
necessary  only  on  account  of  the  limitation  of 
the  human  mind,  which  docs  not  admit  more 
than  a  very  few  facts  to  be  contemplated  at 
once.  The  more  vigorous  and  comprehensive 
any  mind  is,  the  less  need  it  has  of  reasoning, 


to  reach  a  distant  conclusion.  On  the  contrary, 
a  feeble  and  contracted  mind  must,  as  it  were, 
creep  from  point  to  point,  of  an  argument ;  and 
when  it  has  reached  the  termination,  it  lias  per- 
haps lost  its  hold  of  the  connexion  of  facts,  and  is 
rather  so  much  the  more  perplexed,  than  con- 
vinced, by  its  own  effort  to  attain  the  desired 
conclusion.  But  much  facility  may  be  acquired 
in  reasoning,  by  exercise ;  and  this  sort  of  ex- 
ercise ought  to  form  a  capital  part  of  eve^y  good 
education. 

The  real  nature  of  the  operation  w^hich  is 
passed  through,  in  a  process  of  reasoning,  may 
be  exhibited  by  dissecting,  if  we  may  so  speak, 
the  working  of  an  easy  arithmetical  problem. — 
I  affirm,  for  instance,  that  if  you  take  432,  nine 
times  over,  you  will  have  3888. — This  is  my 
ultimate  proposition,  which  I  assume  as  true, 
and  profess  to  be  able  to  establish.  I  do  so,  by 
presenting  to  you  a  number  of  lesser  proposi- 
tions, the  truth  of  which  you  have  either  already 
ascertained,  or  which  you  can  peixeive  to  be  true, 
as  soon  as  presented  to  you :  and  then,  when 
all  these  propositions  are  taken  together,  or 
summed  up  in  succession ; — that  is  to  say,  when 
the  connexion  between  all  of  them  is  exhibited, 
you  cannot  refuse  your  assent  to  my  conclusion. 
— As  thus, — The  figures   432   represent,  in  a 


140 


ELEMENTS   OF  THOUGHT 


ELEMENTS   OF  THOUGHT. 


141 


condensed     form,     three     distinct    quantities  ; 
namely,  four  hundred,  and  thirty,  and  two.     We 
will    therefore   separately  take    each  of   these 
quantities  nine  times,  and  then  join  the  several 
products  : — 2,  nine  times  taken,  is  18  :  and  30, 
nine  times,  is  270  :— but  270,  and  18,  are  288. 
Again  ;  400,   nine    times   taken,  is  3600 ;  and 
3600,  added  to  288,  is  3888  ;  which  was  at  first 
affirmed.     Now,  if  any  one  were  not  convinced 
of  tiie  truth  of  this  affirmation,  as  thus  proved, 
it  would  be  necessary,  in  the  first  place,  to  dis- 
sect each  of  the  above-named  propositions  fur- 
ther; that  is,   to  reduce  each  one  to  several 
smaller  propositions,  the  truth  of  whicli  might 
be  more  readily  perceived  ; — as  for  instance,  we 
should  show  how  2,  nine  times,  makes  18,  &c. 
And  after  this  more  minute  dissection  had  been 
gone  through,  we  should  explain   the  general 
principle  of  the  argument ;  by  proving  that  all 
the  parts  of  a  thing,  taken  together,  must  be 
reckoned  equal   to   the  whole  of  it  ;  and  that 
therefore  the  summing  up  of  all  the  propositions, 
must  give  a  true  result.     It  is  often  necessary, 
after  a  particular  argument  has  been  brought  to 
a  conclusion,  to  go  back,  in  this  manner,  to  a 
more  general  argument ;  for  the  purpose  of  jus- 
tifying the  mode  of  conducting  it. 

But  whatever  may  be  the  subject  of  reason- 


ing, or  whatever  xh^form  it  is  made  to  assume, 
it  is  always,  in  substance,  the  same,  namely — a 
showing,  in  succession,  all  the  lyarts  of  a  com- 
plex proposition,  and  all  the  connexions  of  those 
parts.  It  is  obvious  to  remark,  that  an  immea- 
surable advantage  rests  on  the  side  of  vigorous 
and  practised  minds,  over  the  feeble  and  un- 
taught : — for  the  very  necessity  of  examining, 
one  by  one,  all  the  minute  parts  of  a  proposi- 
tion, adds  so  much  to  the  labor  of  the  mind, 
and  so  much  increases  the  apparent  confusion, 
that  the  weaker  understanding  is  almost,  or  quite, 
as  much  embarrassed  as  aided  by  the  endeavor 
to  attain  satisfaction.  Meanwhile,  the  strong 
and  well-taught  mind,  which  has  discerned  the 
truth  of  the  proposition  in  two  or  three  large 
masses,  if  we  might  so  speak,  and  has  not  de- 
scended to  the  lesser  particulars,  suffers  no 
fatiiruc,  is  conscious  of  no  confusion  :  but  con- 
templates,  at  leisure,  what  has  exhausted  all  the 
powers  of  the  other  to  reach.  Hence  we  may 
infer  the  serious  responsibility  which  rests  upon 
superior  minds,  in  dealing  with  the  simple  and 
uninformed. — How  careful  should  such  be  not 
to  abuse  the  advantage  they  possess ; — an  ad- 
vantage which  there  are  always  so  many  temp- 
tations to  abuse  !  It  would  be  thought  a  poor 
triumph  for  an  adult  to  exhibit  his  strength  in 


i^BI 


142 


ELEMENTS  OF  THOUGHT. 


crushing  an  infant.  And  is  it  not  a  paltry 
triumph  which  men  of  intellectual  acuteness 
obtain,  when  they  employ  their  powers  of  rea- 
soning to  mislead  and  confound  the  uninformed 
by  specious  sophisms  ? 

RELATION. 

That  which  gives  rise  to  a  comparison  be- 
tween two  things,  and  which  leads  us  hence- 
forward to  think  of  each,  not  as  if  alone,  but 
as  if  connected  with  the  other,  though  in  truth 
there  is  no  other  connexion  than  what  has  been 
formed  in  our  own  minds.  Tf  we  think  of  a 
house  as  high,  it  is  because  we  have  (mentally 
at  least)  compared  it  with  one  not  so  high. — 
There  exists  in  our  mind  a  relation  of  ine- 
quahty  between  the  two  houses.  If  we  see 
these  two  lines, 


we  can  hardly  avoid  comparing  xhem,  first,  in 
regard  to  their  length ;  and  we  perceive  them 
to  be  equal:  or,  in  other  words,  they  are  related 
to  each  other  by  their  equality  in  length.  We 
then  think  of  their  position,  one  to  the  other; 
and  perceiving  that  they  are  equally  distant, 
from  end  to  end,  we  say  they  are  parallel  lines. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


143 


— Now  this  word  parallel  represents  nothing 
that  actually  exists,  or  that  can  be  shown  in 
either  of  the  lines ;  but  it  declares  the  notion 
the  mind  has  formed  of  their  relation,  one  to 
the  other,  of  equal  distance,  at  all  points. 

A  very  large  proportion  of  all  our  abstract 
notions  are  relations : — that  is,  the  result  of  some 
coniparison  between  two  things,  or  notions ;  as 
for  example. — Truth  is  a  relation  of  sameness, 
or  agreement,  between  an  affirmation,  and  the 
thing  spoken  of.  Value,  or  worth,  is  a  relation 
of  equality,  between  one  mode  of  employing  or 
consuming  a  commodity,  and  another  mode. 
In  analysing  relative  notions,  we  have  first  to 
ascertain  what  the  two  things  are  which  are 
supposed  to  be  compared ;  and  then,  what  is 
the  proportion  which  the  one  bears  to  the  other. 

SENSATION— «<?«  PERCEPTION. 

Is  the  mere  effect  produced  upon  the  mind, 
through  the  senses,  by  some  external  object. 
The  construction  of  the  organs  of  sensation — 
the  eye — the  ear — the  palate,  &c.  may,  to  a 
certain  extent,  be  understood,  and  laid  open  ; 
and  again  we  may  examine  our  consciousness, 
and  distinguish  one  kind  of  sensation  from 
another ;  but  we   are  utterly  ignorant  of   the 


144 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


reason  of  the  connexion  between  the  falling  of 
light  upon  the  retina  of  the  eye,  and  the  sensa- 
tion produced  on  the  mind  thereby.  It  is,  how- 
ever, certain,  that  it  is  the  mind,  not  the  body, 
which  feels  and  perceives ;  and  it  may  well  be 
imagined  that  the  organs  of  sensation  are,  in 
fact,  limitations  of  the  sensitiveness  of  the  mind  ; 
or  are  the  means  of  the  confinement  of  its  uni- 
versal faculty  of  seeing,  hearing,  tasting,  &c.  to 
a  particular  spot  or  portion  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem. It  may  be  conceived,  that  if  the  nerves 
of  the  hand,  for  instance,  were  exposed  to  the 
impression  of  light,  in  the  same  degree  as 
they  are  upon  the  retina,  that  we  should  see 
there,  as  well  as  in  the  eye ; — and  the  same  of 
the  other  senses.  We  may  then  imagine  that 
the  mind,  if  separated  entirely  from  the  body, 
or  set  free  from  all  limitation,  would,  by  its 
proper  and  uniform  sensibility,  perceive  inces- 
santly all  external  objects.  This  supposition  is 
at  least  as  probable  as  that  the  being  which,  in 
the  body,  perceives,  should  lose  its  sensibility 
when  separated  from  it.  Nor  is  it  improbable 
that  the  dissolution  of  the  body  may  set  the 
spirit  free  to  perceive  some  new  qualities  of  the 
external  world. 


■ 


I 


ij 

III 
It 


ELEMENTS      OP      THOUGHT.  145 

SIGNS, 

Are  not  resemblances,  or  images  of  things, 
but  sounds  or  marks,  associated  by  inere  usage 
in    the    mind,  with  certain   ideas   or   notions. 
This  use  of  arbitrary  signs,   connected  as  it  is 
with  the  power  of  giving  modulations  to  the 
voice,  and  subserving,  as  it  does,  the  faculty  of 
abstraction,  not  only  affords  the  means  of  inter- 
course between  man  and  man ;  but  is  the  great 
instrument  of  all  intellectual  operations,  and  the 
principal  means  of  all  improvement. — The  use 
of  signs  may  be  taken   as   the   distinguishing 
difference  between  man  and  the  inferior  tribes. 
Whether  it  he  possible  to  think  or  reason  at  all 
concerning  abstract  notions  without  the  use  of 
words,  may  be  questioned  ;  but  it  is  certain  that 
words  facilitate,  and  abbreviate,  ^mdjix  the  pro- 
cesses of  thought   in    an    incalculable   degree. 
This  must  be  allowed,  although  it  were  granted, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  words  are  a  very  im- 
perfect instrument  of  mental  operations,  and  that 
they  convey  abstract  notions,  and  mental  facts, 
very  vaguely,  and  often  erroneously. 

Let  any  one  attempt  to  think  without  a 
mental  reference  to  words,  and  he  will  find  how 
much  (though  unconsciously)  he  is  ordinarily 
indebted  to  them. 


146 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


If  there  had  been  but  one  language  in  the 
world,  and  that  language  permanent  from  age 
to  age,  it  would  have  been  very  difficult,  per- 
haps impossible,  not  to  have  supposed  that  there 
is  a  real  connexion  between  certain  sounds,  and 
the  things  of  which  they  are  the  signs.  But 
the  diversity  of  languages  enables  us  readily  to 
perceive  that  all  signs  are  purely  arbitrary,  and 
that  man  means  man,  only  hy  usage ;  for  after 
crossing  a  channel  or  a  river,  we  find  that 
Jiomme  means  man ; — or  homo  ;  or  av^pwro?. 
The  diversity  of  language  though  attended 
with  many  inconveniences,  has  unquestionably 
operated  to  set  the  human  mind  free  from  what 
would  otherwise,  probably,  have  been  a  sort  of 
despotism  of  words  over  ideas,  and  notions,  and 
opinions.  This  diversity  has,  without  depriving 
us  of  the  usefulness  of  language,  as  an  instru- 
ment of  thought,  enabled  us  to  use  \i  freely,  and 
independently — as  a  mere  instrument,  and  no- 
thing more. 

SOPHISM, 

From  tfo^pitffjLa,  a  device,  or  fraudulent  contriv- 
ance.  Though  any  sort  of  false  and  specious 
argument  is  sometimes  called  a  sophis?n,  the 
epithet  is  most  properly  applied  to  those  falla- 
cious reasonings  which  are  constructed  for  the 


t  m 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


147 


purpose  of  recommending  error ;  and  which  he 
who  employs  them  strives  to  shield  from  ex- 
amination, by  subtilty,  and  the  ambiguity  of 
language.  In  books  of  logic  are  to  be  found 
methodical  descriptions  of  the  various  sorts  of 
sophisms,  together  with  rules,  which  may  fur- 
nish aid  in  detecting  the  lurking  error  of  all 
such  fallacious  arguments.  But,  however  good 
these  rules  may  be,  it  requires  much  attention, 
and  some  acuteness,  as  well  as  frequent  exercise 
in  disputation,  to  make  any  practical  use  of 
them,  or  to  retain  in  the  memory  the  abstract 
distinctions  on  which  they  are  founded.  In- 
stead of  attempting,  in  this  place,  to  give  a 
summary  of  any  such  rules,  two  or  three  plain 
directions  and  hints  are  offered,  which  may 
serve  to  secure  the  mind  against  the  danger  of 
having  important  principles  overthrown  by  the 
craft  of  disingenuous  wranglers. 

1st.  A  sophistical  argument  is  very  commonly 
expressed  in  a  style  of  affected  nicety,  and  of 
refined  precision.  The  sophist  will  seldom 
consent  to  state  his  reasons  in  any  other  terms 
than  those  he  has  artfully  selected.  But  sub- 
stantial and  important  truths,  as  they  are  always 
independent  of  words,  may  be  conveyed,  with 
nearly  equal  advantage,  in  several  forms  of  ex- 
pression ;  and  an  honest  reasoner,  if  indeed  he 
understands  what  he  advances,  will,  if  he  fails 


^^i^W^^'w'^M' 


148 


■■  JN^^^^^^  ^•^i<rf'>^S>^^<^^>.^ 


***^^*   »^»»,»j>^^»^^^  — ^^.— ,g-^j^^—  ^— ^^^j—j-^ j-,_^ j^_p 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


149 


to  make  himself  intelligible  in  one  mode,  readily 
find  another,  and  yet  another  set  of  phrases, 
until  his  proposition,  whether  true  or  false, 
stands  out  fairly  in  the  light.  Whoever  sus- 
pects that  an  argument  which  he  finds  it  diffi- 
cult to  overthrow,  is  sophistical,  may  well 
demand  that  it  should  be  presented  to  him 
in  another  form  of  expression ;  and  that  no 
stress  should  be  laid  upon  certain  words  ; 
especially  if  they  are  of  an  abstruse  or  ambi- 
guous kind. 

2d.  Sophistical  reasoning,  if  not  subtile  and 
nice,  is  often  bold,  abrupt,  and  dogmatical,  and 
affects  to  force  assent,  by  the  power  of  demon- 
stration ;  and  that  too  on  subjects  which  do 
not  admit  of  demonstrative  reasoning. 

Now,  as  a  defence  against  this  sort  oi  vio- 
lence, or  tyranny,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind, 
especially  when  questions  are  discussed  which 
have  long  been  matters  of  controversy,  that  if 
these  pretended  demonstrations  were  indeed 
sound  and  good — if  they  were  as  conclusive  as 
they  may  seem  to  be,  to  those  to  whom  they 
are  netc,  they  would  long  ago  have  brought 
the  controversv  to  a  conclusion,  and  have  com- 
pelled  the  assent  at  least  of  all  intelligent  and 
honest  men.  Demonstrative  reasoning  either 
supersedes  all  other  arguments ;  or  it  is  utterly 
useless.     It  is  good  for  e7iery  thing,  or  good  for 


W 


( 


nothing.  Of  this  sort,  for  example,  is  the  brief 
method  which  has  often  been  resorted  to  for 
the  purpose  of  disproving  the  Christian  miracles. 
— All  our  knowledge,  it  is  said,  is  drawn  from 
experience : — we  nmst  therefore  always  be 
guided  by  our  experience,  in  what  we  believe, 
or  disbeheve.  Now  it  is  contrary  to  our  expe- 
rience that  the  dead  should  return  to  life,  or 
that  cripples  should  be  made  to  walk,  by  a  word. 
But  on  the  contrary,  it  is  agreeable  to  experi- 
ence that  men  should  invent  and  propagate 
marvellous  tales. —  Therefore,  it  is  reasonable  to 
suppose  the  narratives  of  the  Evangelists  to  be 
fabrications.  If  this  demonstration  were  a 
sound  one,  it  would  not  only  destroy  our  belief 
in  Christianity,  but  put  an  end  to  all  science, 
and  give  the  lie  to  the  greater  part  of  history ; 
for  it  would  make  it  unreasonable  to  believe 
any  thing  of  which  we  had  not  some  personal 
knowledge.  As  when  a  native  of  northern 
climates  declares,  to  the  inhabitants  of  some 
tropical  island,  that,  in  his  country,  water  is 
often  as  hard  as  a  stone.  According  to  the 
above  mentioned  sophism,  the  islanders  would 
do  well  to  treat  such  an  account  with  scorn ; 
for  it  contradicts  their  experience,  and  is  far  less 
credible  than  that  travellers  should  relate  fie- 


150 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


tions.     But  \vc  see  that  such  a  rule  would  be 
fallacious. 

3d.  When  sophistical  reasoning  is  neither 
subtile  nor  dogmatical,  it  is  often  flippant  and 
epigrammatic.  This  style  is  adopted  by  those 
who,  being  incapable  of  thinking  vigorously, 
employ  jests  and  irony  to  disguise  the  poverty 
of  their  understandings; — or,  who  having  adopt- 
ed profligate  principles,  which  they  well  know 
will  not  bear  examination,  have  recourse  to  wit, 
as  the  best  weapon  for  keeping  off'  the  attacks 
of  sound  reason.  By  far  the  greater  part  of  all 
that  has  been  written  against  the  Bible,  is 
sophistry  of  this  sort. 

4th.  The  real  question  at  issue  is  often  co- 
vertly taken  for  granted,  in  a  sophistical  argu- 
ment ;  or  is  silently  assumed,  as  a  general  prin- 
ciple, which  no  one  disputes.  A  whimsical 
instance  of  this  sort  is  the  one  which  has  fre- 
quently been  related  of  the  witty  Charles  II. 
who  proposed  it  as  a  grave  question — Why  a 
pail  of  water  weighed  no  more  after  a  fish  was 
put  into  it  than  before  ?  After  much  learned 
controversy  had  taken  place  on  the  subject,  the 
difficulty  was  dispelled  by  simply  denying  the 
assumed  fact.  An  easy  means  of  exposing 
many  sophisms,  is  to  examine,  one  by  one,  the 
propositions   which    are    tacitly   or    obliquely 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


151 


affirmed  in  the  argument.  A  single  w  ord  some- 
times contains  within  it  the  very  point  in  dis- 
pute, by  having  a  double,  or  doubtful  sense. 
Thus  it  niav  be  said — a  virtuous  man  need  not 
trouble  himself  with  matters  of  faith,  or  forms 
of  piety ;  for  virtue  must  ever  be  the  object  of 
the  Divine  favor ;  and  those  who  possess  it  can 
have  nothing  to  fear  in  the  future  life.  The 
questionable  point  is  here  indirectly  affirmed, 
by  calling  a  man  virtuodSy  who  is  destitute  of 
faith  and  piety ;  or  whose  only  virtue  consists 
in  temperance  and  honesty. — We  may  deny 
this  to  be  virtue,  and  then  the  sophism  is  stript 
of  all  appearance  of  force. 

5th.  Sophisms  often  consist  in  assigning  the 
wrons:  cause  of  an  effect,  when  two  causes 
have  become  accidentally  associated.  As  when 
it  is  affirmed  that  Christianity  has  been  the 
cause  of  massacres,  persecutions,  and  sangui- 
nary wars.  It  is  true  that  the  name  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  its  authority,  have  been  used  as  a 
pretext  to  justify  the  ambition  and  cupidity  of 
princes,  or  their  advisers  :  but  it  is  these  malig- 
nant passions,  not  the  Gospel  of  peace,  which 
have  been  the  scourges  of  mankind. 

6th.  Sophisms  consist  sometimes  in  the  use 
of  a  general  principle,  as  if  it  were  universal. 
It  is  perhaps  generally  true,  or  true  to  some  ex- 


152 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


tent,  that  Portuguese  are  perfidious,  Spaniards 
proud,  Italians  revengeful,  &c.,  but  it  is  far  from 
universally  true,  and  nothing  can  be  more  illi- 
beral than  to  assume  the  truth  of  such  proposi- 
tions, in  particular  instances,  without  proof. 
Persons  who  attempt  to  decide  practical  ques- 
tions by  vulgar  maxims,  are  often  in  the  wrong 
on  this  ground.  There  is,  perhaps,  some  ge- 
neral truth  contained  in  certain  popular  apo- 
thegms; but  nothing  that  can  be  confided  in, 
as  a  rule.  Or  the  exceptions  are  quite  as  many 
as  the  instances  in  point.  It  may  be  observed 
that  persons  of  cultivated  minds  and  of  exten- 
sive experience,  sometimes  err  by  placing  too 
little  reliance  upon  general  rules,  which  they 
know  to  be  open  to  many  exceptions ;  while 
on  the  contrary,  uncultivated  minds  make  a 
rude  and  blind  use  of  such  rules,  without  allow- 
ing at  all  for  exceptions. 

It  should  ever  be  kept  in  mind,  that  the 
soundness  of  an  argument  is  not  to  be  esti- 
mated by  our  pei*sonal  ability  to  defend,  or  to 
expose  it.  We  may  be  much  embarrassed,  or 
quite  overthrown  in  our  endeavors  to  establish 
the  principles  we  believe  to  be  true :  and  may 
be  utterly  at  a  loss  to  reply  to  the  objections  of 
those  who  impugn  them.  But  it  by  no  means 
follows  that  those  principles  are  erroneous,  or 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


153 


those  objections  valid.     All  the   difficulty  may 
arise  from  our  particular  ignorance,  or  want  of 
address,  in  argumentation.     There  is  no  de- 
fence against  sophistry  better  than  an  intelli- 
gent modesty.     Indeed,  a  true  firmness  of  mind 
implies  an  habitual  recollection  of  the  hmited 
extent  of  our  powers  and  acquirements  ;  and 
there  is  a  union  of  diffidence  and  of  courage 
which  true  wisdom  approves : — that  is  to  say- 
diffidence  of  ourselves,  and  courage   in    resist- 
ing the  attempts  of  others  to  strip  us,  in  a  mo- 
ment, of  our  principles.     It  rarely  happens  that 
important  truths  are  acquired  in  consequence 
of  disputation.      To  read— to  think — to  con- 
verse calmly  with  the  best  informed  persons  ; 
and,  if  the  matters  in  question  belong  to  reli- 
gion— to  implore  Divine  teaching — these  are 
methods  of  learning  far  more  likely  to  lead  us 
to  truth,  than  to  wrangle  whh  wranglers.     So- 
phistry is  the  common  fruit  of  disputation ;  and 
even  when  our  cause  is  good  we  are  in  danger 
of  falling  into  disingenuous  methods  of  argu- 
ment, if  hardly  pressed  by  an  adversarv,  or  if 
the  temper  be  roused  by  a  sense  of  unfairness 
on  his  side.     Simple  truth  then  not  serving  our 
purpose,  we  turn  to  any  subterfuge  that  may 
offer  itself  at  the  moment. 


154 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


SPACE. 

By  the  diffusion  of  sensation  through  the 
body,  and  by  combining  the  sensations  of  touch 
and  of  sight,  we  acquire  the  notion  of  Exten- 
sion :  if  from  this  notion,  which  is  conjoined 
with  that  of  sohdity,  or  resistance,  we  detach, 
or  abstract,  the  ideas  of  visible  and  tangible 
substance,  the  notion  that  remains  is  signified 
by  the  word  Space, 

SUBJECT, 

In  a  proposition,  is  that,  concerning  which 
the  predicate  is  affirmed,  or  denied.  Or  when 
speaking  of  things,  it  is  that  to  which  some 
quality  that  has  been  mentioned  is  supposed  to 
belon' 


^g- 


SUBSTANCE : 


A  mere  word  of  convenience,  representing 
the  involuntary  notion  that  is  formed  of  a  some- 
thing hidden,  which  supports,  or  sustains  all  the 
qualities  by  which  any  thing  is  made  known  to 
us.  Or  it  may  represent,  abstractedly,  the  most 
inseparable  and  permanent  of  those  qualities. 
Matter  is  called  a  solid,  extended,  and  colored 
substance  :  Mind — a  thinking,  or  rational 
substance. 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


155 


SUCCESSION  OF  IDEAS, 

Is  that  incessant  flow,  or  continuous  move- 
ment of  images,  feelings,  notions,  which  belongs 
to  the  mind,  both  waking  and  sleeping,  and 
which  is  again  and  again  diverted,  interrupted, 
and  controlled,  by  impressions  on  the  senses — 
by  internal  sensations ;  or  by  the  exertion  of 
the  active  power  of  the  mind.  There  are  cer- 
tain principles  which  seem  to  influence  this 
flow  of  ideas,  and  these  are  called  the  laws  of 

ASSOCIATION,  or 


SUGGESTION ; 

That  is  to  say,  whatever  it  is  that  connects 
one  involuntary  thought  with  another  ;  or  causes 
this  image  to  follow  that.  Any  one  who  re- 
traces the  musings  which  have  occupied  him 
in  an  idle  hour,  will  find  that  the  most  incon- 
gruous or  dissimilar  ideas  have  succeeded  each 
other :  and  yet,  if  he  can  distinctly  recollect  the 
train  of  images,  or  feelings,  he  will  discover,  in 
each  instance,  some  trivial  or  incidental  circum- 
stance which  has  served  to  fink  them  together. 
Some  circumstance  of  resemblance,  or  of  dis- 
similarity ; — of  proximity  in  space,  or  time : — 
some   jingle    or   rhythm  of  words  ; — or  some 


156 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


\ 


-II  r-i  ru-iLTii  1-1  raT-ir- ■*-■■"  ■*■-"'■*■  —  ■»-^*--^"*»* 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


157 


unison  of  the  emotions  which  attended  both 

ideas. 

This  principle  of  suggestion  prevails  to  a 

great  extent,  even  when  the  mind  is  in  an  active 
state :— or  there  is,  if  we  might  so  speak,  an 
alternate  regency  of  the  mind,  by  its  involun- 
tary suggestions  and  its  active  power ;  and  in 
the  issue  of  our  meditations,  there  is  commonly 
a  mingling  of  both.     Infirm  minds  are  more 
controlled  by  suggestion,  and  less  by  voluntary 
power.      Strong  and  cultured  minds  are  less 
influenced  by  suggestion,  and  more  by  their 
rational  force.     The  diversities  of  intellectual 
character  take  their  rise  very  much  from  the 
differences  that  exist  in  this  principle  of  sugges- 
tion.    One  man's  thoughts  are  chiefly  suggested 
by  words,  phrases,  and  modes  of   expression, 
that  have  fixed  themselves  in  the    memory  ; 
such   a   one   may  speak   fluently,  and    perti- 
nently, but  will  seldom  or  never  be  profound, 
or   original.       Another    man's    thoughts    are 
suggested  chiefly  by  his  habitual  emotions,  or 
by  what  might   be    called— the   color  of   his 
imagination.— Sentiments  of  benevolence,    or 
anger,  or  contempt;    or  the  love  of  freedom, 
or    the    emotions    of    piety ;— or   impressions 
of   sublimity,    or    ideas  of    beauty,  rule    the 
current    of    his    thoughts,    and    enable    him, 


1  J 


with  vivacity  and  force,  to  bring  forward  such  as 
are  most  proper  for  exciting  similar  emotions  in 
other  men.  But  then  he  will  be  dependent,  for 
his  power  of  speaking  effectively,  upon  the  de- 
gree of  excitement  his  mind  may  happen  to  be 
under.  In  another  mind  perhaps,  external  re- 
semblances, or  casual  analogies,  are  the  ruling 
principles  of  suggestion ;  and  such  will  be  in- 
genious, striking,  witty,  and  see?ningly  original, 
in  their  discourse.  But  if  it  be  the  real  analo- 
gies, and  abstract  qualities  of  things,  that  form 
the  principles  of  suggestion,  they  will  constitute 
the  philosophical  character.  When,  from  a 
man's  ordinary  or  careless  conversation,  the 
particular  law  of  suggestion  in  his  mind  is  dis- 
covered, we  may,  as  if  by  the  use  of  a  key,  un- 
derstand much  of  his  conduct,  and  often  unravel 
his  character ;  and  sometimes  even  anticipate 
what,  in  certain  circumstances,  he  will  say  and 
do.  A  true  knowledge  of  the  law  of  suggestion, 
in  our  otcn  minds,  if  kept  in  view,  will  often 
guard  us  against  the  follies  or  evils  into  which 
we  are  most  prone  to  fall. 

SYLLOGISM, 

From  (fvWoyKfiiog,  a  putting  together  of  reasons. 
An  inference  from  admitted  principles,  or  pre- 


158 


ELEMENTS      OF     THOUGHT. 


mises  (as  they  are  called)  when   expressed  in 
due  form,  is  called  a  syllogism ;  as  thus — 

1.  No  one  who  lives  in  perpetual  fear  can  be 
happy ; 

2.  But  a  miser  lives  in  perpetual  fear: 

3.  Therefore  a  miser  cannot  be  happy. 

If  we  know  concerning  the  ivhole  of  a  thing 
that  it  is  so  and  so  ;  or  not  so ;  we  may  then 
safely  affirm  the  same  of  any  part,  as  thus — 

All  the  space  between  the  hues  A,  B,  C,  is 
green — 

But  the  little  space  d,  is  included  within  the 
lines  A,  B,  C  ; 

Therefore  the  little  space  d,  is  green. 

All  the  artificial  forms  of  the  syllogism,  as  set 
forth  in  books  of  logic,  may  be  reduced  (in  one 
manner  or  another)  to  this  rule ;  and,  for  all 
practical  purposes,  it  is  quite  as  well  to  drop  the 
forfii  of  logical  inference,  and  simply  to  state 
the  inference,  with  an  allusion  to  the  general 
truth,  whence  it  results  as  thus—A  miser  can 
never  be  happy  because  he  lives  in  perpetual 
alarm.  Every  one  well  knows  that  this  state 
of  incessant  trepidation  is  incompatible  with 
happiness ;  nothing  is  gained  by  formally  de- 
claring it. 

In   the  technical  language  of  logic,  the  two 
preceding  propositions  are  called  the  pretnises ; 


Ni*»^^^«^-^»'Si 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


159 


or  the  antecedents :  and  the  first  of  them  the 
major,  the  second  the  minor,  and  the  third  the 
conclusion.  This  method  of  formal  reasonins 
by  syllogism,  was  long  believed  to  be  adapted  to 
the  discovery  of  things  unknown.  But  it  is 
manifest  that  it  can  safely  be  applied  only  to  the 
setting  forth,  distinctly,  of  things  already  known. 
If  the  major  proposition  be  uncertain,  or  if  it 
contains  more  than  we  are  fully  acquainted 
with  ;  or  if  it  be  uncertain  whether  the  minor 
be  properly  a  part  of  the  major,  then  our  con- 
elusion  must  be  also  uncertain  ;  and  if  owing 
to  this  appearance  of  rigid  reasoning,  we  are  in- 
duced to  think  that  to  be  ascertained,  which  in 
fact  is  not  so,  our  logic  serves  only  to  fortify  us 
in  error.  It  was  thus  that  during  many  ages, 
the  most  egregious  errors  in  religion  and  philo- 
sophy, were  held  to  be  unquestionable  truths. 


SYNTHESIS, 

From  (Ti^v^cCi^,  a  putting  together,  is  opposed 
to  Analysis,  which  is  the  separation  of  parts,  or 
elements.  Analysis  is  employed  on  things  un- 
known, for  the  purpose  of  becoming  acquainted 
with  them.  Synthesis  is  employed  on  things 
already  known  by  analysis,  and  which  are  re- 
compounded  for  the  purpose  of  contemplating 


•30 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


them    in    their   symmetry,   and   their   mutual 
relations. 


TERMS 

Of  a  proposition,  are  its  two  ends,  namely  the 
suhjecty  and  the  predicate. 

TESTIMONY, 

Is  the  conveyance  of  facts,  by  speaking  or 
writing,  from  those  who  have  personal  knowledge 
of  them,  to  those  who  have  not :  the  accepting 
of  such  evidence  is  Belief,  (See  Belief  and 
Evidence  )  By  far  the  larger  portion  of  all 
the  evidence  by  which  we  are  directed  in  the 
affairs  of  common  life,  and  almost  the  entire 
mass  of  the  sciences,  and  of  what  is  called 
Learning,  in  its  various  branches,  is  received 
upon  the  faith  of  testimony.  And  in  truth  the 
human  mind  is  so  constituted  as  to  receive,  and 
to  rely  upon  this  sort  of  know  ledge,  with  as 
much  confidence  as  upon  that  w^hich  it  acquires 
by  personal  inspection.  It  is  only  after  having 
found  it,  in  several  instances,  fallacious,  that  we 
learn  to  withhold  our  confidence,  or  to  ask  for 
corroborative  evidence. 

Testimony  may  be  fallacious,  either  in  con- 
sequence of  the  unintentional  error  of  the  wit- 
ness ;  or  in  consequence  of  his  wilful  faUifica- 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT 


161 


tion.  In  estimating  therefore  the  value  of  testi- 
mony, the  process  resolves  itself  into  two 
inquiries. 

1st  Is  the  witness  competent  to  give  evi- 
dence in  the  instance  before  us  1  or  in  other 
words,  had  he  the  means  of  fully  knowing  the 
fact  which  he  reports ; — and  was  that  fact  one 
in  relation  to  which  he  was  likely,  or  not  likely, 
to  be  deceived  ?  As  for  example,  if  a  witness 
declares  that  he  has  been  robbed  and  beaten  on 
the  road ;  this  is  a  matter  concerning  which  he 
could  not  have  been  mistaken  ;  and  if  any  doubt 
rests  upon  the  fact,  it  must  attach  to  his  veracity. 
But  if  he  affirms  that  the  man  whom  now  he 
sees  in  court  was  the  perpetrator  of  the  deed, 
it  is  possible  that,  without  any  design  to  deceive, 
he  may  be  in  error ;  and  especially  so,  if  the 
robbery  took  place  after  sun-set :  on  this  point, 
therefore,  we  are  not  only  to  consider  the  vera- 
city of  the  witness,  but  his  competency  also. 

2d.  If  satisfied  on  these  points,  we  next  con- 
sider the  character  of  the  witness,  or  judge  of 
the  probability  of  his  being  influenced  by  mo- 
tives which  may  lead  him  to  a  falsification  of 
the  fact.  As  for  example,  if  a  man  has  a  great 
interest  at  stake  in  the  determination  of  a  con- 
troversy, there  exists  so  strong  a  probability  that 
he  may  yield  to  the  temptation  to  misrepresent 


162 


ELEMENTS   OF   THOUGHT. 


ELEMENTS   OF   THOUGHT 


163 


the  truth,  that  his  evidence  is  cither  not  asked 
for  at  all,  or  is  received  with  great  caution. 
Tlieveracili/  of  a  witness  is  established  (chiefly) 
in  the  four  methods  following : — 

]st.  His  known  or  ordinary  character  is  ex- 
amined. Character  is  in  fact  the  chief  ground 
of  confidence  in  Testimony.  Falsehood  is  ab- 
horrent to  a  man  of  virtue ;  and  the  cases  are 
extremely  rare  in  which  those  who  possess  a 
well-established  reputation,  as  honest  men,  are 
found  to  forfeit  it,  how  much  soever  their  testi- 
mony may  be  opposed  to  their  personal  inter- 
ests. We  believe  a  friend  of  whose  integrity 
we  have  no  suspicion,  even  when  lie  affirms 
what  may  seem  highly  improbable.  But  a  man 
of  no  character,  or  a  known  liar,  receives 
scarcely  any  credit,  even  on  the  most  ordinary 
occasions.  Our  reliance  upon  character  is  so 
firm,  that  nothing  seems  to  us  so  incredilfle  as  that 
several  men  of  good  understanding,  and  tried 
integrity,  should  concur  in  affirming  an  untruth. 
The  veracity  even  of  men  who  lived  in  distant 
ages  may  safely  and  fairly  be  judged  of,  if  his- 
tory has  recorded  the  general  course  of  their 
conduct;  or  if  their  writings  have  descended 
to  our  times,  and  given,  as  it  were,  a  portrait  of 
their  dispositions  and  principles. 

2d.  We  estimate,  as  far  as  we  have  the  means 


I 


of  doing  so,  what  may  be  called  the  7noral  j^osi- 
tion  of  the  witness,  in  relation  to  the  facts 
of  which  he  speaks: — that  is  to  say,  how 
those  facts,  or  his  testimony  concerning  them, 
affected,  or  was  likely  to  affect,  his  personal 
welfare.  Even  if  we  confide  in  his  character, 
we  shall  feel  a  slight  diminution  of  confidence, 
if  this  evidence  was,  in  its  tendency,  highly  ad- 
vantageous to  the  witness ;  and  on  the  contrary, 
even  if  we  know  nothing  by  other  means  of 
the  character  of  the  witness,  we  shall  readily 
impute  to  him  a  good  character,  if  we  find  him 
persisting  in  testimony  which  immediately  ex- 
posed him  to  peril  or  disadvantage : — and  then, 
if  by  some  indirect  channel,  we  are  assured  of 
his  general  integrity,  it  will  be  scarcely  possible 
to  entertain  a  doubt  of  his  veracity. 

3d.  The  value  of  Testimony  is,  in  most  cases, 
easily  estimated  by  comparing  one  part  of  it 
with  another ;  especially  in  points  of  a  trivial 
or  unimportant  kind.  The  lesser  circumstances 
of  a  story  that  has  been  invented  to  deceive, 
will  seldom  be  found  compatible,  one  with 
another.  Nothing  but  the  real  consistency  of 
truth,  can  give  consistency  to  a  long  relation  of 
facts.  The  minute  particulars  of  place,  and 
time,  and  persons,  and  accidents,  can  never  be  so 
calculated  and  arranged  by  a  fabrication,  as  to 


164 


ELEMENTS   OP   THOUGHT. 


ELEMENTS   OF   THOUGHT. 


165 


remove  every  clew  to  the  detection  of  the 
fraud.  Testimony  that  is  completely  in  ac- 
cordance with  itself,  is  very  rarely  found  to  be 
untrue. 

4th.  Tl>e  conclusive  method  of  detecting  the 
false,  and  ascertaining  the  true,  in  matters  of 
Testimony,  is — The  comparison  of  the  evidence 
of  independent  witnesses.  A  set  of  false  wit- 
nesses, whatever  pains  they  may  take  in  arrang- 
ing their  evidence,  never  fail  to  be  at  fault  in 
some  notable  instance.  And  much  more  is  that 
probability  increased,  if  they  give  their  evidence 
without  previous  concert,  or  in  an  incidental 
manner,  which  admits  of  no  contrivance. 
Again,  if  there  are  witnesses  to  the  same  fact, 
some  of  whom  are  opposed  in  interest  to  others, 
or  who  are  absolutely  unconnected,  one  with 
another,  their  concurrence  must  be  held  to  place 
the  matter  beyond  reasonable  doubt. 

It  is  by  these  methods  that  Testimony  is 
estimated  in  courts  of  justice,  and  that  questions 
of  property  and  of  life,  are  determined: — and  it  is 
by  a  full  and  fair  application  of  the  very  same 
rules  that  the  most  important  of  all  questions 
is  brought  to  an  issue — namely,  that  which  re- 
lates to  the  Truth  of  Christianity.  The  Tes- 
timony which  supports  the  great  facts  recorded 
by  the  Evangehsts  and  Apostles,  is  confirmed 


in  each  of  the  methods  above  mentioned,  and 
by  the  combination  of  them  all.  Indeed  it  may 
boldly  be  affirmed  that  no  fact  whatever,  in 
ancient  history,  is  nearly  so  well  and  fully  at- 
tested as  is  the  Gospel  history.  If  that  history 
is  rejected,  then  not  only  is  all  history  an  illu- 
sion, but  the  entire  system  of  human  affairs  is 
removed  from  its  foundation,  and  no  man  can 
rely  upon  anything  but  what  is  immediately 
present  to  his  senses.  The  young  reader  is  re- 
commended, both  as  an  exercise  of  his  power 
of  investigation,  and  as  a  means  of  establishing 
his  religious  principles,  to  apply  /^r  himself,  the 
preceding  four  rules  to  the  evangelical  history. 
He  will  not  be  at  a  loss  to  obtain  the  informa- 
tion requisite  for  doing  so,  if  he  refers  to  any 
of  the  well-known  works  which  exhibit  at  large, 
the  Christian  Evidences. 

THEORY 

Is  sometimes  distinguished  from  'practice  ;  as 
thinking  differs  from  acting :  or  as  science  differs 
from  art.  But  in  its  strictest  sense,  the  word 
signifies  a  system,  or  set  of  principles,  intended 
to  explain  certain  facts  not  as  yet  confirmed 
by  demonstrative  reasoning.  A  hypothesis  is  a 
single  supposition,  relating  to  the  cause  of  a 


I 


166 


ELEMENTS   OP   THOUGFIT. 


ELEMENTS   OF   THOUGHT. 


167 


particular  effect.  A  theory  is  a  complete  set  of 
suppositions,  comprehending  a  hypothetical  ex- 
planation of  all  the  facts  helonging  to  one  hranch 
of  science.  As  for  example — a  hypothesis  may 
be  advanced  relative  to  the  luminous  stream 
which  attends  a  comet :  or  there  have  been 
several  theories  of  the  heavens,  explaining  all 
the  appearances  and  movements  of  the  hea- 
venly bodies,  on  different  principles,  as  the 
Ptolemaic,  the  Copernican,  and  the  Newtonian. 

TIME, 

Is  duration  measured,  or  divided,  into  equal 
parts ;  as  distance  is  extension,  so  measured. 

TRUTH, 

Is  the  agreement  of  our  notions  with  the 
reality  of  things ;  or  it  is  the  agreement  of  pro- 
positions with  the  notions,  or  things,  or  facts, 
concerning  which  an  affirmation  is  made.  The 
word  truth  is  often  improperly  employed,  in  a 
vague  sense,  as  if  there  were  an  abstract  exist- 
ence, somewhere  to  be  found,  which  is  inde- 
pendent both  of  propositions  and  of  notions. 
But  truth,  as  it  is  an  agreement,  or  a  sameness, 
implies  necessarily,  a  thing,  or  notion  ;  and  a 
representation,  or  affirmation  concerning  it. 


/ 


f 


Truth  in  propositions  does  not  exist,  unless 
the  terms  employed  are  understood  in  the  same 
sense  by  the  speaker,  and  by  the  person  ad- 
dressed. As  well  utter  a  formal  falsehood,  as 
use  a  word  in  a  sense  which  those  to  w  hom  we 
speak  do  not  suppose  us  to  intend. 

In  relation  to  the  truth  of  notions,  or  concep- 
tions, a  distinction  of  some  importance  is  to  be 
observed,  between  a  perfect  and  an  iinpeifect 
agreement  of  our  notions  with  the  things  that 
are  the  objects  of  them.  The  notion  we  form 
of  a  triangle,  and  of  its  properties,  may  be  per- 
fect : — that  is  to  say,  complete  as  well  as  fault- 
less. But  our  notions  of  the  operations  of 
nature — of  the  constitution  of  our  own  minds, 
and  especially  of  the  attributes  of  the  Divine 
Being,  can  never  be  better  than  imperfectly  true : 
— for  our  knowledge  on  these  subjects  is  very 
limited.  The  notion  which  a  child  has  of  the 
moon,  who  w^ould  fain  have  it  given  to  him  as 
a  plaything,  is  altogether  false.  The  notion  of 
the  astronomer,  who  rightly  estimates  its  size 
and  distance,  and  calculates,  with  precision,  its 
movements,  is  true — but  imperfectly  so ;  inas- 
much as  he  knows  little  more  of  the  moon  than 
those  mathematical  facts. 

Such,  too,  arc  the  notions  which  the  chemist 
forms  of  the  properties  of   bodies;    they   are 


166 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


particular  effect.  A  theonj  is  a  complete  set  of 
suppositions,  comprehending  a  hypothetical  ex- 
planation of  all  the  facts  helonging  to  one  hranch 
of  science.  As  for  example — a  hypothesis  may 
be  advanced  relative  to  the  luminous  stream 
which  attends  a  comet :  or  there  have  been 
several  theories  of  the  heavens,  explaining  all 
the  appearances  and  movements  of  the  hea- 
venly bodies,  on  different  principles,  as  the 
Ptolemaic,  the  Copernican,  and  the  Newtonian. 

TIME, 

Is  duration  measured,  or  divided,  into  equal 
parts ;  as  distance  is  extension,  so  measured. 

TRUTH, 

Is  the  agreement  of  our  notions  with  the 
reality  of  things ;  or  it  is  the  agreement  of  pro- 
positions with  the  notions,  or  things,  or  facts, 
concerning  which  an  affirmation  is  made.  The 
word  truth  is  often  improperly  employed,  in  a 
vague  sense,  as  if  there  were  an  abstract  exist- 
ence, somewhere  to  be  found,  which  is  inde- 
pendent both  of  propositions  and  of  notions. 
But  truth,  as  it  is  an  agreement,  or  a  sameness, 
implies  necessarily,  a  thing,  or  notion  ;  and  a 
representation,  or  affirmation  concerning  it. 


/ 


ELEMENTS      OF      THOUGHT. 


167 


Truth  in  propositions  does  not  exist,  unless 
the  terms  employed  are  understood  in  the  same 
sense  by  the  speaker,  and  by  the  person  ad- 
dressed. As  well  utter  a  formal  falsehood,  as 
use  a  word  in  a  sense  which  those  to  whom  we 
speak  do  not  suppose  us  to  intend. 

In  relation  to  the  truth  of  notions,  or  concep- 
tions, a  distinction  of  some  importance  is  to  be 
observed,  between  a  perfect  and  an  impeifect 
agreement  of  our  notions  with  the  things  that 
are  the  objects  of  them.  The  notion  we  form 
of  a  triangle,  and  of  its  properties,  may  be  per- 
fect : — that  is  to  say,  complete  as  well  as  fault- 
less. But  our  notions  of  the  operations  of 
nature — of  the  constitution  of  our  own  minds, 
and  especially  of  the  attributes  of  the  Divine 
Being,  can  never  be  better  than  imperfectly  true : 
— for  our  knowledge  on  these  subjects  is  very 
limited.  The  notion  which  a  child  has  of  the 
moon,  who  would  fain  have  it  given  to  him  as 
a  plaything,  is  altogether  false.  The  notion  of 
the  astronomer,  who  rightly  estimates  its  size 
and  distance,  and  calculates,  with  precision,  its 
movements,  is  true — but  imperfectly  so ;  inas- 
much as  he  knows  little  more  of  the  moon  than 
those  mathematical  facts. 

Such,  too,  are  the  notions  which  the  chemist 
forms  of  the   properties  of   bodies;    they   are 


'■-•'■*  —  —  — —  — '^--^-^-■-^  ■-'^ riTf  j~  '  r 


168 


ELEMENTS     OP     THOUGHT. 


precise  to  a  certain  extent ;  but  beyond  that 
point,  are  vague,  or  erroneous.  It  is  important 
in  all  cases  to  discern,  and  ingenuously  confess, 
the  imperfection  of  our  knowledge.  This  in- 
genuousness is  now  commonly  exercised  in  all 
branches  of  natural  science.  But  in  matters  of 
rehgion  it  is  often  much  wanting,  and  not  a  few 
of  the  controversies  which  divide  the  Christian 
world  would  instantly  disappear,  or  be  held  in 
abeyance,  if  things  which  surpass  the  range  of 
our  conceptions,  or  the  limits  of  our  actual  in- 
formation, were  seen  and  acknowledged  to  be, 
as  they  are,  unknown,  except  so  far  as  the  bare 
affirmation  of  Scripture  offers  them  to  our  as- 
sent, as  facts  partially  revealed.  All  that  is 
imagined,  or  dogmatically  affirmed,  beyond  this 
limit,  is  not  true,  how  nearly  soever  it  may  be 
connected  with  truth ;  but  is  positive  error. 
To  adhere  firmly  to  what  is  known,  and  to 
reject  all  those  surmises  and  inferences  by 
which  the  mind  labors  to  fill  up  the  vacant 
spaces  in  its  systematic  notions,  is  a  prime  part 
of  wisdom. 


THE      END. 


A  CATALOGUE  OF   THE  W^RITINGS  OF 


ISAAC  TAYLOR. 


ANCIENT  CHRISTIANITY,  AND  THE  DOCTRINES  OF 
THE  OXFORD  TRACTS  FOR  THE  TIMES.  Fourth 
Edition,  with  Supplement,  Index,  and  Tables.  2  vols.  8vo., 
pp.  660  and  700.    London.     1844. 

SPIRITUAL  DESPOTISM.  Second  Edition.  8vo.,  pp.  604. 
London.     1836. 

FOUR  LECTURES  ON  SPIRITUAL  CHRISTIANITY, 
delivered  in  the  Hanover  Square  Rooms.  London,  March, 
1841.     12mo.,  pp.  203.    LK>ndon.     1841. 

ELE:MENTS  of  thought  ;  OR,  CONCISE  EXPLANA- 
TIONS,  ALPHABETICALLY  ARRANGED,  OF  THE 
PRINCIPAL  TERMS  EMPLOYED  IN  THE  DIFFER- 
ENT BRANCHES  OF  INTELLECTUAL  PHILOSOPHY. 
Seventh  Edition.    8vo.    London. 

NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  ENTHUSIASM.  Eighth  Edition, 
8vo.    London. 

SATURDAY  EVENING.  Sixth  Edition.  8vo.  London. 
12mo.,  pp.  379. 

HOME  EDUCATION.    London.    1838. 

AN  ESSAY  INTRODUCTORY  TO  A  NEW  EDITION  OF 
PASCAL'S  THOUGHTS. 

THE  WESLEY  AN  METHODIST :  a  Review,  published  in 
the  Edinburgh  Review. 


170  Catalogue  of  the  Writings  of  Isaac  Taylor. 

CHARACTER  ESSENTIAL  TO  SUCCESS  IN  LIFE 
18mo.,  pp.  132.     1836. 

ESSAY  ON  THE  APPLICATION  OF  ABSTRACT  REA- 
SONING IN  THE  CHRISTIAN  DOCTRINE.  Originally 
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pp.  163.     Boston.     1832. 

ANCIENT  CHRISTIANITY,  AND  THE  DOCTRINES  OF 
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1844. 

LOYOLA  AND  JESUITISM  IN  ITS  RUDIMENTS.  12mo., 
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PROCESS  OF  HISTORICAL  TRUTH.    8vo. 

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1) 


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BOOKS 


PUBLISHED   BY 


WILLIAM    GOWANS. 


178  Fulton  Street,  New  York. 


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Plato  s  Phctdon ; 

Or  .1  Dialogue conecrniii};  llic  Immortality  of  tlic  Soul.  Trunslatid 
from  tho,  original  Cireck  by  M.  Dacicr,  with  Notes  ami  Emenda- 
tions. To  which  in  prefixed  a  Life  of  I'lalo.  Hy  Bisiiop  FenekoiN. 
A  new  edition,  to  whieh  is  added,  by  way  of  an  Appendix,  the 
Opinions  of  Ancient,  Intermediate,  and  Modern  Philo.-^ophers  and 
Divines  on  the  Soul's  Immortality  ;  also.  Catalogue  of  Books, 
by  various  authors,  treating  on  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul. 
12mo.,  pp.  238.     $1  25.     1849. 

Ancient  Fragmenfs ; 

Namely: — The  Morals  of  Confucius,  ihc  Chinese  IMiilosophcr  ; 
The  Oracles  of  Zoroaster,  the  founder  of  the  Persian  Magi  ;  San- 
choniatho's  Theology  of  the  Pha^nicians  ;  the  Periplus  of  Hanno, 
the  Carthaginian  Navigator  and  Discoverer;  King  Hiempsal's 
History  of  the  African  Settlements  ;  the  Choice  Sayings  of  Pub- 
lius  Syrus ;  The  Egyptian  Fragments  of  Manelho ;  The  Simili- 
tudes of  Demophitus,  or  Directions  for  the  Proper  Regulation  of 
Life  ;  and  the  Fxcolhuit  Sayings  r.f  the  Seven  Wise  Men  of 
Greeoe.  Tr.iiislaled  ni(u  Knujjsh  by  various  authois.  l:2ii»o., 
pp  298      %\  2.r     183.5 


174 


William  Gowans*  Publications. 


Denton,  Daniel. 

A  Description  of  New  York,  formerly  called  Now  Netherlands, 
with  the  places  thereunto  adjoining.  Likewise  a  Brief  Relation 
of  the  Customs  of  the  Indians  there.  By  Daniel  Denton.  A 
new  edition,  with  an  Introduction  and  copious  Historical  Notes, 
by  Gabriel  Fdrman.    8to.,  pp.  57.    $1  00.     1845. 

Colton,  C.  C — Lacon; 

Or,  Many  Things  in  Few  Words,  addressed  to  Those  Who 
Think.  By  the  Rev.  C.  C.  Colton.  Revised  edition,  with  an 
Index.    8vo.,  pp.  504.    ^  00.     1849. 


The  Same  Work, 

In  one  vol.     12mo.  pp.  504.     $1  25. 


1849. 


Alhjn,  Avery, 


A  Ritual  ol  Freemasonry,  illustrated  by  thirty  engravings.  To 
which  is  added,  a  Key  to  the  Phi  Beta  Kappa,  the  Orange,  and 
Odd  Fellows'  Societies.  With  Notes  and  Remarks.  By  Avery 
Allyn.     12mo.,  pp.  269.     $5  00.     1831. 

California, 

The  Wonder  of  the  Age.  A  book  for  every  one  going  to,  or 
having  an  interest  in  that  Golden  Region ;  being  the  Report  of 
Thomas  Butler  King,  United  States*  Government  Agent  in  and 
for  California,     bvo.,  pp.  34.     12^  cts.     1850. 

Due  de  La  Rochefoucauld. 

Moral  Reflections,  Sentences,  and  Maxims.  Newly  translated 
from  the  French  ;  with  an  Introduction  and  copious  Notes,  and  a 
Life  of  the  Author.  With  an  elegant  steel  Portrait.  To  which 
is  added  the  Moral  Sentences  and  Maxims  of  the  good  Stanislaus, 
King  of  Poland.  Also  a  Catalogue  of  all  the  Books  written  on 
Proverbs,  Maxims,  Sayings,  Sentences,  Apothegms,  Similitudes, 
&c.,  &,c.     12mo.,  pp.  210.     $1  25. 

Taylor,  Isaac, 

Elements  of  Thought ;  or,  Concise  E.xplanations  {alphabeticaUy 
nrrnn^ed)  ;  or,  the  Piincipal  Terni.s  Employed  in  tlie  InUllecluul 
Philoauphy.     li»mo.,  pp.  ItiO.     $100. 


William  Gowans'  Publications, 


175 


Taylor,  Isaac. 

Physical  Theory  of  Another  Life.     To  which  is  added  a  Cata- 
logue of  all  the  authored  writings.     12mo.,  pp.  278.    $1  25. 


The  following  Books  are  in  preparation,  and  will  he  Pub- 
lished  during  the  Present  Year : — 


Mourt,  G. 

A  Relation  or  Journal  of  the  Beginning  and  Proceeding  of  the 
English  Plantation  settled  at  Plymouth,  in  New  England.  A  new 
edition,  with  Notes  Historical  and  Biographical.  By  William 
Thaddeus  Harris.    8vo. 

Millar,  John. 

A  Description  of  the  Province  and  City  of  New  York,  with  Plans 
of  the  City  and  several  Forts,  as  they  existed  in  the  year  1695. 
By  the  Rev.  John  Millar.     To  which  will  be  added  Notes, 
illustrative  of  the  History  of  the  Progress  of  the  City  and  State  of 
New  York  to  the  Present  Time.     8vo. 

Abelard  and  Heloise. 

The  Lives,  Loves,  Letters,  and  Misfortunes  of.  With  a  consider- 
able amount  of  new  matter,  not  heretofore  published.  Also,  the 
Poetical  Versions  of  these  celebrated  Letters,  by  Pope,  Madden, 
Cawthorne.  and  others.     12mo. 

Tannahill,  Robert,  Poems  and  Plays  of. 

Poems,  Songs,  and  Plays,  chiefly  in  the  Scottish  Dialect.  By 
Robert  Tannahill.  With  Notices  respecting  the  Life  of  the 
Author,  and  Criticisms  upon  his  Writings,  by  Ramsay.     12mo. 

Ramsay,  Allen,     The  Gentle  Shepherd: 

A  Pastoral  Comedy,  in  Five  Acts.  To  which  will  be  added  the 
Life  of  the  Author,  and  a  Catalogue  of  all  the  Scottish  Poets. 
12mo. 


176 


William  Gowans'  Publications. 


Coleridge,  S.  T. 

Biographia  Literaria ;  or,  Biographical  Sketches  of  My  Literary 
Life  and  Opinions.  From  the  Second  London  Edition.  Pre- 
pared for  Publication  in  part  by  H.  N.  Coleridge.  2  vols,  thick 
13mo. 

Goodwin,  Thomas. 

A  Child  of  Light  Walking' in  Darkness:  a  Treatise  showing 
the  Causes,  Circumstances,  and  Purposes  for  which  God  leaves 
his  Children  to  Distress  of  Conscience.  With  Directions  how  to 
Walk  so  as  to  be  relieved  from  such  a  Condition.  To  which  is 
added,  a  Child  of  Darkness  Walking  in  Light.  Also,  a  Life  of 
the  Author,  and  a  Catalogue  of  all  his  Writings.  12mo.,  pp. 
275. 

Burnet,  Gilbert  (Bishop  of  Saru?n). 

A  Discourse  on  the  Pastoral  Care,  reprinted  from  the  Author's 
latest  edition,  and  now  carefully  revised,  with  Notes  and  Refe- 
rences to  the  Fathers,  and  a  Prefatory  Address  by  Thomas 
Dale.  To  which  will  be  added  a  Life  of  the  Author,  and  a 
Complete  Catalogue  of  all  his  writings.     12nio.,  pp.  206. 


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